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Abstract 
 
This dissertation is a meta-critical inquiry into the foundations of evaluative criteria in 
rhetorical criticism. Where do these criteria come from, and how can their appropriateness 
be justified? In order to answer these questions, the dissertation investigates and discusses 
historical, theoretical/methodological, and analytical issues. The historical part focuses 
on the decline of evaluative rhetorical criticism in the twentieth century. Through a read-
ing of a number of seminal rhetorical texts going back to Herbert A. Wichelns, the case 
is made that a conception of rhetorical criticism without evaluation as its main purpose 
arose around 1970. This decline is explained with reference to the counterculture of the 
1960s and simultaneous increase in demand for scholarly rigor. Further it is argued that 
these developments should not necessarily lead to a decrease in scholarly attention to 
evaluative rhetorical criticism, not least because it has its own raison d’être which sup-
plements that of analytical/explanatory criticism. In the theoretical/methodological part 
of the dissertation, it is hypothesized that the notion of function may be able to explain 
the origin and appropriateness of evaluative criteria in rhetorical criticism, and it is argued 
that rational reconstruction may be a means of analyzing and illustrating how the notion 
of function is operative among evaluative rhetorical critics. Finally, in the analytical part 
of the dissertation, rational reconstruction is used to explicate how four evaluative critics 
(Wichelns, Auer, Kock, Patterson) rely on the notion of function to reason about the qual-
ity of rhetoric and argumentation and derive and justify evaluative criteria. In this way, 
the dissertation aims to contribute historical, theoretical/methodological and analytical 
insights to an arguably neglected part of rhetorical criticism, namely the evaluative di-
mension. 
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Resumé 
 
Denne afhandling er en meta-kritisk undersøgelse af grundlaget for vurderingskriterier i 
retorisk kritik. Hvor kommer kriterierne fra, og hvordan kan deres hensigtsmæssighed 
underbygges? For at besvare disse spørgsmål undersøger og diskuterer afhandlingen hi-
storiske, teoretiske/metodiske og analytiske problemstillinger. Den historiske del af af-
handlingen handler om det tyvende århundredes tilbagegang i vurderende retorisk kritik. 
Gennem læsning af en række retoriske nøgletekster fra Herbert A. Wichelns og frem ar-
gumenteres der for, at idéen om retorisk kritik uden vurdering som hovedformål vandt 
indpas omkring 1970. Tilbagegangen forklares med henvisning til 1960ernes modkultur 
og et samtidigt øget krav om akademisk stringens. Det fremføres videre, at disse faktorer 
ikke nødvendigvis bør føre til et formindsket fokus på vurderende retorisk kritik, bl.a. 
fordi denne form for kritik har sin egen eksistensberettigelse, der komplementerer den 
analytiske/forklarende retoriske kritik. I den teoretiske/metodiske del af afhandlingen fo-
reslås, at begrebet ’funktion’ kan forklare oprindelsen og hensigtsmæssigheden af vurde-
ringskriterier i retorisk kritik, og det fremføres at rationel rekonstruktion er et egnet red-
skab til at vise, hvordan funktionsbegrebet anvendes af vurderende retoriske kritikere til 
netop dette formål. I den analytiske del af afhandlingen ekspliciteres gennem rational 
rekonstruktion, hvordan fire forskellige vurderende kritikere (Wichelns, Kock, Auer, Pat-
terson) baserer deres vurderingstænkning på fire forskellige funktionsbegreber, som de 
anvender til at opstille og underbygge hensigtsmæssigheden af vurderingskriterier for re-
toriske artefakter. På denne måde sigter afhandlingen mod at bidrage til at besvare cen-
trale spørgsmål om den underbelyste vurderende dimension af retorisk kritik gennem hi-
storiske, teoretiske/metodiske og analytiske indsigter. 
v 
Contents 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements ii 
Abstract iii 
Resumé iv 
1. INTRODUCTION	 1 
Three reasons motivating the inquiry 2 
Chapter overview 5 
 
PART ONE: HISTORY 
2. TRACING	THE	DECLINE	OF	THE	EVALUATIVE	DIMENSION	 10 
Did the evaluative dimension decline in the twentieth century? 11 
The role of evaluation in rhetorical criticism from 1925—1950 13 
The role of evaluation in rhetorical criticism from 1950—1960 16 
The role of evaluation in rhetorical criticism from 1960—1970 20 
The role of evaluation in rhetorical criticism from 1970—1980 22 
The role of evaluation in rhetorical criticism from 1980—present 24 
Conclusion 26 
3. EXPLAINING	THE	DECLINE	OF	EVALUATIVE	CRITICISM	 28 
Did professionalization cause the decline? 29 
Professionalization is not a good explanation of the decline 31 
A rival explanation: Less authority and tradition, more rigor 36 
Evaluative criticism has the potential to improve a practice 39 
Conclusion 44 
 
PART TWO: THEORY AND METHOD 
4. CRITERIA	AND	FUNCTION	 47 
The criteria requirement 47 
The problem of origin 48 
The problem of appropriateness 50 
The Functional Goodness Intuition 52 
Proponents of the Functional Goodness Intuition 54 
The problem of function ascription 59 
Conclusion 61 
 
vi 
5. RATIONAL	RECONSTRUCTION	 62 
Rational reconstruction illustrated 63 
Habermas on rational reconstruction 66 
Why do rational reconstruction? 70 
Discussion 71 
Conclusion 73 
 
PART THREE: ANALYSIS 
6. FUNCTION	FROM	DESIGNER	INTENTIONS:	HERBERT	A.	WICHELNS	 75 
The basics of Wichelns’ position 77 
The designer approach to function ascription 77 
Reconstruction of Wichelns’ approach to function ascription 80 
Failing to see the orator as orator 82 
Succeeding in seeing the orator as orator 84 
The function of the orator 86 
Conclusion 88 
7. FUNCTION	FROM	USER	NEEDS:	CHRISTIAN	KOCK	 90 
Christian Kock’s commitment to normativity 91 
Kock’s normativity is functional 92 
Kock rejects the designer approach to function ascription 94 
The user approach to function ascription 96 
Reconstruction of Kock’s approach to function ascription 97 
Discussion of Zarefsky’s criticism 100 
Conclusion 102 
8. FUNCTION	FROM	ETIOLOGY:	J.	JEFFERY	AUER	 103 
The basics of Auer’s position 103 
The etiological approach to function ascription 105 
Reconstruction of Auer’s approach to function ascription 107 
Conclusion 110 
9. FUNCTION	FROM	OPTIMALITY	CONSIDERATIONS:	STEVEN	PATTERSON	 112 
The basics of Patterson’s position 113 
The optimality approach to function ascription 114 
Plato’s functionalism 116 
Reconstruction of Patterson’s approach to function ascription 117 
Conclusion 120 
10. CONCLUSION	 121 
Did practicing rhetorical critics actually evaluate? 121 
A more detailed explanation of the decline 122 
Functional Goodness 123 
Rational reconstructions 123 
A concern about rational reconstruction 126 
Further case studies that may extend our understanding of function 127 
Concluding remarks 130 
LITERATURE	 134	
vii 
  
 
 
 
 
 
C H A P T E R  1  
Introduction 
 
No critical judgments can be more complicated than  
trying to distinguish good rhetoric from bad 
 Wayne C. Booth (2004, p. 39) 
 
What is rhetorical quality? Rhetorical critics  
still are struggling with this question. 
James Jasinski (2001, p. 133) 
 
 
 
Rhetoric varies in quality; it can somehow be better or worse. But what makes it so? What 
are the criteria by which rhetoric is (or should be) evaluated, where do these criteria come 
from, and how can their appropriateness be justified? This dissertation investigates these 
questions in order to contribute to our understanding of how one might “distinguish good 
rhetoric from bad” (cf. Booth above) or understand the idea of “rhetorical quality” (cf. 
Jasinski above). In attempting to answer the questions, I hope to vindicate the relevance 
of an important but arguably neglected dimension of rhetorical criticism, namely evalu-
ation. 
What is evaluation? As a general phenomenon, evaluation may be defined as “the 
act of judging the value, merit, worth, or significance of things.” (Schwandt, 2015, p. 1). 
Or, as the venerable rhetorical critic Barnett Baskerville once put it more bluntly in the 
2 
specific context of rhetorical criticism: Evaluation is the attempt to “distinguish quality 
from shoddy” (Baskerville, 1953, p. 2).1 
Although the dissertation is about criteria, it is not an attempt to add my own list 
of evaluative criteria to those already on the market. Instead, the project undertaken here 
is a meta-critical analysis of how some rhetorical critics have established their evaluative 
criteria and argued for their appropriateness. What I hope to show, for reasons to be ex-
plained, is that evaluation of rhetoric can be based on systematically derived and justified 
criteria. If this project is successful, the ideas presented here may be useful for those 
engaging in (or wanting to engage in) evaluative rhetorical criticism. At the very least, 
these ideas will serve as a challenge for anyone who might doubt that evaluative criteria 
could have a deeper basis than ideology, arbitrary traditions, taste, or bias. The present 
inquiry, then, concerns the foundations of evaluative criteria in rhetorical criticism. 
Three reasons motivating the inquiry 
What warrants a study of the evaluative dimension of rhetorical criticism now? Several 
reasons may be adduced. For introductory purposes, I shall mention three. The first rea-
son is intradisciplinary. As I will argue in Chapter 2, evaluation was for many years 
regarded as the ultimate purpose of rhetorical criticism. More specifically, the case may 
be made that evaluation was considered central to rhetorical criticism at least from 1925 
when Herbert A. Wichelns inaugurated the modern discipline of rhetorical criticism in 
his landmark essay “The Literary Criticism of Oratory” (1925/1995). The importance of 
evaluation was affirmed all the way through to the publication of the proceedings of the 
renowned Wingspread Conference in 1971 (Bitzer, Black, & Wallace, 1971).2 For almost 
                                               
1 By defining evaluation this sense, I concur with scholars such as Stephen E. Lucas (1981, p. 13) who 
maintain the futility of trying to classify all rhetorical criticism as evaluation: “There is a crucial difference 
between explicit evaluation in rhetorical criticism and evaluation as an inescapable part of all perception 
and interpretation. To say that rhetorical critics must forthrightly judge rhetorical works against some set 
of criteria is one thing. To say that rhetorical critics can never escape some sort of evaluative process no 
matter how they try is quite another. The latter position rests upon such a broad construction of ‘evaluation’ 
as to rob the term of any special meaning.” 
2 I use the phrase ”modern history of rhetorical criticism” or ”modern rhetorical criticism” to refer to the 
post-1925 era. Some readers will undoubtedly and understandably question my decision to include an essay 
from 1925 under the rubric of “modern rhetorical criticism.” The demarcation from 1925 onwards as “mod-
ern” is, it must be granted, somewhat arbitrary. But it reflects the notion that critics and theorists at least 
from this point on seem to converge on the idea that evaluation—in some form or another—should be 
central to rhetorical criticism. 
3 
half a century, statements of any alternative raisons d’être for rhetorical criticism were 
virtually impossible to locate in the literature. And to this day, many textbooks on rhe-
torical criticism continue to advise students to include an evaluation of the artifact or 
artifacts of their choice.3 It thus seems that evaluation was, and to an extent still is, per-
ceived as a primary responsibility of rhetorical critics. As Walter R. Fisher has put it, 
echoing the sentiments of many of his colleagues, “…the most fundamental task of the 
critic is to make evaluative judgments” (1974, p. 77), and during the fifty years post-
Wichelns, whatever else critics said and did, some kind of assessment of the quality of 
the rhetoric was held to be necessary for their work to count as criticism. 
If we grant that evaluation has been central to rhetorical criticism and grant also 
that it is a theoretically and practically complex phenomenon, it seems we should be able 
to find a significant number of extended treatments or even book-length accounts dedi-
cated to the topic on our library bookshelves. Strangely enough, though, our libraries (at 
least the ones I know of, physical and digital) contain no such copiousness. In fact, to my 
knowledge, only a quite limited number of works focus squarely on the fundamental 
problems of establishing and justifying evaluative criteria in rhetorical criticism. These 
include Leister Thonssen and Albert Craig Baird’s (1948) mammoth volume Speech Crit-
icism: The Development of Standards for Rhetorical Appraisal and the more modest 123-
page doctoral dissertation on Evaluation in Rhetorical Criticism: Its Nature and Func-
tion, with an Application by Howard N. Schreier, a graduate of Temple University 
(Schreier, 1980).4 Whatever the scope and merits of these works, disparate efforts to 
throw light on the manifold and profound problems of evaluation hardly seem sufficient 
to seal off this entire area of inquiry from further investigation and consider these prob-
lems to be sufficiently illuminated. One intra-disciplinary reason for the relevance of an 
inquiry about evaluation derives from the fact that it is a historically important, yet a 
theoretically (and perhaps practically5) under-explored aspect of rhetorical criticism. 
The second reason is interdisciplinary. There is growing interest from other aca-
demic disciplines in the phenomena of evaluation and normativity. As I will argue in 
Chapter 3, disciplines such as political science, sociology, philosophy and argumentation 
                                               
3 One of the most recent and prominent examples can be found in Kuypers (2009). 
4 There might be other works addressing evaluative issues more tangentially, but my contention is that eval-
uation is important enough to warrant much more detailed and sustained attention.  
5 The extent to which evaluation has been historically central among practicing rhetorical critics is a topic I 
will discuss in Chapter 2. 
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theory increasingly take an interest in normative modes of scholarship along with an in-
terest in defining the proper scope and methods of such scholarship. Since the discipline 
of rhetoric has historically accorded great importance to normative scholarship, rhetoric 
as a discipline is uniquely situated to contribute to the development of normative schol-
arship in academia for example by investigating and explaining methods and strategies 
of evaluative reasoning and argument. 
A third reason for the relevance of a study of evaluative rhetorical criticism is 
extra-disciplinary and concerns the growing distrust of evaluation as a general phenom-
enon in society. As pointed out by evaluation theorist Thomas Schwandt, among at least 
some members of the public, evaluative reasoning in the form of argument about policies 
or discussions about the merits of solutions to problems in community affairs is cynically 
dismissed as nothing but thinly veiled attempts at satisfying personal preferences that 
could have no basis in reason or rationality. In one paper, Schwandt thus writes (2008):  
We are facing a rather worrying brew of developments affecting practical intellec-
tual life in modern society and the very well-being of society itself. These develop-
ments threaten to degrade the central role that the cognitive endeavor, known as 
reasoned evaluative criticism, plays in the achievement, maintenance, and enhance-
ment of the good society. 
Schwandt points to a range of factors undermining the belief in reasoned evaluative crit-
icism, but his basic concern is that we are increasingly substituting our belief in evalua-
tion for impulsive gut-feelings illustrated by ‘likes’ on social media, thus promoting a 
shallow, superficial conception of preferences (needs, wants, etc.) to the detriment of a 
deeper appreciation of more thoroughly reasoned judgments. In my opinion, rhetorical 
critics and theorists have a duty to demonstrate how and why genuine evaluative reason-
ing about public issues by politicians or other public figures can be meaningful and sig-
nificant, and to demonstrate that such reasoning does not have to be interpreted as at-
tempts at spin, partisanship and egoism.6 
In my opinion, these are three weighty reasons for undertaking a study of the 
evaluative dimension of rhetorical criticism: Within the discipline itself, sustained 
                                               
6 In the following quotation, Schwandt speaks of evaluators generally, but I believe it applies to rhetorical 
critics who have evaluative ambitions: “[Evaluators] ought to embody in their work the viewpoint that 
reasoned evaluative criticism plays a central role in the achievement, maintenance, and enhancement of the 
good society.” 
5 
attention to the evaluative dimension is absent. Across the disciplines, evaluative modes 
of scholarship seem to be gaining traction, and rhetoric ought to be able to contribute to 
this area of inquiry. And a study of the evaluative dimension could also contribute, how-
ever modestly, to building a culture in which public evaluative arguments were better 
understood. With the above outline of the general topic and relevance of this dissertation, 
here is an overview of coming chapters. 
Chapter overview 
The dissertation consists of three parts. The first part is historical, the second part is the-
oretical/methodological, and the third part is analytical. The historical part opens with 
Chapter 2 which traces the ostensible decline of the evaluative dimension of rhetorical 
criticism. For most of the twentieth century, rhetorical critics commonly reiterated the 
idea that evaluation is a crucial, even constitutive, dimension of rhetorical criticism. How-
ever, in recent years prominent scholars such as James Jasinski (2001), Leslie Olson 
(2010, 2012), and David Zarefsky (2008) have suggested that evaluation moved from the 
center of rhetorical criticism to its periphery at some point during the twentieth century. 
Unfortunately, the details of this radical reorientation of the field of rhetorical criticism 
remain obscure. Chapter 2 therefore sets out to trace the contours of the decline of eval-
uation in rhetorical criticism, particularly with respect to the question of when it took 
place. Through a detailed examination of a large range of texts beginning with Wichelns’ 
“The Literary Criticism of Oratory” from 1925 (1925/1995), I argue in the chapter that a 
conception of rhetorical criticism without evaluation at its center seems to evolve around 
1970 at the time of the famous Wingspread Conference. Further, the chapter provides an 
important deepening of our understanding of the decline of evaluative criticism by show-
ing that evaluation was perhaps never as important among practicing critics as it was 
among programmatically or theoretically inclined critics. 
Chapter 3 continues the historical mode of inquiry from Chapter 2. Whereas 
Chapter 2 asked when the evaluative dimension of rhetorical criticism declined, Chapter 
3 attempts to understand why it declined. What caused a defining feature of rhetorical 
criticism to move from the center of the discipline to its periphery? One candidate expla-
nation builds on the narrative of professionalization as suggested by Nothstine, Blair, and 
Copeland (1994). However, after considering this narrative of professionalization and its 
possible contribution to the decline of evaluation, the chapter also critically questions the 
6 
explanatory power of this narrative. For while Nothstine et al. present professionalization 
as a ubiquitous phenomenon across all disciplines within the academy, evaluative re-
search programs blossomed in disciplines closely related to rhetoric at the very same time 
that evaluation in rhetorical criticism seemed to decline. This paradox suggests that if 
neighboring disciplines were able to develop and refine a theoretically respectable eval-
uative component, so could rhetorical criticism. As an alternative to the narrative of pro-
fessionalization, I speculate that factors such as an increase in the demand for scholarly 
rigor and an intellectual climate inspired by the counterculture of the 1960s may better 
explain the decline of evaluative rhetorical criticism. Finally, I end the chapter by dis-
cussing what, if anything, evaluative criticism has to offer that non-evaluative criticism 
does not. The answer I propose is that evaluative criticism has a capacity for effecting 
reasoned improvement in a target practice—a capacity that rhetorical critics should not 
ignore.  
Chapter 4 focuses on criteria and functions. In order for evaluation to get off the 
ground, evaluative criteria must first be in place. Rhetorical critics, however, have not 
produced a clear theory about where those criteria come from (the problem of origin) or 
how their appropriateness for a given artifact may be justified (the problem of appropri-
ateness. In Chapter 4, I conjecture that the concept of function may bring us closer to 
possible answers to these questions by serving as a useful starting point for a rational 
reconstruction of evaluative reasoning in rhetorical criticism. More specifically, I show 
that a specific intuition intimately related to evaluation is ubiquitous among theorists 
across a number of disciplines and academic eras. This is the intuition that the quality of 
an object is intimately related to its capacity to fulfill its function. While this idea prom-
ises to bring us closer to an understanding of evaluation of rhetorical artifacts, it also 
raises the following question: What exactly is a function, what exactly does it mean for 
an object to have a function, and how do objects actually come to have a function? These 
questions pertain to the problem of function ascription. 
In Chapter 5 I propose a strategy for answering these questions. The strategy in-
volves case studies of evaluative reasoning that will provide insights into the problems 
of origin and appropriateness of evaluative criteria. I argue that a suitable analytical ap-
proach for these case studies is rational reconstruction. Rational reconstruction is an an-
alytical approach aimed at creating knowledge by explicating implicit principles and in-
tuitions operative in a practice. If one problematic aspect of evaluative criticism is that it 
7 
can seem subjective and ad hoc (and therefore not in accordance with the academic de-
mand for rigor), rational reconstruction—if successful—will hopefully contribute to 
showing that evaluation can be based on identifiable principles instead of undisclosed 
taste, ideology, and prejudice. 
Chapter 6 marks the beginning of the analytical part of the dissertation. In the 
chapter, I reconstruct the evaluative reasoning in Herbert A. Wichelns seminal essay “The 
Literary Criticism of Oratory” (1925/1995) with special attention to the problem of func-
tion ascription. In the paper, Wichelns posits that using literary criteria in the evaluation 
of rhetorical (“oratorical”) artifacts is inappropriate. This claim raises the following 
question: Why are these criteria inappropriate? I propose the following answer: Since 
literary artifacts and rhetorical artifacts have different functions, the appropriate criteria 
for their evaluation will also differ. But this solution invites a new question: How does 
Wichelns establish that literary and rhetorical artifacts have different functions? The an-
swer proposed and substantiated in the chapter is, briefly put, that Wichelns employs a 
so-called designer approach to function ascription. 
In Chapter 7, I reconstruct the evaluative reasoning in the work of Christian Kock. 
In a number of publications, Christian Kock has defended a decidedly normative ap-
proach to rhetorical criticism of, especially, democratic debate (see e.g. Kock, 2013; 
2011; Kock & Villadsen, 2015). Moreover, Christian Kock places the idea of function at 
the center of his normative approach. Through an analysis of Kock’s publications on the 
nature of rhetoric and public political debate, I argue that Kock’s evaluative perspective 
is primarily, though not exclusively, informed by a so-called user approach to function 
ascription. In the chapter I also discuss a critical commentary on Kock’s evaluative ap-
proach by David Zarefsky. 
In Chapter 8, I reconstruct the evaluative reasoning in J. Jeffery Auer’s classic 
article “The Counterfeit Debates” (1962). In the article, Auer posits five evaluative crite-
ria for judging the first televised debate between John F. Kennedy and Robert Nixon in 
1960. Auer reviews in detail the tradition of debate in the context of democratic society, 
and I argue that the emphasis on tradition is most charitably reconstructed as expressing 
an etiological approach to function ascription. 
In Chapter 9, I reconstruct the evaluative reasoning in an essay by philosopher 
Steven Patterson. More specifically, I discuss Patterson’s attempt to show that argumen-
tation has a function. As in the previous chapters, I focus on rationally reconstructing the 
8 
reasoning employed by Patterson to defend this claim, and I argue that Patterson’s eval-
uative reasoning can be reconstructed as basically expressing an optimality approach to 
function ascription—an approach that goes back to Plato. 
Chapter 10 concludes the dissertation. In the chapter I briefly summarize the find-
ings in order to set the stage for a discussion of some outstanding questions and to point 
to relevant directions that further research on evaluation in rhetorical criticism might take. 
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C H A P T E R  2  
Tracing the decline of 
the evaluative dimension 
 
 
 
Prominent rhetorical critics such as James Jasinski, Lester C. Olson, and David Zarefsky 
have drawn attention to a significant but arguably underexplored development in rhetor-
ical criticism. In passing remarks, they each posit that the evaluative dimension of rhe-
torical criticism seems to have declined during the twentieth century. The aim of this 
chapter is to examine this ostensible decline: Is there evidence to support it? Is the evi-
dence clear or mixed? Can the moment or trajectory of the decline be pinpointed or traced 
with any accuracy? An investigation of these questions will contribute to the aim of vin-
dicating the importance of the evaluative dimension of rhetorical criticism by bringing us 
closer to an understanding of what, if anything, could be problematic about the dimen-
sion. If by investigating the decline of the evaluative dimension we are able to move 
closer to an understanding of why it happened, this understanding could provide valuable 
information in the context of considering any obstacles—theoretical or otherwise—that 
would need to be overcome for critics with evaluative ambitions.7 
To anticipate the conclusion of the chapter, what follows will reveal that a wide 
range of central rhetorical sources from Herbert A. Wichelns to current thinkers indicate 
that the basic story of decline as suggested by Jasinski, Olson, and Zarefsky is 
                                               
7 Cf. Booth (1988) who noted a decline in theoretical discussions of the (ethical) value of literature: “As we 
take a close look at some of the reasons for such a decline, we may well risk destroying our subject entirely. 
It is always possible that the reasons for any cultural shift of this kind are good ones: ethical criticism may 
have no theoretical justification. On the other hand, if we take the reasons for its decline seriously we may 
manage to resurrect a hardier creature than has emerged from other recent efforts to bring forth a Lazarus.”  
 
11 
corroborated by reasonably clear evidence. But the reading also suggests an important 
bifurcation among modern rhetorical critics—a twist to the narrative of decline: Whereas 
theoretically oriented critics generally regarded evaluation as a central aspect of rhetori-
cal criticism until around at least the late 1960s, it seems that more practically oriented 
critics have always—even since the days of Wichelns—been much less concerned with 
evaluation. The chapter thus accomplishes two goals. It provides evidence for and details 
about a hitherto under-investigated disciplinary story of decline; and it adds a new and 
unrecognized dimension to this story. 
Did the evaluative dimension decline in the twentieth century? 
Even though rhetorical criticism cannot and should not be reduced to a formula or recipe, 
it is commonplace to identify a number of components or dimensions typically present in 
a given piece of rhetorical criticism. James Jasinski (following Abrams and Bryant) help-
fully summarizes these “crucial characteristics of criticism” in the following way: Rhe-
torical criticism (1) defines, (2) classifies, (3) analyzes, (4) interprets and (5) evaluates 
its objects (Jasinski, 2001, p. 125).8 Despite the fact that these components or dimensions 
of criticism depend crucially on each other and frequently merge both in theory and in 
practice, the focus here is on the evaluative dimension of rhetorical criticism and its al-
leged decline. To provide a starting point for inquiry into the decline, consider the fol-
lowing comment by Jasinski (2001, my emphasis) on the development of rhetorical crit-
icism in the twentieth century: 
Perhaps the first significant development in rhetorical criticism during the second 
half of the twentieth century was an interrelated process in which its judicial or 
evaluative dimension declined while its epistemological or analytic function dra-
matically increased. 
Jasinski’s understanding of the development of rhetorical criticism is seconded by David 
Zarefsky, who notes that ”while in earlier years it was widely believed that evaluation 
was the sine qua non of criticism; today explicit judging of the work is generally regarded 
as one of the critic’s options, not a necessary condition” (2008). The same point is 
made—more despairingly—by Olson (2010):9 
                                               
8 A similar exposition can also be found in Villadsen (2009). 
9 For a reiteration of this point, see also Olson (2012). 
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“[l]ess frequently today do rhetorical critics present ourselves as judges who offer 
reasons for an explicit appraisal in light of pre-existing theories or models, norma-
tive depictions of genres, ideologies, or movements, or even touchstones. Some 
have apparently abandoned judgment in favor of interpretation as being sufficient 
for criticism.”  
Judging from these quotations, then, a significant development in the discipline of rhe-
torical criticism does indeed seem to have taken place during the twentieth century: The 
evaluative dimension has declined and evaluation in rhetorical criticism has come to be 
regarded as optional rather than obligatory. But when and how did this significant devel-
opment happen? Neither Jasinski, Zarefsky nor Olson provide details. And so, in order 
to get a clearer picture of when evaluation was relegated from the center of rhetorical 
criticism, it is necessary to conduct a historical inquiry. To this end, the present chapter 
will review evidence from the earliest modern conceptions of rhetorical criticism and 
move forward chronologically in order to trace the alleged decline of evaluation through 
the twentieth century.10 Pursuing this issue is interesting in its own right, but in doing so 
we may also move closer to an understanding of the potential obstacles of arguing for the 
viability and importance of evaluative criticism. 
A comment about my approach: It is, of course, practically impossible to review 
in full detail the development of the evaluative dimension of rhetorical criticism since the 
modern beginnings of the discipline in the current context. Certain choices have to be 
made. In order to feasibly achieve the most accurate and detailed review, I have focused 
here on reviewing journal articles and texts from authors that feature prominently in var-
ious anthologies and collections of modern canonical texts. (I make extensive references 
to these texts throughout the chapter). This choice of materials entails that I have not 
focused primarily on actual examples of rhetorical criticism, although much could un-
doubtedly be learned from such an investigation. The assumption behind this methodo-
logical decision is that important developments in the actual practice of rhetorical criti-
cism will, sooner or later, leave sediments in the more theoretically oriented journal arti-
cles. If, say, an important shift in the conception of evaluation has taken place among 
                                               
10 I use the term “modern” in contrast with “classical” or “ancient” in order to refer to the post-Wichelns era 
of rhetorical criticism. 
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practitioners of rhetorical criticism, this shift would—presumably—either motivate or be 
motivated by work in the theoretically oriented journal articles.11 
The role of evaluation in rhetorical criticism from 1925—1950 
An obvious place to begin the inquiry is by considering Herbert A. Wichelns’  seminal 
essay on ”The Literary Criticism of Oratory” (1925/1995) After all, as noted by Walter 
R. Fisher, ”[o]ne could as well avoid the name of Aristotle in tracing the history of rhet-
oric as neglect a reference to Herbert A. Wichelns in an essay reviewing a significant 
aspect of twentieth century rhetorical criticism” (Fisher, 1980). 
In the context of the current agenda, the most significant feature of Wichelns’ 
essay is perhaps its lack of direct argument or justification for the importance or relevance 
of evaluation in rhetorical criticism. But this is not to say that Wichelns does not consider 
evaluation important or relevant. On the contrary, Wichelns’ silence on the issue speaks 
volumes of his conception of rhetorical criticism as properly evaluative. For Wichelns’ 
whole essay, from beginning to end, is an exercise in establishing a method for conduct-
ing evaluative criticism that is properly rhetorical, as opposed to literary. Put differently, 
Wichelns’ essay is a corrective to what he regarded as a prevalent category mistake, 
namely to evaluate rhetoric (or “oratory”) by applying literary criteria. In Wichelns’ es-
say, the relevance and importance of evaluation in rhetorical criticism is thus never ar-
gued but assumed. 
The following quotations will substantiate this point. In the opening lines of his 
essay, Wichelns states the gist of his meta-critical project in the following way: “[T]hat 
section of the history of criticism which deals with judging of orators is still unwritten. 
Yet the problem is an interesting one, and one which involves some important concep-
tions” (Wichelns, 1995, p. 3). The crucial term here is “judging”. For Wichelns, “[w]hat 
interests us is the method of the critic: his standards, his categories of judgment, what he 
regards as important” (ibid., p. 4) In other words, the critic should be regarded as a judge 
who employs certain standards for the purpose of reaching an evaluative verdict. The 
very topic of Wichelns’ essay, then, is critical evaluation. And case by case, he trawls 
through a number of approaches to evaluation of rhetoric and finds them all wanting—to 
                                               
11 This methodological decision is inspired by Nothstine, Blair and Copeland’s method for investigating the 
influence of professionalization on rhetorical criticism (1994, p. 30). Naturally, the accuracy of my depic-
tion of the decline depends on the validity of the sampled source material. 
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various degrees and for various reasons. For Wichelns, we may conclude, there seems to 
be little doubt that rhetorical criticism should evaluate. Wichelns is not concerned with 
the question of whether criticism should evaluate, but rather how. 
The importance of the evaluative component in rhetorical criticism is also taken 
for granted by a host of illustrious critics and theorists writing in the wake of Wichelns’ 
seminal essay. Brigance (1933) warns critics, very much in the spirit of Wichelns, against 
the mistake of evaluating rhetoric as if it were literature. Hunt (1935) talks of the im-
portance of pronouncing “judgments of value” and of these being “adequate judgments.” 
Bryant (1937) also repeats the thoroughly Wichelnsian doctrine that rhetorical criticism 
is concerned “only secondarily with permanent esthetic canons” and should focus instead 
on “contemporary effectiveness.” Lee (1942) denotes four perspectives from which a 
critic may “judge whether [a] speech was ‘good’ or ‘bad’,” and Dickey (1943) makes the 
case that critics should evaluate rhetoric by assessing not how many people were influ-
enced, but rather how much they were influenced. Continuing in the same vein, Baird 
(1943, p. 304) characterizes rhetorical criticism as centered on “evaluation of outstanding 
speakers”, and Reid (1944) holds that the critic should offer “a critical judgment about 
the ideas of the speech”, make “a judgment about the effectiveness of the speech” (ibid., 
p. 420), and preferably be able to “demonstrate […] excellences as well as shortcomings, 
particularly in relation to speech composition” (ibid., p. 421). 
For these critics, then, evaluation is clearly a central dimension of rhetorical crit-
icism. However, the above quotations are all from primarily theoretical accounts of the 
nature of rhetorical criticism. And actual instances of rhetorical criticism are of course 
not the same as theoretical, programmatic ideals; for criticism is at bottom a practical art. 
And so, while the theorists quoted above are writing about criticism, they were not them-
selves (in these excerpts at least) doing rhetorical criticism. And Loren Reid makes an 
important point about those “practicing critics”. For, perhaps in contrast with Wichelns, 
the aim of Reid’s paper from 1944 was not to provide detached mission statement on 
behalf of a still nascent and developing discipline, anxious to devise academically re-
spectable methods and procedures. Rather, Reid’s aim was to review the last two decades 
of published rhetorical criticism in order to inductively pave the way for improvements 
of the critical practice by identifying some observable “perils” encountered by practicing 
rhetorical critics unshielded by the comforts of armchair theorizing: “Perhaps now is a 
good time to look over what has been done, and to make certain observations, chiefly to 
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draw from the practice of the last twenty years principles which may be useful during the 
next twenty.” (Reid, 1944, p. 416, my emphasis). 
So, what are those useful principles that rhetorical critics should follow? Accord-
ing to Reid, perhaps the single most important principle is that the critic must “take to 
heart his primary and inescapable responsibility as a critic: to interpret, to appraise, to 
evaluate; to say here the speaker missed, here he hit the mark; sometimes to speak with 
restraint when others applaud, sometimes to bestow praise when others have passed by” 
(ibid., p. 422). This is clearly an evaluative aim. Interestingly, Reid felt that it was nec-
essary—after having reviewed twenty years of published rhetorical criticism—to remind 
practicing critics of the “peril” of writing non-evaluative criticism. Given that Reid felt 
the need to issue this cautionary statement in 1944, we may infer that much practical 
rhetorical criticism at least since Wichelns had been largely non-evaluative in the eyes of 
Reid. 
Nonetheless, all the theorists and critics quoted above either assert or imply that 
evaluation is a central dimension of rhetorical criticism. And in no way do these writers 
seem to regard this doctrine as particularly controversial or in need of much justification 
or defense. Its importance is assumed rather than defended. In contrast to this attitude, 
Baird and Thonssen (1947) offer a much more elaborate case for the centrality of the 
evaluative dimension of rhetorical criticism. For example, Baird and Thonssen note how 
the ancients in their criticism of orators “not only formulated principles of composition 
and of presentation, but recorded at length their judgment of contemporary speechmak-
ers” (ibid., p. 134). Baird and Thonssen provide reasons for their view of the appropri-
ateness or perhaps necessity of evaluation in rhetorical criticism, and their article contains 
a number of passages suggesting a felt need to argue that evaluation is an important di-
mension of rhetorical criticism. But, as they note—perhaps with a nod to Wichelns—the 
study of techniques for evaluation in rhetorical criticism is a relatively recent endeavor: 
“[A]s a research technique, however, the art [of evaluation] is a contribution chiefly of 
twentieth century scholars. Only in the latest decades have investigators systematically 
developed and formulated working principles and techniques of rhetorical evaluation.” 
(ibid., p. 134).12 
                                               
12 Interestingly, Baird and Thonssen reference no such principles and techniques. 
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Having thus canvassed the scholarly situation as they saw it, Baird and Thonssen 
go on to state their main claim: “The thesis of this article is that the purpose of rhetorical 
criticism is to express a judgment on a public speech” (ibid., p. 135, my emphasis). As 
far as I have been able to gather, this is the earliest explicit and clear statement of the idea 
that the very purpose (as opposed to merely one important aspect) of rhetorical criticism 
is, ultimately, evaluation. And, to emphasize their point, Baird and Thonssen state that 
the “problem [to be dealt with in all rhetorical criticism] is that of pronouncing judgment” 
and, further, that “if the critical function is uppermost, the pronouncement of judgment 
must be a central consideration.” Throughout their article, Baird and Thonssen comment 
on a number of ways in which the evaluative judgment could and should be reached. But 
for now, let us not get caught up in the details of why and how evaluation should take 
place. Instead, let us simply note that Thonssen and Baird provide the hitherto most direct 
and elaborate case for regarding evaluation as the ultimate purpose of rhetorical criti-
cism—perhaps the first sign that evaluative criticism was in need of justification. 
The role of evaluation in rhetorical criticism from 1950—1960 
Leland Griffin is yet another proponent of evaluation in rhetorical criticism. In his semi-
nal article on the “Rhetoric of Historical Movements” (1952), he stresses that criticizing 
rhetorical movements involves applying criteria “in evaluating the public address of the 
movement”. Barnet Baskerville (1953) follows Baird and Thonssen in welding criticism 
and evaluation together: “[t]he critical method in speech, like the critical method in any 
other discipline, consists of making reasoned judgments based on certain standards of 
excellence” (ibid., p. 1), and to bring home the point, “[i]t is the function of criticism to 
render intelligent and relevant judgments […]” (ibid., p. 5). But, Baskerville contends, 
practicing critics do not put enough emphasis on the evaluative component. There is, 
according to Baskerville, a “frequent lack of a sense of proportion” in rhetorical criticism 
(ibid., p. 4, emphasis added): 
The biographical chapter goes on for fifty pages; the political-economic-social 
background is delineated in laborious detail; while the speaker's ideas, as they ap-
pear in the speeches, are dispensed with in five pages, and the critical evaluation, 
properly hedged about with qualifications, is timorously tacked on to the summary.  
And, according to Baskerville, this tendency for practicing critics to slight or even ignore 
evaluation in rhetorical criticism is the single most important problem in the field of 
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rhetorical criticism: “But the most basic indictment of our critical studies is that they are 
not very critical. In our intense desire to be objective and ‘scientific’ we eschew evalua-
tion and fall back upon labeling and classification.” (ibid., p, 4, emphasis added). 
So, while Baskerville reaffirms that rhetorical criticism should be seen as an eval-
uative endeavor, he—like Reid before him—laments that practicing critics do not evalu-
ate. And this theme is picked up by Albert Croft who—like Reid and Baskerville—ex-
amines the actual practices of working critics. And Croft’s findings, too, reveal interest-
ing discrepancies between the theoretical ideals and the actual practices of working crit-
ics. In problematizing what he calls “the ‘standard’ approach to rhetorical criticism” 
(Croft, 1956, p. 283), Croft finds that there is very little evaluation going on in practice: 
“Perhaps the chief problem in public address research,” says Croft, as if echoing Reid 
and Baskerville, “is that we have thought of it all as ‘criticism’ when some is really the-
ory, some is history, and some is criticism which has not evaluated the speeches studied”. 
And he then goes on to describe a common “inadequacy” in graduate theses on rhetorical 
criticism, namely that “very little effort, if any, is made to evaluate […]” and he finds 
that “[t]here is a subtle but unmistakable implication in all these studies that the ‘critical’ 
process is not even intended to produce judgments on the merit of the speech.” (ibid., p. 
285, my emphasis). Like Reid and Baskerville before him, then, Croft finds that there is 
a considerable difference between the theoretical ideals of rhetorical criticism (neces-
sarily evaluative) and the actual practice of rhetorical criticism (largely non-evaluative). 
The lack of an evaluative component in the works of practicing rhetorical critics, 
however, does little to detract from the point that no disciplinary controversy existed at 
the theoretical level at this point in time with regard to the question of whether rhetorical 
criticism ought to contain an evaluative dimension. On the contrary, we may conclude 
from the evidence cited so far that a consensus seems to be forming in the discipline 
around this time: Rhetorical criticism is considered to be evaluative almost by definition, 
and a critic who does not evaluate is neglecting a crucial responsibility. 
With such a consensus, however, comes a requirement of theoretical solidity; in 
any respectable academic field, the most central tenets ought to be subjected to critical 
scrutiny before being accepted. Perhaps triggered by the sense that the importance of 
evaluation had at this point become virtually unquestioned, Thompson (1954) points to a 
troubling issue. In a survey of twenty-four articles published in leading journals between 
1948 and 1952, Thompson finds that “eighteen out of twenty-four writers include value 
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judgments”. It is not clear exactly what Thompson understands by “value judgments,” 
but we should note here that his findings seem to go against the problem pointed out by 
Reid, Baskerville, and Croft, namely that practicing critics did not, in fact, fulfil their 
duty to evaluate. If “value judgments” is interpreted broadly, however, Thompson’s find-
ing is not surprising.13 But despite the prevalence of value judgments in his sample, 
Thompson states that he has not been able to find a single paper “dealing with difficulties 
of evaluating effectiveness” or attempts at “improving these attempts at evaluation” (p. 
24-25). So, while the importance of evaluation in rhetorical criticism seems to be taken 
for granted at this point, some concerns about the theoretical and methodological robust-
ness of the evaluative dimension of criticism are slowly emerging. 
Striking the same note as Thompson before him, Nilsen (1956) points out that 
“[a]n old and insistent problem in rhetorical criticism appears to be attracting new atten-
tion. I refer to the problem of whether and to what extent the effects of a speech should 
be within the purview of the speech critic.”14 Nilsen follows up his claim with a discus-
sion of the prevalent conception of evaluation as the attempt to gauge the effect of a 
speech as measured by the impact of a speech on its immediate audience along with a 
proposal to extend this conception of evaluation to include consideration of more wide-
ranging social consequences. With Thompson and Nilsen, then, evaluation thus moves 
slowly from being a rather unreflectively endorsed dimension of rhetorical criticism to 
being subject to theoretical and critical attention. 
This movement is reinforced by Redding (1957), who—as far as I have been able 
to tell—is the first rhetorical critic to propose that a conception of rhetorical criticism 
entirely without an evaluative dimension may be viable. Quoting literary theorist Wayne 
Shumaker with approval, Redding argues that thorough criticism necessarily involves 
limiting the tasks of the critic in one or more ways—for instance by excluding the eval-
uative dimension (ibid., p. 101, my emphasis): 
                                               
13 Cf. again Lucas (1981, p. 13) who distinguishes between different kinds of value judgments: “To say that 
rhetorical critics must forthrightly judge rhetorical works against some set of criteria is one thing. To say 
that rhetorical critics can never escape some sort of evaluative process no matter how they try is quite 
another. The latter position rests upon such a broad construction of ‘evaluation’ as to rob the term of any 
special meaning” 
14 It is noteworthy here that Nilsen does not provide any references to substantiate the claim that this problem 
is an ”old” one. In fact, the oldest reference to rhetorical theory in Nilsen’s article is to Herbert Wichelns 
(1925/1995) whose essay cannot in any meaningful sense be said to question whether the effects of the 
speech should be within the purview of the critic. 
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[A]s historians and others have long ago discovered, severe limitation of the subject 
is inescapable if thorough scholarship be the goal: ‘the necessity of limiting each 
critical book or essay to some part of the total critical process has been increasingly 
recognized in recent years.’ One—and only one—way of limiting the scope of crit-
icism is to concentrate upon analysis rather than evaluation. 
With Redding’s article from 1957 we have, then, the first example of a conception of 
rhetorical criticism favoring analysis over evaluation. Further, we may note that Red-
ding’s motive for proposing non-evaluative criticism is that this may lead to more thor-
ough scholarship. But as we have already seen, this does not mean that rhetorical criticism 
in actual practice had been evaluative up to this point. As was implied by Reid’s analysis 
of critics from 1925 to 1944, by Baskerville (1953), and by Croft’s analysis of the “stand-
ard approach” to rhetorical criticism, practicing rhetorical critics had not always lived up 
to the disciplinary orthodoxy of including an evaluative component in their work. This 
discrepancy between ideal and reality is also noted by Brock, Scott and Chesebro in their 
comment on the state of rhetorical criticism around the middle of the twentieth century 
(1989, p. 25, my emphasis): 
Finally, in 1955 Marie Hochmuth Nichols published the third volume of History 
and Criticism in American Public Address, supplementing William Norwood Brig-
ance’s two volumes released in 1943. These works include the critical efforts of 
forty scholars in the field of speech communication and demonstrates the applica-
tion of the basic patterns to traditional criticism. However, the application was un-
even and at times deviated significantly from the ideal. Wichelns—and later 
Thonssen and Baird—stressed making judgments about the effects of rhetoric; but 
many of these critical essays tended to stress description, stopping shy of explicit 
evaluation. The thrust of traditional criticism apparently brought many critics to 
look on their art as that of identifying conventional rhetorical strategies and pre-
senting an account of the speaker and the times. 
Around this time, then, the idea that rhetorical criticism should reconsider its connection 
with evaluation (and the idea that criticism might even get by without evaluation) is thus 
clearly beginning to be felt, perhaps influenced by the practicing critics.15 
                                               
15 As Fisher (1974) would later note, ”theory tends to follow rather than precede practice.” And as George 
Campbell (1776, pp. 16-17) remarked, in the same vein, “As speakers existed before grammarians, and 
reasoners before logicians, so doubtless there were orators before there were rhetoricians, and poets before 
critics.” 
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The role of evaluation in rhetorical criticism from 1960—1970 
The prevailing theoretical conception of criticism at this point, however, still holds that 
evaluation is central to rhetorical criticism. Consider thus Hillbruner (1960) who main-
tains that “[…] criticism has as its primary goal the artistic evaluation of any aspect of 
contemporary public address” (ibid., p. 7) and further that “[t]he ultimate function of 
criticism […] is to evaluate all or any factors dealing with the public speaking process 
and its relation to any facet of current society and to do it in an individual, articulate, 
moving, and dynamic way.” In sum, the “ultimate aim” of rhetorical criticism is to “call 
attention to the best speaking of the day” and “castigate the poor speaking” (ibid., p. 9). 
On the surface, then, Hillbruner thus appears to be reaffirming the traditional doc-
trine of rhetorical criticism in which evaluation is central. But this is not the whole story. 
For the motivation behind Hillbruner’s argument is his concern with a perceived lack of 
creativity among mainstream rhetorical critics. Hillbruner is making a case for a kind of 
criticism (and thus evaluation) “[u]nfettered by any pre-disposed critical formulae” (p. 
6). He is arguing for a kind of criticism in which the basic characteristic of the critic, in 
fashioning his evaluation, in fact, the main if not the only one, is his individuality. By 
this is meant that each subject of his scrutiny is approached in a unique, subjective man-
ner, dictated by the material being analyzed and appraised” (p. 7-8). What Hillbruner is 
reacting to here is, in other words, the kind of ‘cookie-cutter criticism’ that would later 
become a central issue in Edwin Black’s (Black, 1965/1978) seminal book on rhetorical 
criticism.16 
Like so many before him, Black also considers evaluation to be central to rhetor-
ical criticism. But Black holds that evaluation as it had been conceived of until this point 
in time had certain crucial limitations that needed to be overcome in order for criticism 
to break free of its creativity-hindering shackles. More specifically, Black argues that the 
mode of criticism he labeled “neo-Aristotelian” too unreflectively adopts a distinct per-
spective of rhetoric to the detriment of other viable alternatives. The problem with the 
neo-Aristotelian perspective, Black holds, is that “it circumscribes the conception of the 
context that will guide this criticism; it substitutes historical reconstruction for re-creative 
criticism; and it limits judicial criticism to the evaluation of immediate effects.” In this 
way, Black’s seminal work may be regarded as a sustained and focused argument 
                                               
16 For another similar argument, see also Hillbruner (1963). 
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continuing the sentiments expressed earlier by critics such as Thompson, Nilsen, Red-
ding, and Hillbruner. For these critics—in their different ways—all raise questions about 
prevailing disciplinary assumptions pertaining to the evaluative dimension of rhetorical 
criticism.17 
But in questioning why and how evaluation should be part of rhetorical criticism, 
these critics do not question whether it should. It would not be long, however, before this 
discussion would begin, even though the traditional doctrine was still being reaffirmed: 
Ericson (1968) claims that “[a]t its roots, all criticism serves to evaluate”, Kane (1968) 
maintains that “the essential nature of criticism is that of formulating and presenting judg-
ments” and further that “the critic, whether writing on historical or current matters, must 
make judgments in order to discharge his responsibility as a critic”, and Rosenfield 
(1968) asserts that “criticism does eventuate in, or at least has as an ultimate objective, 
assessment”.18 On this basis Rosenfield concludes that “we ought seldom to find a critic 
engaging in description of a rhetoric event for its own sake; and if we do, we ought per-
haps proceed most cautiously in determining whether to label the product ‘criticism’.” 
But despite these repetitions of the traditional conception of criticism as necessarily eval-
uative, a keystone document in the field would soon appear. And surprisingly, at least to 
some critics, it contained very little talk of evaluation. 
                                               
17 For a similar criticism of the tendency to apply a pre-ordained “method” of rhetorical criticism to rhetorical 
artifacts, see also Fisher (1969). 
18 Rosenfield contrasts the term ’assessment’ with ’description’, and he seems to take it to be synonymous 
with ’evaluation’, cf. Rosenfield’s (p. 54) verbatim quotation of Edwin Black: ”At the culmination of the 
critical process is the evaluation of the discourse or of its author; a comprehensive judgment which, in the 
best of criticism, is the fruit of patient exegesis . . . Even the purely technical objective of understanding 
how a discourse works carries the assumption that it does work, and that assumption is an assessment. 
Similarly, to understand why a thing has failed is at least to suspect that it has failed, and that suspicion is 
an assessment. There is, then, no criticism without appraisal; there is no "neutral" criticism. One critic's 
judgment may be absolute and dogmatic, another's tentative and barely commital; but however faint the 
judicial element in criticism may become, it abides.” As an aside, a footnote to the footnote, it should be 
noted here that Black’s usage of the term ‘work’ is of course ambiguous. On the one hand, stating that a 
given object ‘works’ can clearly in a sense be taken as an evaluation. However, ‘understanding how a 
discourse works’ could also be understood along the lines of establishing cause and effect, and this does 
not imply an evaluation any more than ‘understanding how helium works to alter the pitch of the voice 
when inhaled’. Put differently, Black equivocates between ‘understanding how a discourse does what it is 
supposed to do’ and ‘understanding how a discourse causes whatever effect it causes.’ The first sentence 
implies, I think most would agree, an evaluation; the second does not, at least not in and of itself. 
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The role of evaluation in rhetorical criticism from 1970—1980 
This document is the The Prospect of Rhetoric. Report of the National Development Pro-
ject (Bitzer et al., 1971). The book contains essays, reports and recommendations pre-
pared by some 40 prominent scholars who participated in the Wingspread Conference 
and the follow-up National Conference on Rhetoric.19 This ambitious project, sponsored 
by the Speech Communication Association, aimed to develop the discipline so as to meet 
current and future needs, and as such its conclusions were thoroughly studied at the time 
of publication—and to an extent they still are.20 
One of the most fundamental objectives of the project was to formulate a shared 
definition of rhetoric and of rhetorical criticism.21 The report’s ultimate definition of a 
rhetorical critic was encapsulated in the following statement (Bitzer, Black, & Wallace, 
1971): 
We are arguing that any critic, regardless of the subject of his inquiry, becomes a 
rhetorical critic when his work centers on suasory potential or persuasive effects, 
their source, nature, operation, and consequences. 
Even while this definition contains no direct reference to the task of evaluation, it may 
not be entirely possible to decide on the basis of the quotation whether evaluation should 
or could be considered part of the critic’s tasks. But, according to Walter Fisher, this is 
not the case. In a polemic with Gary Keele, Fisher maintains that “the complete report 
does not justify the conclusion that the Committee [responsible for the above quotation] 
encouraged or even included a regard for normative judgment” and that “[w]hen it was 
first presented in open session at the Wingspread Conference, I asked the Chairman about 
the absence of any reference to the quality of rhetorical transactions and he said the Com-
mittee purposefully omitted it.” (Keele & Fisher, 1974). 
For Fisher, the Committee’s omission of evaluation as the central task of the critic 
is nothing short of unacceptable. As a response, he offered an alternative statement of the 
evaluative conception of rhetorical criticism (Fisher, 1974, p. 75): 
More specifically, [this paper] may be taken as an antithesis statement on criticism 
to the one made by the Committee on Rhetorical Criticism at the National 
                                               
19 The Wingspread conference was held Jan. 25-27, 1970 at the Wingspread Conference Center, Racine, 
Wisc., USA, and the National Conference on Rhetoric was held May 10-15, 1970 in St. Charles, Ill., USA. 
20 Cf., e.g., Mountford (2009), Enos (1997) and Carole Blair’s restatement in Kiewe & Houck (2015). 
21 This would prove—perhaps unsurprisingly—to be a difficult task. For more on this, see Mountford (1997). 
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Conference on Rhetoric. The Committee’s thesis was this: “We are arguing that 
any critic, regardless of the subject of his inquiry, becomes a rhetorical critic when 
his work centers on suasory potential or persuasive effects, their source, nature, 
operation, and consequences.’’ My antithesis is that the committee’s statement ig-
nores the essence of criticism, which I will take to be—a qualitative judgment. 
While Fisher thus upholds the traditional doctrine of rhetorical criticism as evaluative, 
there is clear evidence (apart from the Wingspread report) that something is changing in 
the disciplinary conception of criticism around this time. As Sonja Foss notes (1983) 
Klyn (1968) talked about how criticism “does not imply a prescriptive mode of writing 
or any judgmental necessity”.22 Further, Gary Keele—writing in opposition to Walter 
Fisher—is clearly open to the idea that rhetorical critics may choose a non-evaluative 
approach to criticism and “believe it [to be] a legitimate function of the critic to explain 
[as opposed to evaluate]” (Keele & Fisher, 1974). Similarly, we find in Baskerville an 
earlier expression of agreement with the non-evaluative stance of the Committee on Rhe-
torical Criticism: "Are you not forgetting that the ultimate purpose of criticism is judg-
ment?”, Baskerville asks rhetorically. His reply is a clear call for an attenuation of the 
evaluative component of criticism (Baskerville, 1971, p. 119): 
Regardless of your position on the judicial function of the critic, we can probably 
agree that critics of speakers have of late been more prone than is entirely becom-
ing, to assume the role of judge on the bench, handing down sweeping pronounce-
ments of guilt and innocence, success and failure. 
Further, Wayne Brockriede (1974) is also clearly open to the idea that evaluation is op-
tional, not necessary, when he claims that criticism is “the act of evaluating or analyzing 
experience”. This means that someone functions as a critic “either by passing judgment 
on the experience or by analyzing it for the sake of a better understanding of that experi-
ence or of some more general concept or theory about such experiences.” 23 (my empha-
sis). Continuing along the same lines, albeit more cautiously, Hillbruner (1975) admits 
                                               
22 This quotation is Foss’ summary of Klyn’s point. 
23 Brockriede provides an interesting clue to the state of the discussion at this point in time when he explains 
that ”Marie Nichols, Edwin Black, and other writers may be well be right in claiming that criticism neces-
sarily involves evaluation, judgment, discrimination among values. Others perhaps could make a case that 
criticism necessarily involves analytic description, classification, or explanation. I do not need to deny 
either claim […]” (p. 165). The issue at this point in time, we may take it, is unsettled. It is worth noting, 
however, that Brockriede cites no proponents of non-evaluative rhetorical criticism. 
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that sometimes “a definitive judgment […] cannot be made. If valuation is not possible,” 
he advises, “certainly analysis and interpretation […] is.”24 
There seems to be evidence, then, that the dominant theoretical ideal of rhetorical 
criticism as necessarily evaluative is being seriously challenged around this time. But the 
challenge does not mean that the evaluative doctrine itself disappears entirely, nor that 
support for it vanishes in the journals after 1971. For instance, Campbell (1974, p. 40) 
states that “[i]n my opinion, evaluation is fundamental to the very idea of criticism; all 
critical acts express a judgment resulting from the application of appropriate criteria to 
phenomena of a particular type” and she repeats the same point in a later statement 
(1979), when she maintains that “evaluation will be an inevitable part of critical activity”. 
Similarly, Ewbank and Ewbank (1976) hold that “[d]escription is a necessary antecedent 
to and element in criticism, but it must not be confused with the end product of the critic's 
work, which is evaluation or judgment.” 
The role of evaluation in rhetorical criticism from 1980—present 
The first theorist in the discipline to investigate the disciplinary debate over the distinc-
tion between the analytical/descriptive and evaluative doctrines beyond the length of a 
single paragraph is, as far as I have been able to discover, Stephen E. Lucas (1981). His 
paper “The Schism in Rhetorical Scholarship”, however, does not aim to fully analyze 
how or when non-evaluative criticism came to be regarded as a viable type of rhetorical 
criticism. The purpose of his article is instead to examine the relationship between history 
and criticism. In attempting to develop a tenable distinction between history and criticism 
(a project that Lucas aims to show is bound to fail and which therefore should be put to 
rest), Lucas tests the conjecture that criticism is necessarily evaluative, while history is 
not.25 This basis of differentiation between history and criticism, however, turns out to 
crumble—or so Lucas argues—for rhetorical criticism, he claims, is not necessarily eval-
uative. To support this claim, Lucas adduces four concrete sources: the Wingspread re-
port from 1971, Wayne Brockriede’s distinction between explanatory and evaluative 
                                               
24 Hillbruner is writing specifically about moral evaluation of rhetoric, but for the purposes of this chapter, 
the distinction between different types of evaluation is not central. 
25 With regard to the differences between history and criticism in rhetorical studies, Lucas holds that ”the 
boundary between the two is usually so fluid and indistinct that to insist upon a firm partition is fruitless” 
(1981, p. 19). 
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criticism from 1974,26 Donald Bryant’s (1973) dictum that “all analytic, interpretive, par-
ticularizing, or generalizing examinations of the arts broadly conceived—individual 
works, kinds, elements, aspects, and authors—are essays in criticism,”27 and finally Phil-
lip K. Tompkins (1969), who argues that the fundamental purpose of rhetorical criticism 
is explication rather than evaluation.28 
Perhaps most interesting in the current context is Lucas’ observations regarding 
critical practice (1981, p. 12).: 
Theories of rhetorical criticism often have little to do with the way criticism is prac-
ticed. In fact, relatively few essays in ‘rhetorical criticism’ truly entail explicit eval-
uation as either a necessary or sufficient procedure […] In practice, if not in theory, 
most rhetorical critics produce scholarship that is essentially analytic rather than 
judicial. 
In this way, Lucas repeats the idea already implied by Loren Reid as early as 1944, re-
peated by Baskerville in 1953, Albert Croft in 1956 and illustrated by the contributors to 
the three volumes of The History and Criticism of American Public Address, namely that 
practicing rhetorical critics have in fact frequently ignored the evaluative dimension.  
But even in the face of the growing awareness and acceptance of the idea that 
rhetorical criticism need not be evaluative, the support for the evaluative doctrine was 
still strong at this point. Sonja Foss (1983) writes: 
the critic […] must […] evaluate the symbolic activity of the rhetor being studied 
… As a result of analyzing a symbolic act […] the critic must have ideas about 
what could have been done to make the act function more effectively. To avoid 
making an evaluation as a result of the inquiry, then, is to denigrate human choice 
by refusing to make a choice when given the opportunity. 
                                               
26 We have already encountered these two sources. 
27 Even though this quotation would seem to indicate that Bryant does not regard evaluation to be part of 
rhetorical criticism, Lucas is moving a bit too quickly here. For, as Jasinski (2001) notes, Bryant (1973) 
does in fact include “supporting value judgments” as one of the constituent dimensions of rhetorical criti-
cism. 
28 In support of this position, Tompkins cites as an authority the fierce opponent of evaluative literary criti-
cism, Northrop Frye (1973), who in his “Polemical introduction” famously declared that “the study of 
literature can never be founded on value judgments.” I return to the idea of explication in Chapter 5. 
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And, in a very direct fashion, Benoit and Dean (1985) offer their support for the evalua-
tive doctrine of rhetorical criticism in the following way:29 
[R]hetorical criticism should render an evaluation or judgment. This is consistent 
with the meaning of the term “criticism”; it is consistent with usage by various 
rhetorical scholars; and we ought not be dismayed if it differs from usage in other 
disciplines. Many useful investigations of rhetoric exist which do not include judg-
ments. However, strictly speaking, they should be referred to by a different label, 
since a study must evaluate if it is to qualify as “criticism.” 
Dale L. Sullivan (1993) also joins the proponents of evaluation when he states that “[c]rit-
icism is the process of evaluation i.e., the process of locating an object of criticism within 
a value system” (ibid., p. 341) and further that “[t]he ultimate aim of criticism is evalua-
tion” (ibid., p. 344). 
On the one hand, Sullivan’s conception of rhetorical criticism is supported by 
Nothstine, Blair, and Copeland (1994). But on the other, these authors simultaneously 
assert that there has been a decline in evaluative criticism when they write that “[w]hile 
one might expect criticism’s principal operations to be interpretative and/or evaluative, 
contemporary critics align themselves with scientists in describing their work as primar-
ily explanatory in nature.” (I will return to Nothstine et al. in Chapter 3 to analyze and 
discuss their explanation of the decline). 
To round off the survey, consider Jim A. Kuypers (2009) who—in a recent book 
aimed at educating students of rhetorical criticism—writes that “[g]enerally speaking 
your essay should contain three components: a description, an analysis, and an evalua-
tion” and further that “[f]or our purposes, we are interested specifically in the analysis 
and evaluation of rhetorical acts.” Kuypers is the last—and therefore most recent—ex-
ample to be adduced here, but he clearly seems to endorse the evaluative component and 
regard it as important for rhetorical criticism. 
Conclusion 
This chapter began by noting that prominent contemporary scholars such as James Jasin-
ski, Leslie Olson, and David Zarefsky have independently asserted that the evaluative 
                                               
29 Notice the parallel between this position and Rosenfield’s (1968, p. 54) sentiment that “we ought seldom 
to find a critic engaging in description of a rhetoric event for its own sake; and if we do, we ought perhaps 
proceed most cautiously in determining whether to label the product ‘criticism’.” 
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dimension of rhetorical criticism declined during the twentieth century. The purpose of 
this chapter was to investigate and qualify their claim by scrutinizing a range of relevant 
sources consisting mainly of journal articles on rhetorical criticism containing passages 
bearing on the role of evaluation in rhetorical criticism. 
The first thing to note on the basis of the foregoing review is that there is clearly 
a discernible point of disruption in the surveyed literature. Since Wichelns, the theoretical 
descriptions of rhetorical criticism either implied, asserted or argued that evaluation is a 
central or even constitutive dimension of rhetorical criticism. But the support for this 
doctrine began to wane around the middle of the century when Redding (1957) proposed 
that the evaluative dimension of rhetorical criticism could be omitted in order to focus 
instead on analysis. The Wingspread report from 1971 clearly strengthened the non-eval-
uative doctrine of criticism, and scholars like Tompkins (1969), Keele (1971) and 
Brockriede (1974) further gave support to this new doctrine. And by 1981, Lucas treated 
the idea of non-evaluative rhetorical criticism as largely uncontroversial. 
But, in a way, perhaps it always was uncontroversial. For while theorists of rhe-
torical criticism only started to recognize non-evaluative criticism as a viable option 
around 1970, there is clear evidence that practicing critics at least since Wichelns have 
always produced non-evaluative criticism. Reid (1944), Baskerville (1953), Croft (1956), 
Lucas (1981), and Brock et al. (1989) thus all state or imply that practicing critics were 
to a large extent always non-evaluative. In this way, then, the decline of evaluative criti-
cism asserted by Jasinski, Olson, and Zarefsky may be appreciated in a new light. 
On the one hand, the present chapter has thus provided evidence for the claim that 
evaluation in rhetorical criticism declined in the twentieth century. On the other hand, the 
chapter has contributed to qualifying the story of decline by drawing a distinction between 
the theoretical ideals and the practical realities of rhetorical criticism. Among the remain-
ing issues, however, is to understand the causes of the decline. How did the evaluative 
dimension of rhetorical criticism come to be marginalized? What caused it to move from 
the center of the discipline to the sidelines? By understanding the causes of this reconfig-
uration in as much detail as possible, it will hopefully be possible to discuss sensibly 
whether the decline should be accepted as inevitable.  
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C H A P T E R  3  
Explaining the decline of 
evaluative criticism 
 
 
 
The point of departure of Chapter 2 was a specific claim about the development of rhe-
torical criticism made by prominent rhetorical scholars such as James Jasinski, Lester C. 
Olson, and David Zarefsky. According to the claim, the evaluative dimension of rhetori-
cal criticism declined during the twentieth century. The aim of Chapter 2 was to survey 
a range of historical sources in order to examine and qualify the claim. And the survey 
produced evidence that Jasinski, Olson, and Zarefsky are correct – at least partially – 
when they claim that evaluation declined during the twentieth century. For around 1970, 
a widely supported theoretical conception of rhetorical criticism—according to which 
evaluation is its purpose—was supplemented, perhaps even supplanted, by an alternative 
conception of rhetorical criticism in which explanation/analysis is regarded as the pur-
pose of rhetorical criticism. 
James Jasinski describes the decline of the evaluative dimension as a “significant 
development” in history of rhetorical criticism (2001, p. 250). But this description, I 
would argue, amounts to an understatement. When the standardly accepted purpose of a 
whole field of inquiry is eclipsed by a markedly different alternative, it would be more 
fitting to say that a radical reorientation of that discipline has taken place. And radical 
reorientations of a field or discipline—any field or discipline—call for disciplinary self-
examination. The aim of this chapter is to begin such a disciplinary self-examination. The 
means is to continue the historical mode of inquiry of Chapter 2, only this time with a 
different focus. This chapter thus examines why the evaluative dimension of rhetorical 
criticism declined. 
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Which factors can explain why evaluation went from being a central, even con-
stitutive, part to a peripheral, optional, element of rhetorical criticism? This question is 
relevant, as just intimated, for the self-understanding of rhetorical criticism as a field. 
But, further, the question is relevant in the present context given an important hypothesis 
motivating this study, namely that evaluative rhetorical criticism contains a potential by 
virtue of which it deserves to be taken seriously alongside more “neutral”, descriptive-
explanatory studies. This is the potential to improve rhetorical practice through its ca-
pacity to effect reasoned change. I thus contend that evaluative criticism ought to be more 
thoroughly practiced, studied and theorized—alongside other types of rhetorical criti-
cism. 
In this chapter, I therefore critically discuss—and ultimately reject—a possible 
explanation for the decline of evaluative criticism, namely the influence of professional-
ization on the field of rhetorical criticism as described by Nothstine, Blair, and Copeland 
(1994). Then, I go on to construct an alternative to the explanation intimated by Nothstine 
et al., and I argue that this alternative explanation has greater explanatory power. Lastly, 
I argue that neither of the explanations for the decline provide good reasons for today’s 
rhetorical critics to avoid engaging in evaluative rhetorical criticism. 
Did professionalization cause the decline? 
In their book Critical Questions: Invention, Creativity, and the Criticism of Discourse 
and Media, William Nothstine, Carole Blair, and Gary Copeland (1994) describe a par-
ticular movement in academia towards a culture or an ideology known as professional-
ism.30 To see in more detail what professionalism entails, consider the following (ibid., 
p. 18): 
Professionalism in academia is also a historically identifiable ideological edifice 
held together by three interlocking supports: disciplinarity, the creation and en-
forcement of academic disciplines, which divide knowledge into separate territo-
ries, each with its own proper methods of investigation; scientism, the reduction of 
all “knowledge” to a somewhat limited interpretation of the assumptions and 
                                               
30 Professionalism is not a term invented by Nothstine et al., but a term used widely to describe a specific 
and commonly recognized phenomenon within the Western academic world. See for instance Wilshire 
(2002) and Graff (2007). 
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techniques of modern science; and pressure toward civic and experiential disen-
gagement on the part of the academic professional.  
According to the Nothstine et al., rhetorical criticism—and a host of other disciplines, 
practices, and assumptions within the academy—are increasingly shaped and structured 
by professionalism. In fact, the effects of professionalism, the increasing professionali-
zation, the authors hold, have been felt in “every field,” including literary studies, history, 
philosophy and political science (p. 26). But what are those effects? 
Especially salient in our context, professionalization reduces the possibility and 
acceptability of evaluative criticism due to its impetus towards shaping the humanities 
and social sciences in the mold of the natural sciences (“scientism”). This impetus man-
ifests itself in several different ways. One way is through the tendency of professionalism 
to disengage academics from “public experience and involvement.” According to Noth-
stine et al., this tendency is enforced through a pressure to construe critical judgments “in 
ever more technical senses, imperiling the sense of their broadly human significance, and 
of how they might be true of human life.” The fundamental questions or motivations 
guiding research thus change, so that they become “ideologically neutral, detached from 
historical and pragmatic considerations” (ibid., p. 23). The proper stance for the profes-
sionalized researcher becomes one of “objectivity—practical, ethical, and intellectual 
distance from the object of study.” This stance of objectivity amounts to a situation in 
which “the questions worth asking, and the answers worth having, are generally empirical 
in nature and positivist in temperament.” 
Disengagement, then, is one consequence of the scientistic impulse of profession-
alization obstructing the evaluative dimension of rhetorical criticism. But another conse-
quence of professionalization and the accompanying scientism is that “explanation and 
prediction are to be distinguished […] from the rendering of a judgment.” (ibid., p. 25). 
An important corollary of this development, according to Nothstine et al., is that “’The-
ory’ has become virtually the singular objective of criticism; even ‘judgment,’ which 
might seem a definitional end of anything called ‘criticism,’ has become a secondary and 
often quite expendable goal.” (ibid., p. 32). Because of this development, “[w]hile one 
might expect criticism’s principal operations to be interpretative and/or evaluative, con-
temporary critics align themselves with scientists in describing their work as primarily 
explanatory in nature.” (ibid., p. 34) According to Nothstine et al., this emphasis on 
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theory and explanation leads to a situation in the academy in which “normative judgments 
of all varieties—ethical, political, and moral—are frequently devalued.” (ibid., p. 35). 
Although Nothstine et al. invoke professionalization primarily in order to explain 
why invention, i.e. the process of developing questions that can productively drive rhe-
torical criticism, has been “systematically slighted” (ibid., p. 15), it is easy to see how 
professionalization with its emphasis on detachment and its devaluation of normativity 
and judgment is also in many ways incompatible with the evaluative dimension of criti-
cism. 
Professionalization is not a good explanation of the decline 
The narrative of professionalization proposed by Nothstine et al. is, as far as I am aware, 
the closest thing to an explanation of the decline of the evaluative dimension of rhetorical 
criticism available in the rhetorical literature. But there is something about the narrative 
that seems to me to be imprecise. Congruent with the evidence we amassed in Chapter 2, 
Nothstine et al. seem to locate the effects of professionalization to around the time of the 
Wingspread conference in 1971,31 and according to the authors, professionalization im-
pacted virtually every discipline. But if this is true, then we should expect to see the ef-
fects of professionalism not just in rhetorical criticism, but also in other disciplines. That 
is, we should expect to see the same positivist yearn for neutrality, objectivity, disengage-
ment, and abstinence from normativity and judgment from all around the academy. And 
this, I believe, goes against the evidence. In fact, other disciplines closely related to rhet-
oric (such as political theory and informal logic) seem to have made the very opposite 
turn (away from detached explanation/analysis and toward engagement, normativity and 
judgment) at the very same time that the evaluative dimension of rhetorical criticism de-
clined. That is, while many rhetorical critics seem to have retreated from their position as 
openly evaluative and normative around the time of the Wingspread conference in 1971, 
at least some disciplinary neighbors went the other way: from a detached and neutral 
attitude to a normative, evaluative and engaged one. 
Consider for instance political philosopher John Rawls’ massively influential 
work A Theory of Justice (1971/1999). In the disciplinary self-understanding of political 
theorists, this work is commonly considered to mark the beginnings of a shift away from 
                                               
31 Nothstine et al. do not offer discuss this in detail, but most of their illustrations of professionalization come 
from texts published around this time. 
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a sterile, positivist political theory preoccupied with linguistic analysis of political con-
cepts (see Kymlicka, 2002, p. 10; List & Valentini, 2016).32 In the very same year as the 
Wingspread Report, then, we thus saw the publication of an immediately and hugely in-
fluential milestone in the revival of normative political theory. 
While certainly an important factor, Rawls’ book did of course not singlehandedly 
cause the revival of a normative political theory. Other events certainly contributed. 
Speaking of the issue of the revival of normative political theory in the early 1970s from 
the earlier grips of positivism during which the whole enterprise of political theory had 
been pronounced all but “dead” (Laslett, 1956, p. vii), Terence Ball states, ”Vietnam 
raised anew and brought to the forefront exactly the sorts of normative questions that 
political theory was supposed to address—questions about the rights and duties of citi-
zens, about one’s obligation to fight for the state, about just (and unjust) wars, about 
active and passive resistance, and related matters.” (Ball, 1994, p. 49). 
Similarly, Brian Barry (1980, p. 285) notes: 
If Rawls’s A Theory of Justice was the internal stimulus to the outpouring of [nor-
mative] political philosophy that we have witnessed since 1971, the Vietnam war 
was unquestionably the crucial external stimulus. Individual choices had to be made 
about draft resistance and other forms of civil disobedience; and those who con-
demned the war had to develop the categories in which to show what was wrong 
with the means by which the war was being waged by the USA. 
David Miller (1990, p. 422) agrees that the revival of normative political theory was in 
large part fueled by a “sharp rise in the level of ideological contestation in western soci-
eties, sparked off especially by the emergence of the New Left and the controversies 
surrounding the Vietnam War.” 
                                               
32 List & Valentini (2016, p. 530) note that ”[t]he bulk of political theory in the decades prior to the publica-
tion of Rawls’ A Theory of Justice was conceptual analysis” and further that ”conceptual analysis is, in 
some sense, the least normative or evaluative part of political theory.” Cf. also Brian Barry (1980, pp. 284–
285) who asks about A Theory of Justice, ”Why was this extremely long, poorly organized and stylistically 
undistinguished book such a smash hit? […] I think for many social scientists, reared on simple-minded 
logical positivism in graduate courses on ‘methodology’, the most exciting thing about Rawls was that he 
showed one could sustain rational argument about questions of ‘values’ over 600 or so pages. Among 
philosophers, logical positivism, with its doctrine that all ‘value judgments’ are merely ‘emotive utterances’ 
- boos and hurrahs - had already been discredited. But Rawls was the first person to carry the message to 
non-philosophers.” 
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Obviously, these explanations point to highly normative concerns, located well 
outside the neutral and “value free” epistemological realm championed by the positivists. 
And they spring from a deeply felt need to engage with matters external to academia 
judged to be humanly significant—sentiment in direct opposition to the aloof positivism 
that Nothstine et al. claim was and is (silently) dominant. At the very time of the Wing-
spread Conference, then, aspirations of conducting political research in a neutral and de-
tached fashion were being forcefully challenged: “The hope of establishing a positivistic 
political science,” writes Ball, “was dealt a decisive if perhaps not mortal blow by the 
United States’ experience in Vietnam” (1994, pp. 45–53). 
These narratives from academic studies of politics, then, provide counter-exam-
ples to the narrative of professionalization offered by Nothstine et al. But the switch from 
a detached to an engaged attitude also occurred in other areas of the academy. For in-
stance, the movement of informal logic arose as a response to the perceived inadequacies 
of formal deductive logic with respect to normatively engaging the kinds of discourse 
surrounding societal events that seemed most pressingly in need of study, such as the war 
in Vietnam. Howard Kahane (1971, p. vii), one of the founders of informal logic, de-
scribes the issue in the following way: 
[I]n class a few years back, while I was going over the (to me) fascinating intrica-
cies of the predicate logic quantifier rules, a student asked in disgust how anything 
he’d learned all semester long had any bearing whatever on President Johnson’s 
decision to escalate again in Vietnam. I mumbled something about bad logic on 
Johnson’s part, and then stated that Introduction to Logic was not that kind of 
course. His reply was to ask what courses did take up such matters, and I had to 
admit that so far as I knew none did. 
According to informal logicians Johnson, Blair, & Hoaglund (1996, pp. 85-86 and p. 
243), the admission by Kahane that the methods and tools of formal deductive logic could 
do little to engage or critique “real world” political discourse should be seen as an ex-
pression of a foundational impulse behind the movement of informal logic: Since the goal 
of informal logic is precisely to provide normative traction for the systematic evaluation 
of e.g. political discourse, and since formal deductive logic could not deliver appropriate 
means for doing so, it was necessary to abandon formal deductive logic or at least to 
amend it radically in order to develop the kinds of tools suitable for the normative enter-
prise yearned for by university students and staff alike. 
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Both political theory and informal logic—sometimes also classified as ‘argumen-
tation theory’ (especially in European contexts)—are alive and well today. And main-
stream theorists in both disciplines commonly advocate a squarely normative approach. 
Consider for example the political theorist Simone Chambers (2004), who—inspired by 
Habermas’ (1987) theory of communicative action—states that “theories of deliberative 
democracy should be developing critical standards of rhetoric” (ibid., p. 404) and calls 
for the development of “a substantive ideal of a speaker worth listening to” (ibid., p. 410). 
Conversely, in argumentation theory, the very influential pragma-dialectical approach to 
argumentation studies is representative of many other approaches in the specific sense 
that it begins from a clear normative premise (“the ideal model of a critical discussion”) 
and proceeds to analyze and evaluative argumentative artifacts from there.33 
Political theory and informal logic are by no means fringe cases when it comes to 
an increased openness and recognition of evaluative modes of scholarship. Many other 
disciplines have at various points in time seen an increased awareness and recognition of 
evaluative modes of scholarship. These include sociology, political science, literary stud-
ies, and the philosophy of art. 
In large part due to Weber, sociology is a discipline typically regarded as com-
mitted to value-neutral and detached social scientific research. But although this mode of 
research may still be the mainstream ideal in sociology, the discipline is displaying in-
creasing awareness and interest in evaluative and normative modes of scholarship. For 
an early and clear example of this reorientation in the discipline, consider for instance the 
introduction to Wardell and Turners’ Sociological Theory in Transition (1986). In the 
introduction, Derek L. Phillips notes that there is “clear evidence of a normative turn in 
sociology”. The traditional sociological doctrine in which sociologists view “normative 
concerns as out of bounds as concerns their own work” he rejects as old-fashioned, un-
timely and “a thing of the past”. What the normative turn in sociology invites and re-
quires, he says, is to provide “a vision of a better society: a society that is more just, more 
legitimate, more authentic for the lives of full-fledged moral beings.” And he urges that 
sociologists begin to study which “rules, practices, and arrangements are morally justified 
and why” with the ultimate aim of developing a “theoretical understanding which can be 
used to help improve and transform society.” 
                                               
33 For an authoritative overview of the pragma-dialectical ideal model in particular and the pragma-dialectical 
approach in general, see van Eemeren et al. (2014). 
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For a more recent example from sociology, consider how Blau & Moncada (2015, 
p. 18) also notice a normative turn in sociology by referencing Michael Burawoy’s pres-
idential address at the 2004 meeting of the American Sociological Association in which 
he underscored the importance of a committed and engaged “public sociology” (Bu-
rawoy, 2005). His address, according to Blau and Moncada, “marks a shift away from 
the idea that scholars are neutral and objective observers and instead [contends] that 
scholars can be clear about the ideals and aspirations they have for a good society […]”. 
Moving from sociology to political science, Gerring and Yesnowitz (2006) pro-
pose a “normative turn in political science”. Sensing a “growing uneasiness with the ven-
erable fact/value dichotomy” (ibid., p. 101, p. 104) among political scientists in recent 
decades, they see political science as a field ready for integration with normative modes 
of scholarship. Such a “normatively informed political science” (ibid., p. 133), they hold, 
will make for a more “relevant and useful political science discipline” (ibid., p. 101). 
In the field of literary studies, Barbara Herrnstein Smith asserts in her article 
“Contingencies of Value” (1983)34 that evaluative literary criticism is grossly under-ex-
plored and deserves much more attention: 
It is a curious feature of literary studies in America that one of the most venerable, 
central, theoretically significant, and pragmatically inescapable set of problems re-
lating to literature has not been a subject of serious inquiry for the past fifty years. 
I refer here to the fact not merely that the study of literary evaluation has been, as 
we might say, "neglected," but that the entire problematic of value and evaluation 
has been evaded and explicitly exiled by the literary academy. 
And, moving from literary studies to philosophy of art, Susan L. Feagin (2012, p. 149) 
has recently illustrated its current evaluative agenda by pointing out that “[o]ne of the 
liveliest debates in contemporary philosophy of art concerns whether it is possible for 
reasons to provide at least some measure of rational or logical support for evaluative 
judgments of works of art.” In fact, even in the discipline of philosophy of science, openly 
evaluative and normative scholarship is now emerging (Shrader-Frechette, 2014). 
As we have seen, the narrative offered by Nothstine and his colleagues posits 
professionalization as the cause of the decline of evaluative criticism in rhetorical criti-
cism. Professionalization, they hold, is a pan-academic development, and therefore it also 
affects rhetorical criticism causing it to move towards detached explanation and away 
                                               
34 The article was later followed up by a book-length study of evaluation (Smith, 1988). 
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from evaluative judgment. But as I have argued here, this narrative does not seem entirely 
accurate, for competing narratives in the disciplines of political theory and informal logic 
reveal that engagement and normative modes of scholarship actually increased around 
1970. And, moreover, other disciplines such as sociology, political science, literary the-
ory and philosophy of art seem to be increasingly interested in evaluative issues. So per-
haps professionalization is not the key factor in the decline of the evaluative dimension 
in rhetorical criticism. But if professionalization cannot account entirely for the decline 
of evaluative rhetorical criticism, what alternative explanations could? 
A rival explanation: Less authority and tradition, more rigor 
The decline of evaluative rhetorical criticism is undoubtedly a complex development to 
explain in full detail. And any fully-fledged explanation of such a reorientation of an 
academic field must take into consideration a wide range of factors. Pursuing such an 
explanation in detail unfortunately lies outside the scope of this dissertation. 
But I would nevertheless like to venture an alternative explanation, however hy-
pothetical it will have to be, for the decline of evaluative rhetorical criticism. My expla-
nation focuses on two separate factors. One factor is related to the scientism accounted 
for by Nothstine, Blair, and Copeland and the accompanying increase in demand for 
scholarly rigor. The other factor is the general atmosphere of revolution and protest, the 
counterculture, prevalent around 1970. 
In The Death of the Critic (2007), literary theorist and critic Rónán McDonald 
argues that questions of quality, value and evaluation have been “pushed aside” in aca-
demic circles (ibid., p. viii) due to the rise of cultural studies, which has led to a “radical 
change in emphasis” in the humanities (ibid., p. ix) promoting “a general suspicion not 
just of canon formation but of aesthetic judgement as a whole.” This has led to a tendency 
for academic literary criticism to become “increasingly inward-looking and non-evalua-
tive” (ibid., p. xi). The status of the critic across the arts, according to McDonald, is thus 
“much lower now than it was in the 1950s or 1960s.” (ibid., p. viii). 
While McDonald is quick to point out that there is “no one cause for the death of 
the critic”, he traces the beginning of the evaluative critic’s downward slope to the time 
around 1970—congruent with the development in rhetorical criticism. This period, 
McDonald explains, is when academia and especially the humanities experienced the on-
set of three connected intellectual trends, namely structuralism, poststructuralism and, 
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finally, cultural studies. Crucially, as McDonald sees it, these intellectual paradigms are 
not compatible with a serious focus on literary values and evaluative criticism. 
What was the problem with evaluative criticism according to the three paradigms? 
First of all, evaluative literary criticism was—to its detractors—associated with “way-
ward, unquantifiable 'hunches'” and with expressions of “taste and personal preference” 
(ibid., p. 116). Evaluative criticism was, viewed from this angle, “mere exercises of taste, 
a dubious sort of frippery that was shot through with unacknowledged prejudice and elit-
ism.” (ibid., p. 124) And this kind of talk was not welcome in the academy. The sentiment 
was this: “Least of all [criticism] is about communicating our enthusiasms or value judge-
ments. We can have our individual proclivities, however bizarre, but they should be con-
fined to the privacy of our own homes.” (ibid., p. 117). 35 
But what was behind this damning view of evaluative criticism? What were the 
motivating factors, or causes, that brought about this reorientation of literary criticism? 
McDonald does not pursue this question fully, but he hints at two possible important 
answers. One has to do with satisfying a disciplinary anxiety in the English Departments, 
namely the wish “to deliver a long-elusive quarry: disciplinary rigour.” As McDonald 
explains, post-1970 there was an “urge to gird up ‘Eng Lit’, to give it some scientific 
trappings,” in order to “[get] rid of the subjective dimension, and repudiating the elitist 
associations of canons, traditions and evaluative judgments.” (ibid., p. 117). 
McDonald is thus clearly in line with the explanation offered by Nothstine, Blair, 
and Copeland captured by their concept of scientism. But McDonald also offers another 
possible factor to account for the decline of evaluative criticism. For, as he notes, the time 
of 1970 was a time marked by a “generational conflict with authority, flushed with the 
spirit of 1968 […]” The concern with literary values was simply considered outdated: 
                                               
35 McDonald’s diagnosis aligns well with literary theorist Chris Baldick's (2006, p. 94), who writes: ”From 
the 1960s, indeed, evaluative criticism began to lose its pre-eminence in the academy. More ambitious, and 
apparently more rigourous, even scientific-looking projects emerged to threaten it. The Canadian academic 
Northrop Frye launched a grand universal theory of literary forms and genres in his Anatomy of Criticism 
(1957), explicitly sidelining questions of critical valuation. The growing influence of structuralist and post-
structuralist theories in the 1970s and after, accompanied by the impacts of Marxism and psychoanalysis, 
tended to displace critical evaluation further, in favour of ’scientific’ or otherwise value-free accounts of 
literature in the academy. The home of pure criticism—normally the English Department—became in-
creasingly contaminated by neighboring academic disciplines such as philosophy, linguistics, sociology, 
history, and psychology, giving rise to new politicized interdisciplinary structures: Cultural Studies, 
Women’s Studies, Gender Studies, and Post-Colonial Studies.” 
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“Talk of canons, great traditions or timeless beauty belonged to the older, fustier genera-
tion, like bowler hats or monocles. How refreshing to able to get past all that cloistered, 
quasi-religious chatter, with its defence of elite sensibility and its palpable disdain for 
popular culture and the modern world.” (ibid., pp. 115-116) Literary studies post-1970 
was thus influenced by “a radical politics” in “the spirit of the 1968 student revolution-
aries, and their intellectual inspirations”. And this led to an “Oedipal assault on the old 
order.” 
And perhaps in this assault on the old order we find a plausible explanation for 
the opposite developments of fields such as literary and rhetorical criticism on the one 
hand, and political theory and informal logic on the other. For a radical break from the 
“fustier generation” would mean, in the former cases, a movement away from evaluation, 
and, in the latter cases, a movement towards evaluation. As such, the generational conflict 
with authority highlighted by McDonald gains an explanatory power which helps account 
for the opposite attitudes taken by various disciplines in relation to evaluative modes of 
scholarship.36 
I mentioned earlier that my explanation also would take into account another fac-
tor, namely scientism. Scientism entails, at its heart, a search for disciplinary rigor. It can 
be interpreted as an attempt to guard against the accusation that knowledge creation is 
fundamentally subjective and biased to the point where its credibility is undermined. And 
we can interpret the opposite movements in literary and rhetorical criticism on the one 
hand and political theory and informal logic on the other hand as different responses to 
this demand for rigor. For Rawls’ normative project was also an attempt to show how 
evaluative scholarship can rest on rigorous foundations. The same goes for the rise of 
informal logic. Both developments can be interpreted as attempts to undergird certain 
evaluative intuitions about society and argument with systematic frameworks capable of 
meeting the increase in demand for scholarly rigor. As McDonald points out, literary 
criticism, and perhaps the humanities more broadly, took another route. Instead of provid-
ing their evaluative tradition with suitable frameworks to replace the hitherto dominant 
subjectivity and elitism, they instead abandoned the attempt to save evaluation in favor 
of an analytical-explanatory research program designed to counter all accusations of 
                                               
36 I would like to thank Christian Kock (personal communication) for guiding me towards this insight. 
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subjectivism. This aligns with the development of rhetorical criticism away from evalu-
ation and judgment as central to the field. 
To be sure, offering these counter-narratives cannot disprove that professionali-
zation actually caused the decline of evaluation in rhetorical criticism. But at the very 
least, the counter-narratives offered here do invite questions as to how inevitable the 
movement away from evaluative criticism really was. In other disciplines, a lively eval-
uative dimension is seen as closely connected with the disciplines’ relevance in society 
at large. Maybe it is time for rhetorical critics to join their colleagues from political the-
ory, argumentation theory, literary studies, philosophy of art in asking whether and how 
the relevance of evaluative modes of scholarship ought to be reconsidered.  
Evaluative criticism has the potential to improve a practice 
But what could such relevance consist in? What are the benefits of evaluative criticism? 
What does it have to offer that we cannot get from non-evaluative criticism? Unless some 
answer to this question can be mustered, the reason for the decline of evaluative criticism 
could simply be that it does not offer anything that non-evaluative criticism could not do 
just as well. In order to make the case for the continued relevance of evaluative criticism, 
this last section of the chapter investigates what rhetorical critics themselves have said 
about the purpose of evaluative criticism. The answer that emerges is roughly this: Eval-
uative criticism and normative theorizing enable reasoned improvement of the target 
practices (in our case rhetoric). Further, evaluative criticism and normative theorizing 
more directly engage the concerns that are relevant to the communities of which univer-
sities are a part. Therefore, evaluative criticism and normative theorizing are scholarly 
enterprises that ought to be taken seriously—and are being taken seriously in other disci-
plines.  
As we saw in the Chapter 2, the evaluative dimension has been held to be central 
to rhetorical criticism by a long line of distinguished theorists and critics. Given the im-
portance of this particular aspect of rhetorical criticism, it seems natural to inquire into 
the reasons for its centrality: Wherein lies the importance of the evaluative dimension of 
rhetorical criticism? Interestingly, this question is actually left unaddressed by the major-
ity of rhetorical scholars writing about evaluation. It seems that these theorists and critics 
generally rely on a kind of stipulative definition of criticism from which it follows that 
evaluation is a necessary part of criticism because criticism—as a matter of semantic 
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entailment—contains an evaluative dimension. In other words, because evaluation is part 
of the meaning of criticism, critics who do not evaluate actually fail at “doing criticism”. 
But not all critics rely on this semantic strategy to explain the purpose of evaluation. 
Notable rhetorical critics and theorists such as Barnet Baskerville, Anthony Hillbruner, 
and Barbara and Henry Ewbank offer explicit justifications of the centrality of the eval-
uative dimension in criticism. 
Barnet Baskerville (1953, p. 2) offers the earliest discussion of the purpose or 
point of evaluation that I have been able to find. In discussing his conception of criticism 
as an instrument aimed to ”distinguish quality from shoddy” (a clearly evaluative aim), 
he remarks that ”[c]ompetent criticism […] can do much to guide and improve public 
taste […] and by so doing can force eventual modifications in practice.” For Baskerville, 
then, there is a clear connection between evaluative criticism of a rhetorical practice and 
the potential for improving the quality of this practice. According to Baskerville (1953, 
p. 2) ”[t]he critic, as a dealer in values, has a responsibility to see that both speaker and 
audience learn to value the right things, and in the right order.” The purpose of evaluation, 
for Baskerville, is thus ultimately practical and pedagogical. As he concludes (1953, p. 
5): 
It is the function of criticism to render intelligent and relevant judgments, and in so 
doing ultimately to elevate standards and improve practice. In the field of speech, 
as elsewhere, a continual re-evaluation of criteria, both as to individual worth and 
relative importance, is vital to the highest fulfillment of this function. 
To sum up: The purpose of evaluation in rhetorical criticism is to improve the quality of 
rhetoric by making judgments. And it does so by formulating, reflecting upon and em-
ploying evaluative criteria suitable to this task. 
In a later publication, Baskerville expands on the dynamic relation between eval-
uative criticism and the practice it takes as its object. In a discussion of the vagaries of 
earlier evaluative critics and their now abandoned criteria for evaluation, Baskerville re-
marks (Baskerville, 1959, p. 45): 
Then, as now, theory, criticism, and practice worked hand in hand. Critics admired 
what it was fashionable to admire, and in a manner acceptable at the time. Speakers 
obliged by producing oratory of the kind that was admired. Rhetoricians and 
schoolmasters observed great orators in action and formulated principles on the 
basis of what they saw. In such a continuous chain it is impossible to distinguish 
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cause from effect; all were causes and all effects. Each acted on the other, and to-
gether they contributed to the forming of public taste, to establishing the fashion. 
Once again we encounter the idea that the purpose of evaluative criticism is closely re-
lated to the fundamental idea that a practice can be improved by being subjected to eval-
uative criticism. 
This point about the relation between evaluative criticism and its object is echoed 
by Anthony Hillbruner (1960). Writing at a time when the quality of public speaking was 
generally considered to be of a depressingly low quality (this seems to be a perennial 
challenge for democracies), Hillbruner writes: ”Our point is very simple; although it has 
its attendant complex ramifications, public speaking as an art is not flowering because 
contemporary criticism as an art is not flowering” (1960, p. 5). Just as Baskerville before 
him, Hillbruner is thus calling attention to the perceived relationship between evaluative 
criticism and the practice it takes as its object. Since evaluative criticism is taken to be a 
means of improving rhetorical practice, the low quality of the practice is explained (in 
part) by the low quality of evaluative criticism. This situation, Hillbruner holds, is detri-
mental to rhetorical criticism as an academic discipline. For a vital aspect of the justifi-
cation of rhetorical criticism lies in its connection with rhetorical practice (1960, p. 6): 
But something more is needed, something of a larger nature is required if contem-
porary rhetorical critics are to make salient contributions to today's society and if 
they are to stimulate the growth of public address as an art. That something is the 
original and productively creative rhetorical critique of contemporary public ad-
dress. 
Hillbruner further describes the kind of criticism he has in mind (1960, p. 9): 
It should call attention to the best speaking of the day. It should castigate the poor 
speaking. It should, through its criticisms, improve the practice of public speaking 
in contemporary society. It should attempt to make modern public address an art 
form coordinate and congenial with, perhaps even superior to, that of the previous 
"Golden Ages of Oratory." It should stimulate a social climate in which public 
awareness of the proper role of oratory and its accompanying criticism would be as 
natural to the body politic as the value of the other forms: writing, painting, or 
architecture, is. Finally, it should bring into proper perspective for layman and ex-
pert alike the ideal, so often theoretically announced and so seldom practically 
demonstrated, that public address is one of the primary tools of a democracy and 
should hasten the day of its ascendency. 
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Hillbruner’s vision for rhetorical criticism, then, is clearly normative. But how, more ex-
actly, can evaluative criticism improve the quality of the practice it takes as its object? 
Hillbruner argues by way of analogy (1960, p. 9): 
What reason is there to believe, however, that even with this kind of creative criti-
cism of public address that the desired changes would take place? Basically, be-
cause change, growth, and development in the other art forms have come about in 
part at least because of the scope and variety of the criticism of those art forms and 
that in most cases such criticism was of the dynamically creative character. Con-
temporary writers are aware of what the critics have to say about them and their 
writing. And even though some rugged individualists, such as Faulkner, for in-
stance, claim that they never read reviews of their work, much less make conscious 
attempts to profit from them, there is little doubt that such criticism is influential. 
Moreover, if this group of recalcitrants do not utilize the specific critiques of their 
works, still most of them have read evaluations of their predecessors or of their 
colleagues and have profited. As a result, the art of literature has changed, has con-
stantly grown and developed. As with the development of literature under the in-
fluence of the critics, so too with the other arts. The painter has profited from the 
evaluations of both his friendly colleagues and of the art historians and critics. Look 
at the development of art from its earliest beginnings to the present day and observe 
the constant alteration and change. Although not all, certainly much of this change 
has come about through the suggestions, proddings, and even condemnations of the 
art critics. Music, too, that is serious music, has profited from the analyses and 
evaluations of the critics who have urged it to constant mutation and change. And 
at every stage stand and have stood the music critics, constantly evaluating their 
contemporaries; certainly their contribution to the evolution of modern music is not 
a negligible one. 
There is no doubt that Hillbruner is wise to hedge his claim somewhat by saying that that 
“change, growth, and development” in practices such as literature, painting, architecture 
and music come about only ”in part” due to evaluative criticism of those practices. For it 
must be admitted that the causes of change and development of these practices are mul-
tifarious and exceedingly difficult to pin down in any precise manner. This, however, 
does not detract from Hillbruner’s basic point, namely that evaluative criticism holds the 
potential to influence and improve a practice. And, moreover, the influence of evaluative 
criticism on a practice is—if the criticism is well-argued—a reflective and rational one. 
Economic fluctuations, demographic changes, new technologies, politics and other mac-
roscale factors of course wield an influence on arts and practices such as literature, archi-
tecture, painting, music—even rhetoric (think of Twitter). But this influence is marked 
neither by its reliance on reasons or reflection. In comparison, reasoned and reflective 
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evaluative criticism can produce changes in its object that come about as a result of a 
much more rational process. While such “rational development” might not always be 
something to strive for in arts such as literature, music and painting (in part because these 
practices seemingly rely on subconscious inspiration and sensibility), reasoned change 
and development seems to me to be very much appropriate for social and political arts 
(or practices) such as political rhetoric.37  
Ultimately, then, evaluative criticism, according to Hillbruner, holds the potential 
to “improve our speech-making and make a contribution to our role as molders of a dem-
ocratic society.” (Hillbruner, 1960, p. 7). And the idea of the link between evaluative 
criticism and something larger than the discipline itself (idealistic as it may seem) is 
shared by Walter R. Fisher. He states the issue in this way (Fisher, 1974, p. 77): 
The natural province of criticism is praise and dispraise rather than guilt and inno-
cence. And the functions of criticism are in line with those of epideictic discourse: 
to educate men to excellence, celebrate it, and provide “wise counsel for the state.” 
This connection to democratic engagement (the very thing that professionalization is sup-
posed to eradicate) is a topic to which Hillbruner returns when he writes that “[t]he lack 
of candor in today's political and social life makes the teaching and use of moral criteria 
in rhetorical criticism particularly germane.” (1975, p. 228) From this quotation alone it 
is not entirely possible to gauge what exactly Hillbruner means by “lack of candor”, but 
perhaps we may take our lead from another passage in which Hillbruner reveals his pref-
erence for an engaged type of criticism (1975, p. 247): 
It is time for the rhetorical critic to abandon the ideal of aloof scholarship that ana-
lyzes but does not condemn ethical transgressions, that examines but does not laud 
the upholding of moral values. A significant aim of the teacher critic, then, is to 
become passionately involved in the questions of moral values, both individual and 
                                               
37 I note in passing that the term ’art’ is ambiguous. Depending on the selected point of view, rhetoric may 
be defined or viewed as an aesthetic art (closely related with painting, music, literature, dancing, etc.); or, 
it may be defined or viewed as a practical art (more closely related to shoemaking, carpentry, cooking, 
etc.). For the distinction between these two understandings of ’art’, see e.g. Iseminger (2004, p. 2). Whether 
the kind of rational evaluative criticism is more plausible to lead to improvements among the ’practical 
arts’ than among the ’aesthetic arts’ is of course debatable. But insofar that ’taste’ is more prominently 
involved in making judgments of quality among the aesthetic arts, this may be so. Suffice it to say that if 
one accepts that idea that evaluative criticism can improve aesthetic arts such as literature, painting, etc. 
(like Hillbruner), it seems to me that one should also accept the idea that the practical arts can be improved 
through the same means. 
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social, in the real world today. Only then may we be able to say as proud a word 
for rhetorical assessments as can the literary and social critics for their own disci-
plines. 
For Hillbruner, then, the larger goals of evaluative criticism seem directly related to the 
issues of the surrounding society. He is not content with neutral analysis but urges a much 
more engaged and normative criticism aimed at improving the target practices. And im-
provement is also what Ewbank and Ewbank cite as their ultimate aim of evaluative crit-
icism. More specifically, criticism exists “in order to sustain and to enhance standards of 
rhetorical performance and acceptance.” (1976, p. 285). So, as with Baskerville, the idea 
that standards can be enhanced (and therefore that they can be poor to begin with) is key 
to understanding the road to improvement through criticism: “Through time, as appreci-
ation and understanding gain sophistication, the standards of technical excellence and of 
taste which comprise the theory of the art will be modified.” And ultimately, this back-
and-forth movement between the observation and analysis of practice and the develop-
ment of improved standards is hoped to make a difference outside of the academy: “The 
language in which criticism is set forth is necessarily prescriptive. Critical appraisal of a 
work of art is expressed as a judgment or a verdict because it is intended to influence 
future conduct [...]" (Ewbank & Ewbank, 1976, p. 294, my emphasis) 
Baskerville, Fisher, Hillbruner, Ewbank and Ewbank thus all express a funda-
mentally identical vision: Evaluation in general and the development and application of 
evaluative criteria to rhetorical artifacts in particular is the proper province of rhetorical 
criticism. Moreover, this type of criticism holds the potential to accomplish something 
that detached analysis will not be able to, namely a reasoned improvement of the target 
practice through the development of appropriate evaluative criteria. 
Conclusion 
The decline of evaluative rhetorical criticism as intimated by people like Jasinski, Olson, 
and Zarefsky seems to have gained traction around 1970. More specifically, this period 
of time saw a disciplinary discussion and questioning of the central place of evaluative 
criticism in rhetorical criticism. This prompted the following question: Why did evalua-
tive criticism decline? What were the reasons or factors that caused this significant re-
configuration of rhetorical criticism? In this chapter, I discussed two conjectural answers 
to this question. The first was the narrative of professionalization as presented by 
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Nothstine, Blair, and Copeland. As they describe it, professionalization is a pan-academic 
movement causing researchers to act in a detached manner, foregrounding questions of 
explanation and analysis rather than evaluation and judgment. I have argued that this 
explanation—while it may contain some truth—cannot account for the normative devel-
opment in fields including political theory and informal logic. And so, at the very least, 
it does not show convincingly that evaluative and normative modes of scholarship have 
become impossible in academia. For while evaluative rhetorical criticism seemed to fade 
around 1970, disciplines like political theory and informal logic—both rather closely 
linked to rhetoric—saw an opposite turn away from neutral and detached frameworks 
and modes of scholarship toward much more value-laden and engaged default modes of 
operation. In an attempt to offer a rival explanation, I focused on the revolt against au-
thority prevalent in the 1960s and the increase in demand for academic rigor. I argued 
these factors contained more explanatory power than the narrative of professionalization, 
but also that these factors do not at present constitute good reasons for rhetorical scholars 
to jettison evaluative criticism, which still has something crucial to offer: reasoned im-
provement of its target practice. 
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PART TWO: THEORY AND METHOD 
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C H A P T E R  4  
Criteria and function 
 
 
 
This chapter sets the stage for a case-based examination of certain problems inherent in 
the evaluative dimension of rhetorical criticism. In the first part of the chapter, I argue 
that evaluative criteria are indispensable for evaluation—the critic cannot do without 
them. This situation leads to the two problems of the origin and of the appropriateness 
of evaluative criteria: Where do these criteria come from? And given that criteria can be 
more or less appropriate for the artifact in question, how can the critic justify their appro-
priateness for a particular artifact? These central questions have only been cursorily an-
swered in the field of rhetorical criticism, and so the second part of the chapter proposes 
a potential solution to the problems origin and appropriateness. This solution is, simply 
put, to derive evaluative criteria from the function of the artifact. This approach to solving 
the problems of origin and appropriateness, however, comes with its own difficulty: the 
problem of how to establish the function of the artifact; or what I refer to as the problem 
of function ascription. 
The criteria requirement 
In order for evaluation to get off the ground, the critic needs to draw on evaluative criteria 
either implicitly or explicitly. There is no way around it. This ‘criteria requirement’ has 
been noted by a number of rhetorical critics. 
“What interests us,” wrote Herbert Wichelns (1925/1995, p. 4), “is the method of 
the critic: his standards, his categories of judgment, what he regards as important.” In the 
very essay that inaugurated modern rhetorical criticism, we thus find that standards—i.e. 
evaluative criteria—comprise the first element of the critic’s approach to evaluation. Sim-
ilarly, Barnet Baskerville (1953) calls attention to the centrality of criteria. He explains 
that the critic “bear[s] responsibility for establishing and refining standards of 
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performance.” Further, he holds that the critic’s task is “making reasoned judgments 
based on certain standards of excellence,” and that “[t]he critical study moves beyond 
[descriptive analysis] into the realm of evaluation in terms of explicit or implied stand-
ards.” Following the lead of Wichelns and Baskerville, Albert Croft (1956, p. 284) points 
out that “[i]n order to criticize a speech, the standards or criteria against which it is to be 
measured must first be established.” Walter R. Fisher (1974, pp. 75–76) concurs when he 
states that “[t]he essence of [criticism] consists in the comparison of an object or act with 
an implicit or explicit set of norms [or an] implicit or explicit model of excellence.” And 
finally, Stephen E. Lucas (1981, p. 12) describes the activity of rhetorical criticism as one 
in which “rhetorical critics must forthrightly judge rhetorical works against some set of 
criteria”, and, quoting Ernest G. Bormann, Lucas states that “[t]he critic […] must assess 
the critical object against ‘standards of excellence’ […]” (ibid., p. 10). 
The above quotations should suffice to show that the presence of evaluative cri-
teria is a central requirement of the evaluative dimension of rhetorical criticism. This is 
the criteria requirement. 
The problem of origin 
Evaluative criteria do not walk up to the critic and introduce themselves. As noted by 
Barnet Baskerville above, the critic has to furnish these criteria somehow. This raises the 
problem of origin: Where do evaluative come from? What is their source? 
One rather confusing attempt at answering this question can be found in Baird and 
Thonssen’s paper on “Methodology in the Criticism of Public Address” (1947). The pa-
per foreshadowed the central elements of their landmark book Speech Criticism: The De-
velopment of Standards for Rhetorical Appraisal (1948). Noting, along the lines of Bas-
kerville, that it is “part of [the critic’s] task to set up standards,” they consider how this 
may be done: 
Where shall he find [the standards]? He may turn to Aristotle, whose principles are 
adequate for most scholars. Or the critic may adopt the tenets of a group of rhetor-
icians and logicians. As an alternative, he may erect standards of worth based upon 
the united wisdom of his colleagues. Together the “experts” may listen to many 
speakers, classify them as superior, excellent, good, fair, or poor, cast the perfor-
mances into comparable columns, and describe statistically and in detail the char-
acteristics of the “superior” performers. Whatever yardstick is used, the critic will 
wisely refuse to succumb to the rigidities of any formula. 
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Taken as a solution to the problem of origin, this proposal by Thonssen and Baird may 
be practically feasible (since it immediately equips the critic with a set of evaluative cri-
teria), but it is hardly a theoretically satisfactory approach. It must of course be admitted 
that if criteria have been proposed and employed by Aristotle, other rhetoricians and lo-
gicians, or if the criteria are expressions of the united wisdom of one’s colleagues, this 
lends some credence to their validity. However, the fact remains that such credence does 
not explain or justify the appropriateness of the criteria. If someone asked, “why do you 
assume these criteria are appropriate for the artifact?”, the only possible answer would 
be “because other people are using them.” We may thus follow Edwin Black (1978, p. 
63) who criticized Parrish for adopting precisely the strategy of invoking Aristotle in 
order to establish evaluative criteria: 
While it is eminently true that the endorsement of an idea by a genius of Aristotle's 
stature is certainly a prima facie reason for giving that idea careful and serious 
consideration, still such an endorsement does not reinforce or justify the idea in any 
logical sense. Therefore, we might not be unfair in taking the citation of authority 
and tradition in the Parrish paper as immaterial to the argument. 
Appeals to authority, custom or tradition are unsatisfactory in themselves as solutions to 
the problem of origin. But Thonssen and Baird in fact confuse the issue even further when 
they explain that the judgment to be rendered by the critic concerns “the effect of the 
discourse” in terms of the audience’s response. For if this is indeed the relevant yardstick, 
what becomes of their advice from before? Would the critic adhering to the doctrine of 
effect not be forced to denounce Aristotle’s principles or the standards based upon the 
united wisdom of his colleagues if these should happen to conflict with the effect crite-
rion? As should be clear, it is not at all obvious from Thonssen and Baird’s work on 
developing evaluative standards just how the critic is supposed to accomplish this task in 
a sound way. 
But it has to be conceded that the problem is not a simple one. As Brock, Scott 
and Chesebro (1989, p. 17) write in their textbook on rhetorical criticism: “If evaluation 
continually manifests itself in criticism, the question, ‘On what ground shall I evaluate?’ 
is inevitable. The question is difficult to deal with.” And the difficulty is also noted by 
Barnet Baskerville (1953, p. 2) who can think of no greater difficulty than that of 
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employing the appropriate criteria: “The problem of selection and validation of criteria is 
unquestionably the most vexing aspect of the critical process.”38 
The problem of appropriateness 
Barnet Baskerville in fact highlights two separate problems in the quotation above. One 
is the issue of selection of criteria, which I have discussed above under the rubric of the 
problem of origin. The other is the issue of validation of criteria—or, as I think it ought 
to be called—the problem of appropriateness. The basic problem of appropriateness is 
this: the critic cannot simply stipulate, import or invent any set of criteria from any origin. 
The criteria must in some sense of the word be appropriate. They must be the right cri-
teria. This was already recognized by Herbert Wichelns (1925/1995), whose essay con-
cerns the problem of appropriateness: The appropriate evaluative criteria for the rhetori-
cal critic are not identical to the appropriate evaluative criteria for the literary critic. 
Whereas the literary critic is concerned with evaluative criteria such as permanence and 
beauty, the rhetorical critic should—according to most interpretations of Wichelns’ es-
say—instead assess the persuasive effect of the artifact. Wichelns puts the point in the 
following way (1925/1995, p. 25, my emphasis): 
In short, the point of view of literary criticism is proper only to its own objects, the 
permanent works. Upon such as are found to lie without the pale, the verdict of 
literary criticism is of negative value merely, and its interpretation is false and mis-
leading because it proceeds upon a wrong assumption. 
If this difference between literature and rhetoric is not respected, says Wichelns, “[t]he 
result can only be confusion.” As early as Wichelns, then, we find the distinct idea that 
evaluate criteria must be appropriate for the object in question. The same idea is ex-
pressed a few years later by William Norwood Brigance (1933, pp. 556–557): 
Next, I think we shall agree that oratorical literature is a special form, quite distinct 
from poetry, essays, drama, and other forms of prose literature with which it is often 
confused by biographers and literary critics. The tools of rhetoric may indeed be 
the same as those of literature, but the atmosphere and purpose are different. The 
literary artist writes with his eye on his subject. "His form and style are organic 
                                               
38 That the selection and validation of criteria is a difficult aspect of rhetorical criticism is not surprising since 
even in the field of evaluation theory, this aspect has still not received much attention. Thus the Swedish 
evaluation theorist Evert Vedung (2017, p. 10) states: “The selection of criteria of merit is a crucial, albeit 
little debated, issue in evaluation.” 
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with his subject," says Hudson. He is concerned with permanence and beauty. But 
the statesman who must dominate a crisis, or the advocate who must mold the mind 
of a court or a jury, has no time to polish plaudits for posterity. He is concerned 
with deadly and immediate effect. […] To apply the literary tests of permanence 
and beauty to rhetorical literature borders on the fantastic, if not the grotesque. 
In this rather dramatic fashion, Brigance thus echoes Wichelns in warning critics against 
violating the relation of appropriateness between object and criteria: rhetoric (“oratorical 
literature”) is a special form distinct from, but often confused with, poetry, essays, etc. 
And, because of the distinction between rhetoric and literature, it is inappropriate to eval-
uate rhetoric and literature using the same criteria. 
This basic point intimated by both Wichelns and Brigance is also recognized by 
a number of later writers. For instance, Barnet Baskerville (1953, p. 2) notes that “[t]he 
canons of literary criticism are not, however, always applicable to the criticism of 
speeches, since there are basic differences in the thing being criticized.” Walter R. Fisher 
(1974, p. 77, my emphasis) argues that “[w]hether one considers the most unsophisticated 
or the most sophisticated act of criticism, one can see that it is based on a theoretical 
conception of the nature, functions, and norms appropriate to the artifact it concerns or 
it leads to the possibility of such conceptions.” Karlyn Kohrs Campbell (1974, p. 40, my 
emphasis) concurs when she states that “[i]n my opinion, evaluation is fundamental to 
the very idea of criticism; all critical acts express a judgment resulting from the applica-
tion of appropriate criteria to phenomena of a particular type.” And while the critics 
Ewbank & Ewbank (1976, p. 293, quoting social scientist Eugene J. Meehan) caution 
that “[a]lmost any standard or principle can be applied in some situation, but the fact that 
a standard can be applied doesn’t mean that it should be applied”, David Zarefsky 
(1979/2014, p. 63) worries that “when we invoke normative standards […], we are likely 
to do so hastily and select standards that may not be pertinent to the particular controversy 
we wish to evaluate.” 
What all these writers agree on, then, is the importance of the problem of appropri-
ateness: Evaluative criteria should in some sense be appropriate to the object of evalua-
tion. But how do we know when and why this requirement of appropriateness is fulfilled? 
Barnet Baskerville (1953, p. 2) acknowledges the predicament in this way: 
It is discouraging, but it is true that no permanent solution can ever be reached. We 
can never know finally what standards are ‘best,’ since that too is a judgment, based 
upon other standards, founded in turn upon other assumptions. Moreover, 
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conditions and values change; tastes change; and what was ‘best’ for one age may 
be unimportant to another. Where does the critic turn for his standards of judgment? 
To the theorist, the philosopher—whose theorizing, incidentally, probably arose 
originally out of his observation of practice. 
And he goes on to explain that “[t]here is, to be sure, no dearth of applicable criteria by 
which to judge a public speech. The difficulty lies in determining their value, the order 
of their importance, and the manner of their application,” which leads him to conclude 
that “[h]ere we run headlong into a welter of conflicting criteria and emphases, differing 
standards of literary excellence, questions of sincerity and appropriateness, which render 
‘agreement among observers’ virtually impossible.” And this problem is only exacer-
bated when Walter Fisher (1969, pp. 106–107) writes that “a speech may be profitably 
criticized from any humanistic perspective—political, psychological, moral, logical, lit-
erary, and so on.” 
We seem to be in a situation, then, where rhetorical critics and theorists agree on 
the following points: The origin of evaluative criteria is obscure, especially if we are not 
satisfied with simply employing criteria inherited from Aristotle or other experts. It is 
possible to apply an almost indefinite range of evaluate criteria to any given rhetorical 
artifact, but doing so is not necessarily appropriate. Whether evaluative criteria are ap-
propriate or not depends somehow on a relation between these criteria and the rhetorical 
artifact, but the exact nature of this appropriateness relation is unclear. We may add to 
our agenda for the remainder of the dissertation, then, this “most vexing aspect of the 
critical process,” as Barnet Baskerville calls it: The need to explain the origin of evalua-
tive criteria and the way in which their appropriateness may be justified. 
The Functional Goodness Intuition 
In this second section of the chapter, I propose the outline of a solution to the problems 
of origin and appropriateness. To anticipate, the solution will take shape through a review 
of a widely shared intuition about evaluation which, I will argue, also plays a central role 
in the evaluative thinking of at least some rhetorical critics. I call this the Functional 
Goodness Intuition, or the FGI for short. The FGI may be stated in the following way: 
The quality of an object depends on its capacity to fulfil its function. 
A number of corollaries follow from the Functional Goodness Intuition. First, 
evaluative judgments may, it least in many cases, be understood or reconstructed as judg-
ments of function fulfilment. On this view, when a rhetorical critic evaluates a rhetorical 
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artifact positively, the critic may be understood to be estimating that the artifact fulfils 
(or at least has the capacity to fulfil) its function above some relevant threshold. And 
conversely, when a critic evaluates an artifact negatively, the underlying basis for this 
judgment is an estimation that the artifact does not fulfil (or does not have the capacity 
to fulfil) its function above the relevant threshold. For example, according to FGI, if the 
function of a knife is to cut, then a critic would judge the knife to be good (excellent, 
satisfactory, etc.) if and only if it cuts well or has the capacity to cut well; and bad (de-
fective, insufficient, etc.) if it does not cut well or does not have the capacity to do so. 
Second, I submit that the FGI makes for a promising solution to the problem of 
origin. It follows from the FGI that the origin of evaluative criteria is intimately connected 
to the function of the object to be evaluated. The futility of the suggestion made by some 
authors (highlighted earlier in this chapter) that critics should simply inherit their criteria 
from other critics is, on this interpretation, clear. For the criteria used by other critics may 
ultimately have been appropriate only for artifacts with completely different functions. 
And so a critic who unreflectively adopts the criteria of other critics for his own critical 
purposes is basically making an unwarranted decision.39 
Third, I also submit that the Functional Goodness Intuition also makes for a prom-
ising solution to the problem of appropriateness. For it also follows from the FGI that 
evaluative criteria are appropriate for a specific artifact if these criteria are derived from 
an appropriate conception of the function of the object and vice versa: If the function of 
a knife is to cut, then criteria related to cutting (reasonable sharpness, rigidity of the blade, 
an ergonomic handle, etc.) are appropriate for the knife. On the other hand, it is inappro-
priate to assume that the function of a speech is to toast bread, and any attempt at deriving 
criteria for evaluating argumentation based on this inappropriate function will yield in-
appropriate criteria. However, as I will argue later in the chapter, even though the FGI 
thus apparently offers a solution to the problem of appropriateness, the solution actually 
only shifts the problem to a deeper level. On this level, the problem for the critic is to 
establish the function of the object in question. This is the problem of function ascription. 
But before turning to this problem, let us first consider how a range of thinkers have 
expressed the Functional Goodness Intuition. 
                                               
39 It should be immediately be noted that in many cases, different critics will end up using the same criteria—
say the criterion of persuasive effect. But this should be result of critics evaluating objects with the same 
function, not the result of simply copying criteria from each other. 
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Proponents of the Functional Goodness Intuition 
The Functional Goodness Intuition goes back to antiquity, and one of its earliest propo-
nents is Aristotle. In his Nicomachean Ethics (NE1.71097b22–33),40 Aristotle confronts 
the problem of identifying the chief good of man. He therefore outlines a strategy for 
figuring out just what this good might consist in, and the strategy involves considerations 
of the function of man: 
Presumably, however, to say that happiness is the chief good seems a platitude, and 
a clearer account of what it is is still desired. This might perhaps be given, if we 
could first ascertain the function of man. For just as for a flute player, a sculptor, 
or any artist, and, in general, for all things that have a function or activity, the good 
and the ‘‘well’’ is thought to reside in the function, so it would seem to be for man, 
if he has a function. Have the carpenter, then, and the tanner certain functions or 
activities, and has man none? Is he naturally functionless? Or as eye, hand, foot, 
and in general each of the parts evidently has a function, may one lay it down that 
man similarly has a function apart from all these?  
For our purposes, the interesting aspect of passage from Aristotle is not so much the result 
of Aristotle’s reasoning (after having considered several candidate functions, Aristotle 
concludes that the chief good for man is a life lived in accordance with rationality, which 
of course is a highly debatable position). Instead, the interesting aspect is Aristotle’s ex-
plicit connection of function and goodness across a range of domains: For just as a good 
eye is an eye capable of fulfilling its function of seeing well, and the good flute player is 
a flute player capable of fulfilling his function of playing well, Aristotle concludes that 
the good (for) man consists in the fulfilment of his function.41 And what makes Aristotle 
conclude this is the premise that for all things that have a function or activity (ergon), the 
good and the “well” is thought to reside in that function. This is the Functional Goodness 
Intuition. In other words, when faced with the problem of finding out what constitutes 
the human good or the good human, Aristotle employs the Functional Goodness Intuition 
from which it follows that if an object has a function, one needs to know this function in 
order to reach evaluative conclusions about the object. 
                                               
40 I have used the following translation: Aristotle, Ross, & Brown (2009). 
41 That Aristotle has been accused of equivocating between goodness of and goodness for, and that his spe-
cific idea of the function of man is exceedingly controversial and has been attacked from all angles need 
not delay us here. 
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Although Aristotle’s function argument is perhaps the most famous example of 
using the notion of function to derive evaluative criteria, Aristotle is neither the only, nor 
the first ancient thinker to propose this strategy. As noted by philosopher Christine 
Korsgaard (2008, p. 129), Aristotle’s function argument is actually predated by a similar 
argument by Plato in his Republic (1937). Towards the end of the first book of the Re-
public (R 352d—354b), Plato uses a parallel strategy in his search for a conception of the 
“completely good city” by developing a sketch of the Functional Goodness Intuition 
based on analogies with objects such as eyes, pruning knives and horses. Gerasimos San-
tas (2003, p. 125), the noted interpreter of Plato’s thinking, summarizes the relevant rea-
soning in this way:42 
A thing with functions is good of its kind if it performs well the function(s) of things 
of that kind. And a thing with functions has the virtue(s) of its kind if it has the 
“qualities” (properties, structure, composition) which enable it to perform its func-
tion(s) well. Thus the presence of the virtues appropriate to a thing of a given kind 
makes it good of its kind and enables it to perform its functions well […] This 
theory of goodness of kind and of virtue clearly suggests a three-step procedure for 
discovering the virtue(s) of things with functions. First, discover the function(s) of 
a thing of a given kind; second, discover (or imagine) things of that kind that func-
tion well (and others that perform poorly); and finally, discover the qualities of the 
thing which enables it to perform its function(s) well (and in the absence of which 
it performs poorly), and these will be the virtues of the thing. 
Plato’s three-step procedure highlights the importance of discovering the function of a 
thing as the essential first step towards an evaluation of that thing. And the function of a 
thing—its ergon—may importantly also be understood as the purpose, end, aim, goal or 
“for-ness” of that thing (Korsgaard 2008, p. 8 and pp. 134-135). Once the function has 
been found, our understanding of the thing and its function gives rise to an understanding 
of certain qualities as virtues—so-called constitutive standards—against which to judge 
that thing. Philosopher Christine Korsgaard expresses this idea in the following way 
(Korsgaard, 2008, p. 8, my italics): 
If it is the function of a house to provide shelter from the weather, then it is a con-
stitutive standard for houses that they should be waterproof. If it is the function of 
an encyclopedia to provide information to those who consult it, then it is a 
                                               
42 Plato’s argument is developed in the course of a dialogue that cannot easily be condensed here. For the 
purposes of this chapter, the summary from Santas will suffice. I take up Plato’s reasoning again in Chapter 
9. 
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constitutive standard for encyclopedias that their statements should be true. […] 
someone who asks why a house should have to be waterproof, or an encyclopedia 
should record the truth, shows that he just doesn’t understand what these objects 
are for, and therefore, since they are functional objects, what they are.” 
In both Aristotle and Plato, then, we find early expressions of the Functional Goodness 
Intuition in their moral and political philosophy in which the function of an object plays 
a leading role in deriving evaluative criteria for the evaluation of that object. 
These ancient examples of the Functional Goodness Intuition may be supplemented 
by more modern ones inspired by Aristotle. Scottish philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre thus 
follows Aristotle in endorsing the same view (2007, p. 59, my italics): 
To call a watch good is to say that it is the kind of watch which someone would 
choose who wanted a watch to keep time accurately (rather than, say, to throw at 
the cat). The presupposition of this use of 'good' is that every type of item which it 
is appropriate to call good or bad—including persons and actions—has, as a mat-
ter of fact, some given specific purpose or function.  
Philippa Foot is another contemporary philosopher inspired by Aristotle who subscribes 
to the same line of reasoning (Foot & Montefiore, 1961, p. 48): “Where a thing has a 
function the primary (but by no means necessarily the only) criterion for the goodness of 
that thing will be that it fulfils its function well.” 
Despite all its strengths, Aristotelian philosophy is of course not always uncontro-
versial. But the Functional Goodness Intuition is also recognized outside this tradition. 
Consider for example David Hume’s thinking about aesthetics in his classic essay “Of 
the Standard of Taste” (Hume, 1757/2015): 
Every work of art has also a certain end or purpose, for which it is calculated; and 
is to be deemed more or less perfect, as it is more or less fitted to attain this end. 
The object of eloquence is to persuade, of history to instruct, of poetry to please by 
means of the passions and the imagination. These ends we must carry constantly in 
our view, when we peruse any performance; and we must be able to judge how far 
the means employed are adapted to their respective purposes. 
Although Hume substitutes the term ‘function’ with the synonymous terms ‘end,’ ‘object’ 
and ‘purpose,’ the Functional Goodness Intuition remains intact. And, interestingly in the 
present context, Hume connects the FGI directly to criticism—understood as evaluation 
(perusal and judgment) of a performance. 
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Hume’s contemporary, Immanuel Kant, also made use of the Functional Good-
ness Intuition in his work on aesthetics. In his notoriously convoluted work Critique of 
the Power of Judgment, Kant thus intimates that our judgments of the goodness of an 
object, as opposed to our judgments of their beauty, must presuppose an objective pur-
posiveness, i.e. they must rely on us seeing the objects as having a certain function (Kant, 
1790/2000, §15): 
Objective purposiveness can be cognized only by means of the relation of the man-
ifold to a determinate end, thus only through a concept. From this alone it is already 
clear that the beautiful, the judging of which has as its ground a merely formal 
purposiveness, i.e., a purposiveness without an end, is entirely independent of the 
representation of the good, since the latter presupposes an objective purposiveness, 
i.e., the relation of the object to a determinate end.43  
Contemporary writers on art share Hume’s and Kant’s sentiments. Jonathan Gilmore 
(2011) states that he will “defend a functional view of art and its evaluation” and he 
suggests that “a work of art typically possesses as an essential feature one or more points, 
purposes, or ends, in the satisfaction of which the work can be evaluated qua art”. Gil-
more then goes on to explain that this principle implies that works of art have constitutive 
functions and further that: 
[t]o evaluate a work of art with reference to its constitutive function is one way to 
evaluate it as a work of art. Here, if an artwork has a constitutive function, and one 
of its artistic properties counts against the satisfaction of that function, then that 
property is a defect in the artwork considered as the work of art that it is. 
Another contemporary writer on the philosophy of art, Noël Carroll, expresses the same 
view, connecting the function of a work of art (also called “objective”) with the criteria 
(“good-making features” or “virtues”) according to which it ought to be evaluated (2009, 
p. 168): 
Once we establish the objective of slapstick comedies—say, the provocation of 
laughter through physical business, often of an apparently accidental sort—we can 
                                               
43 The original German text from §15 of Kritik der Urteilskraft reads: ”Die objektive Zweckmäßigkeit kann 
nur vermittelst der Beziehung des Mannigfaltigen auf einen bestimmten Zweck, also nur durch einen Be-
griff erkannt werden. Hieraus allein schon erhellt: daß das Schöne, dessen Beurteilung eine bloß formale 
Zweckmäßigkeit, d. i. eine Zweckmäßigkeit ohne Zweck, zum Grunde hat, von der Vorstellung des Guten 
ganz unabhängig sei, weil das letztere eine objektive Zweckmäßigkeit, d. i. die Beziehung des Gegen-
standes auf einen bestimmten Zweck, voraussetzt.” 
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ground the principle that pratfalls, ceteris paribus, are good-making features in 
slapstick comedies. The function of slapstick comedy indicates to us why the pos-
session of pratfalls is good for the genre, just as the function of steak knives grounds 
sharpness as a virtue of this sort of cutlery, since there is a teleological relation 
between the purpose of a kind and what counts as an excellence of that kind.  
And similarly from the philosophy of art, Gary Iseminger  (2004, p. 11) writes that “if 
something’s nature consists in having a certain function, then it is good as a thing having 
that nature just in case it can fulfill that function.” 
In various traditions across various times, then, we seem to find expressions of the 
FGI.  And the intuition is also present among contemporary writers in a field close to 
rhetoric—namely informal logic. Ralph Johnson (2000, p. 181) thus states: 
Let us begin the discussion of the normative question with the view that a good 
argument is one that fulfills its purpose. The standpoint of this work has been that 
the primary purpose is rational persuasion. That is, the purpose of the argument is 
to persuade the Other of the truth of the thesis imbedded in the conclusion and on 
the basis of the considerations advanced in the argument. If the Other is persuaded 
by the argument to accept the conclusion but not for the reasons cited, then the 
argument has not truly achieved its purpose although it may have advanced the 
cause of rationality. 
And, perhaps not surprisingly, the same view can also be found expressed by rhetoricians. 
Here Robert C. Rowland (1984, pp. 192–193) makes the point with reference to evalua-
tion of arguments: 
Critics of argument should not merely borrow evaluative standards from the law, 
science, or any field. Rather they should begin their analysis of any argumentative 
activity by identifying the function of that activity and move from that function to 
the appropriate model for describing and evaluating arguments. Descriptive models 
and evaluative criteria should follow function. 
And finally, Edwin Black (1978, p. 161) may also be taken to endorse the Functional 
Goodness Intuition: 
"Clearly no critical theory can proceed much beyond its most rudimentary formu-
lations without some firm conception of the functions of the activity it is designed 
to understand and appraise.” 
The above quotations should suffice to make the point that the Functional Goodness In-
tuition is not a stray thought, but rather a commonly held belief across disciplines and 
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traditions connecting objects and evaluative criteria. And moreover, the FGI seems to 
solve both the problem of origin and the problem of appropriateness in the following 
way: First, the critic establishes the function of the object (purpose, goal, end, aim, telos, 
ergon). This function may roughly be defined as “what the object is for”, the characteris-
tic work or activity of the object, what the object is supposed to do or be, or what it ought 
to accomplish. Next, certain features of the object ostensibly enabling the object to fulfil 
this function are established. These are the virtues or good-making characteristics of the 
object—its appropriate evaluative criteria. Finally, the extent to which the specific object 
in question meets these evaluative criteria is assessed in order to reach an evaluative 
judgment. 
The problem of function ascription 
But notice the first step of this procedure: The critic establishes the function of the object. 
This is not particularly informative. Where does this function come from? Just how does 
the critic establish it? These are crucial question pertaining to the problem of appropri-
ateness. For while the Functional Goodness Intuition offers a promising start to under-
standing evaluative reasoning and seems to be widely shared, one aspect of it is still un-
explained: If, in order to arrive at the appropriate evaluative criteria viz. a particular ob-
ject we must begin from a conception of the object’s function, how do we get such a 
conception? In other words, how do we determine the function of an object? What does 
it mean that it is “given” or that we have to “discover” it, as Santas states in the summary 
of Plato’s function argument? 
From my office chair I can look out of my window and observe a wide range of 
objects. I can see cars in the parking lot, trees, blackbirds in trees, pebbles on the pave-
ment and so on. Of some of these objects I am inclined to say intuitively that they have 
functions. Roughly, the car is for driving, the parking lot is for parking cars, the pavement 
is for walking. But of other objects, I am not so inclined. The function of a blackbird is 
not obvious to me, and neither is the function of a pebble on the pavement. In other words, 
it seems that sometimes objects or types of objects intuitively have a function, but in other 
cases they do not. And what is more, most objects do not have a tag on them telling us 
their function. It is therefore conceivable that there may be disagreement over the func-
tion of a particular object. Consider for instance the case of Aristotle above, who claims 
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that the function of man is, roughly, rational activity. As we noted earlier, this conclusion 
has been attacked from all sides and is still being discussed today: 
Have the carpenter, then, and the tanner certain functions or activities, and has man 
none? Is he naturally functionless? Or as eye, hand, foot, and in general each of the 
parts evidently has a function, may one lay it down that man similarly has a function 
apart from all these? (NE 1.7 1097b22–33)  
Aristotle’s question is seemingly posed to elicit an affirmative response from the reader 
(‘yes, one must lay it down that man has a function), but as W.F.R. Hardie, the renowned 
Aristotle commentator, remarks, “the obvious answer is that one may not […]”. Or con-
sider Hume, who states without hesitation that the function of history is to instruct. Or 
Ralph Johnson who stipulates that the function of argument is to persuade the Other of 
the truth of a thesis. These are by no means uncontroversial claims, and they have been 
denied by reasonable people. 
At the basis of the Functional Goodness Intuition, then, lies another type of judg-
ment, namely a function ascription. Sometimes function ascriptions are seemingly un-
controversial and based on commonly held intuitions such as when we take for granted 
that the function of a heart is to pump blood, or that the function of a knife is to cut. But 
sometimes function ascriptions are controversial, and when they are, they become the 
crux of the problem of appropriateness. 
It is one thing to posit that objects have functions and proceed to derive evaluative 
criteria based on this function. However, it is quite another thing to be able to justify to 
others through a process of reasoning open to scrutiny and criticism that an object has a 
function. As Jean Goodwin has noted in the context of argumentation theory, unsubstan-
tiated function claims basically amount to normativity on-the-cheap. It is in a sense (too) 
“easy to talk function talk” (Goodwin, 2007, p. 74), because merely positing a function 
for the artifact in question begs the question. It is fine to have intuitions about functions, 
and they may valuable as a starting point in theorizing. But unexamined, they sometimes 
they tend to blur the very areas of inquiry that are most in need of explanation and illu-
mination. As soon as any intuition gives rise to even a modicum of controversy, it be-
comes very problematic, in my opinion, to let such an intuition do any heavy lifting for 
purposes of theory building or analysis without any further defense. In those situations, 
the task at hand should shift immediately to justifying the intuition. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter began by considering the criteria requirement, i.e. the idea that for evalua-
tion to take place, criteria must be present. The criteria requirement gives rise to the prob-
lems of origin and appropriateness—two problems recognized among rhetorical critics 
interested in evaluation. I proposed that a potential solution to the problems of origin and 
appropriateness comes from the Functional Goodness Intuition, a widely held intuition 
across a range of thinkers from various times and disciplines. The Functional Goodness 
Intuition, however, cannot explain on its own how objects get their functions. This is the 
problem of function ascription, and it is the focus of the upcoming case studies. How 
could such case studies be fruitfully carried out? Providing an answer to this question is 
the focus of the next chapter on rational reconstruction. 
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C H A P T E R  5  
Rational reconstruction 
 
 
 
As we have seen, many of the most prominent rhetorical scholars from Herbert Wichelns 
(1925/1995) onward regard evaluation as constitutive of rhetorical criticism. In other 
words, the presence of an evaluative dimension was widely regarded as a necessary con-
dition for anything worthy of the label ‘criticism’. Given the historical importance of the 
evaluative dimension of rhetorical criticism, the modest amount of theorizing about this 
dimension is paradoxical. Few sustained accounts and treatments of the intricacies of 
evaluation exist in the literature on rhetorical criticism, even though there is agreement 
among rhetoricians that evaluation is far from trivial.44 
If there is a lack of knowledge about evaluation of rhetoric, then a strategy is 
needed to create more of this knowledge. Evaluation is of course a tremendously broad 
and unwieldy issue, so to make the task more manageable, I delimited the problems to be 
dealt with in following way: Firstly, I want to understand the origin of evaluative criteria 
applied by critics (i.e., from where do critics get their evaluative criteria?). Secondly, I 
want to understand how the appropriateness of these criteria in relation to a specific arti-
fact can be justified (i.e. how can critics make a case that these criteria are appropriate 
for this artifact?). As indicated in the Chapter 4, one potential solution to these two prob-
lems hinges on providing a solution to a third problem concerned with determining or 
discovering the function of an object, i.e., the problem of function ascription. 
This chapter introduces an approach to or strategy for creating knowledge about 
these problems. This approach or strategy is sometimes referred to as rational 
                                               
44 If evaluation had been central to rhetoric but trivial—spelling comes to mind as a case of such a topic—
then perhaps the lack of a sustained treatment would be understandable. 
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reconstruction.45 In the remainder of this chapter, I will introduce a particular understand-
ing of rational reconstruction based primarily on Jürgen Habermas’ work.46 The reasons 
for introducing rational reconstruction here in some detail are, first, that understanding 
the aims and strategies of rational reconstruction should make it easier to follow the gen-
eral project pursued in the case studies of Chapter 6-9, and, second, that it seems neces-
sary to clarify my particular understanding of rational reconstruction, since the term has 
several rival meanings.47 
Rational reconstruction illustrated 
Before discussing the aims and strategies of rational reconstruction, it will be helpful to 
consider a few examples of this kind of analysis to get a sense of its basic form as I will 
be employing it. Rational reconstruction is widely employed across disciplines (fre-
quently without mentioning the term itself), and here is one well-known example from 
moral philosophy focused on the famous trolley problems: Trolley problems are thought-
experiments aimed at bringing to light characteristics and structures of our morality (in-
troduced by Philippa Foot, 1967, but discussed and utilized extensively by many others, 
including Frances Kamm, 2009). A basic version of one such problem proceeds like this: 
As you are strolling along some railway tracks you realize much to your horror that a 
runaway trolley is hurtling down the track toward five railroad workers who, oblivious 
to the danger, are busy repairing the rails. In despair, you look around to assess your 
                                               
45 Habermas, whose thoughts have inspired this chapter, typically speaks of “the method” of rational recon-
struction. But the term “method” is somewhat unfortunate, because it implies a kind of mechanical, algo-
rithmic procedure for creating knowledge or handling data. As I use it here, rational reconstruction is, in 
its style of knowledge creation, much closer to cognitive acts such as interpretation or close reading than it 
is to “objective” methods like statistical analysis or other quantitative methods. 
46 I should note that I will be referencing the most authoritative English translations of Habermas’ work 
instead of relying on the original German texts. 
47 Jürgen Habermas is by no means the first scholar to talk about rational reconstruction, let alone the first to 
employ it as an analytical tool. In philosophy of science, Rudolph Carnap (1928), Hans Reichenbach 
(1938/1961), and Imre Lakatos (1971) frequently speak of rational reconstruction. In practical philosophy, 
Habermas (1976/1998) and Rawls (1951) are probably the most well-known proponents of rational recon-
struction. In the field of rhetoric, Karen Tracy and Robert Craig (1995), and Edward Schiappa (2013) talk 
about rational reconstruction even though they seem to mean quite different things by the term. Perhaps as 
a testament to the confusion sometimes surrounding the term, Schiappa decided to change ‘rational recon-
struction’ to ‘contemporary appropriation’ in the second edition of his book Protagoras and Logos, since 
some readers were confused by the term (2013, p. x). Tracy and Craig seem to be drawing on Habermas in 
their understanding of the term, but they only cursorily introduce the term, and they do not refer to their 
source of inspiration. 
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options and find that you are standing next to a lever controlling a switch. If you pull the 
lever, the runaway trolley will be directed onto a side track and the five workers will be 
saved from their otherwise certain death. Unfortunately, you notice a single worker re-
pairing the side track. If you pull the lever, he will surely die. Your only options are to 
refrain from pulling the lever, which will result in the trolley killing the five workers on 
the main track or, alternatively, to pull the lever and direct the trolley onto the sidetrack, 
which will result in the trolley killing one worker. What should you do—and why? 
One important point of so-called trolley problems in moral philosophy is their 
capacity to aid in the rational reconstruction of our sense of morality or, to use a near-
synonymous term, to aid in the explication of our sense of morality. Having considered 
the dilemma above we may intuitively feel that diverting the trolley onto the sidetrack 
would be the right thing to do. Perhaps we may ask ourselves why we reach this judgment 
and our answer might be that diverting the trolley would mean the net saving of four 
lives. If we ask why the net saving of four lives is the right thing to do, we would perhaps 
answer that this is because by saving the four lives, our action will conform to a plausible 
moral principle according to which one should always act so as to minimize undue suf-
fering. In this sense, by going back in the chain of reasons from our initial judgment, our 
reflections will result in candidate moral principles that in some sense characterize our 
sense of morality and help explain our judgments. In other words, by reflecting on those 
principles that could plausible guide our judgments, we shed light on these principles. 
In order to see what is meant by the term “candidate” principles, consider now 
the following variation on the above trolley problem: As you are walking across a bridge 
over some railway tracks, you notice a runaway trolley hurtling down the track. Like in 
the previous case, five workers on the track will die if no one takes action. You look 
around and see a large man, oblivious to the situation, leaning over the side of the bridge 
immediately above the track. Here are your options: You can choose not to act, and the 
five workers will die. Or you can gently push the large man so he falls over the side of 
the bridge in front of the trolley, bringing it to an immediate halt and surely killing him. 
In this case, what would you do and why? 
Empirical evidence shows that most people choose to pull the lever in the first 
case, and most people choose to do nothing in the second case (Hauser, Young, & Cush-
man, 2008, pp. 126-135). How can this be? Our explanation of our judgment in the first 
case brought out the candidate utilitarian moral principle that we should act so as to 
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minimize undue harm. If we were to also act on this principle in the second case, we 
arguably ought to push the large man. The thought experiment amounts to a test of the 
principle to see if it will hold universally. For most people, this does not seem to be true, 
so something morally significant about this case must be different in order to explain that 
candidate principle from the first case does not hold in this second case, and we must thus 
look for a different principle to explain the judgment. Perhaps, as some have argued, the 
operative principle in the second case involves Kantian considerations of the moral im-
permissibility of using others (the large man) purely as means to an end (saving the work-
ers) even when doing so would minimize undue harm. Thus, in reflecting upon the second 
case of the trolley problem, another candidate principle of morality has been explicated 
which can account for our judgment that the morally best “action” would be to do noth-
ing. Further, in explicating these principles, we have learned something about our moral 
sense or capacity. In rationally reconstructing some of our moral principles governing 
our moral judgments, we have seemingly understood some of the substance of morality. 
As mentioned earlier, rational reconstruction is applied in a number of disciplines. 
The above example comes from moral philosophy, but in order to illustrate the general 
applicability of rational reconstruction, consider briefly the example of Danish linguist 
Paul Diderichsen. Diderichsen’s most original contribution to the study of Danish gram-
mar was the Danish Sentence Model, which Diderichsen used to characterize sentence 
structures of medieval Danish and later modern Danish (Diderichsen, 1941, 1946). Di-
derichsen’s Sentence Model, i.e. a fundamental structure of Danish sentences, was ab-
stracted from empirical studies of native language users’ choice of sentence structure and 
condensed into principles explaining the ostensible “logic” behind the sentence struc-
ture.48 What Diderichsen did, then, was in a certain methodological sense analogous to 
the exercise in moral philosophy above: Both examples highlight the fundamental aim of 
rational reconstruction, which consists of explicating the governing principles of a certain 
competence – moral, grammatical, or otherwise. 
At its most fundamental level, then, the term rational reconstruction signifies a 
mode of inquiry aimed at creating knowledge of human practices such as, e.g., law, mo-
rality, reasoning or language by shedding light on the principles that seem to be operative 
                                               
48 I say “logic” because native language users typically do not rely on a conscious grammar. They follow 
principles that are simply tacitly operative without, usually, being consciously held. 
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in the behavior of those subjects participating competently in the practice.49 The funda-
mental data or input of a rational reconstruction is the presumably competent, i.e. suc-
cessfully norm-guided behavior, of participants in the practice. With these illustrations 
of the fundamentals of rational reconstruction, I now turn to Habermas’ more detailed 
exposition of what this style of analysis involves. 
Habermas on rational reconstruction 
For Habermas, rational reconstruction is the default style of inquiry in those disciplines 
he designates as the reconstructive sciences. His most frequently cited example of ra-
tional reconstruction is Noam Chomsky’s generative grammar, but Habermas also men-
tions ethics, logic, mathematics, argumentation theory, and developmental psychology as 
examples of reconstructive sciences. 
Again, what these disciplines have in common is their aim of creating knowledge 
about certain human practices by translating—i.e. reconstructing—the implicit, intuitive 
knowledge possessed by competent subjects into a more explicit and precise form. A 
crucial underlying assumption in rational reconstruction is that subjects in various prac-
tices know how to act competently without necessarily being able to provide a full, ex-
plicit account of their competence that others would be able to follow. 
As a case in point, think again of a native speaker of a language: In the context of 
the practice of speaking her native language, the speaker can normally be assumed to be 
competent. But this does not imply that the speaker is able to provide a detailed account 
of how to speak the language to others outside of the practice. In a rational reconstruction 
of linguistic competence, the aim might then be to translate the competence of the native 
speaker into a form—a grammar—that can be grasped by subjects outside of the practice. 
This would enable outsiders to increase their understanding of the practice and its con-
comitant competence, and this understanding could potentially be used as a starting point 
                                               
49 Habermas does not define the idea of a practice, but the general idea is, I think, captured well by Alasdair 
MacIntyre, who defines a practice as: “any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative 
human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to 
achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of 
activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence and human conceptions of the ends and 
goods involved, are systematically extended.” Criticism, and especially evaluative criticism, to me is a kind 
of meta-practice, the aim of which is to accelerate the systematic extension of those human powers to 
achieve excellence in various ground-level practices. Meta-criticism, then, is a kind of meta-meta-practice. 
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for transferring the competence from one set of subjects to another or even for criticism 
of the behavior of competent subjects. 
Habermas’ “A Postscript to Knowledge and Human Interests” (Habermas, 1973a) 
is the earliest publication in which Habermas directly describes his view of rational re-
construction. In the paper, Habermas addresses some of the criticisms and doubts that his 
seminal book Knowledge and Human Interests (1972)) had occasioned. Among these 
were Habermas’ own concerns about the term ‘reflexion’ that he had used without being 
aware that he had thereby conflated two quite different kinds of thinking: self-criticism 
and rational reconstruction (1973, p. 182). 
In order to clear up the confusion and flesh out the meaning of rational recon-
struction, Habermas describes rational reconstruction in the following way (1973, p. 
183): (1) Rational reconstruction is “based on ‘objective’ data like sentences, actions, 
cognitive insights, etc., which are conscious creations of the subject […]” (2) Rational 
reconstruction “tries to understand anonymous systems of rules which can be followed 
by any subject at all provided it has the requisite competence.” (3) Reconstructions “ex-
plicate correct know-how, i.e. the intuitive knowledge we acquire when we possess rule-
competence […]”. 
These ideas may be translated to the agenda of Chapters 6-9 in the following way. 
Clearly, exploring the practice of evaluation as this is exhibited in the work of evaluative 
rhetorical critics involves examining the kind of data that Habermas refers to, i.e. sen-
tences, actions, and cognitive insights consciously created by the critics. Moreover, this 
exploration is aimed at understanding whether and to what extent there are systems of 
rules in operation which may be followed by others who can be brought to understand 
those rules (i.e. it builds on the assumption that evaluation is not a subjective and arbitrary 
practice). And finally, we may assume, at least as a guiding principle, that the critics 
whose reasoning we are to examine possess competence in the practice of evaluation, 
which—if true—will yield an explication of correct know-how. 
The idea that rational reconstruction leads to a kind of knowledge of competence 
is further deepened in Habermas’ book Theory and Practice (1973). In this work, Haber-
mas specifies that rational reconstructions are a kind of ‘theoretical knowledge’ (p. 22) 
or ‘theoretical reflection’ (p. 285fn42) of ‘rule systems which we have to master if we 
wish to process experience cognitively or participate in systems of action or carry on 
discourse.” (p. 22). From these early and rudimentary descriptions of rational 
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reconstruction, Habermas soon turns to a more fully-fledged explanation of the notion. 
His most detailed exposition of rational reconstruction (even to this day) thus occurs in 
his paper “What is Universal Pragmatics?” (Habermas, 1976/1998). In this work, Haber-
mas reiterates the point that rational reconstruction is characteristic of those sciences that 
systematically reconstruct, i.e. explicate, the intuitive knowledge of competent subjects. 
(ibid., p. 29) and that this explication can take place at several levels (ibid., p. 31). 
Pertinent to project to be pursued in the Chapter 6-9, Habermas explains that ex-
plication of meaning has a range that starts on the surface level and can penetrate through 
to explication of “the deep structures of a reality accessible to understanding—a reality 
of symbolic formations produced according to rules.” (ibid., p. 31) This distinction helps 
us understand the difference between interpretation and rational reconstruction. 
In interpretation, meaning explication is directed at the semantic content of the 
‘symbolic formation’. At this level of explication, Habermas explains, the researcher 
takes up the same position as the “author” of the symbolic formation when this author 
wrote the sentence, performed the gesture, used the tool, applied the theory, and so forth. 
In explicating the meaning of the symbolic formation in this way, the understanding of 
the content “pursues connections that link the surface structures of the incomprehensible 
formation with the surface structures of other, familiar formations. Thus, linguistic ex-
pressions can be explicated through paraphrase in the same language or through transla-
tion into expressions of another language; in both cases, competent speakers draw on 
intuitively known meaning relations that obtain within the lexicon of one language or 
between the lexica of two languages.” (ibid., p. 31) 
Relevant to the agenda of Chapters 6-9, Habermas contrasts interpretation with a 
second level of meaning explication that goes beyond the semantic contents of the ‘sym-
bolic formation.’ This kind of meaning explication is carried out, Habermas explains, 
when the researcher alters his or her attitude. Instead of an attitude directed towards un-
derstanding content on the level of surface structures in which the task is to look through 
the symbolic formations to the world about which something is uttered, this second kind 
of meaning explication goes deeper. In the second kind of meaning explication, the re-
searcher focuses on the “generative structures of the expressions themselves.” (ibid., p. 
32). “The interpreter then attempts to explicate the meaning of a symbolic formation with 
the help of the rules according to which the author must have produced it.” Habermas 
expands on this distinction (ibid., pp. 32-33): 
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“In normal paraphrase and translation, the interpreter draws on semantic meaning 
relations (for instance between the different words of a language) in an ad hoc man-
ner, so to speak, in that she simply applies a knowledge shared with competent 
speakers of that language. In this sense, the role of the interpreter can (under suita-
ble conditions) be attributed to the author himself. The attitude changes, however, 
as soon as the interpreter tries not only to apply this intuitive knowledge of speakers 
but to reconstruct it. She then turns away from the surface structure of the symbolic 
formation; she no longer looks through it intentione recta to the world. She attempts 
instead to peer into the symbolic formation—penetrating through its surface, as it 
were—in order to discover the rules according to which this symbolic formation 
was produced (in our example, the rules according to which the lexicon of a lan-
guage is constructed). The object of understanding is no longer the content of a 
symbolic expression or what specific authors meant by it in specific situations but 
rather the intuitive rule consciousness that a competent speaker has of his own lan-
guage.” 
Even though Habermas speaks of “competent speakers” in the above quotation, the scope 
of his method is clearly broader and applies to all competent subjects in norm-governed 
practices and so, I hold, also to rhetorical critics. It is this deeper level, beyond the surface 
structure, that is my interest in the coming case studies. The aim of the case studies is not 
merely to understand or to clarify through paraphrase what various evaluative critics have 
said, but instead to bring out (to extent possible) those rules, principles and assumptions 
that may presumed to be operative in the background and according to which the critics 
have produced their evaluations. In other words, the aim is to bring out the “intuitive rule 
consciousness” of the critics. 
In a further move of clarification (ibid., p. 33), Habermas explains this second 
kind of meaning explication by referring to the British philosopher Gilbert Ryle, who 
distinguishes two kinds of knowledge: know-how and know-that. Know-how refers to the 
“ability of a competent subject who understands how to produce or accomplish some-
thing”, and know-that refers to the “explicit knowledge of how it is that he is able to do 
so” (so a kind of knowledge-of-knowledge.) Habermas illustrates the distinction between 
know-how and know-that in the following way (ibid., p. 33): 
In our case, what the author means by an utterance and what an interpreter under-
stands of its content are a first-level know-that. To the extent that his utterance is 
correctly formed and thus comprehensible, the author produced in in accordance 
with certain rules or on the basis or certain structures. He knows how to use the 
system of rules of his language and understands their context-specific application; 
he has a pretheoretical knowledge of this rule system, which is at least sufficient to 
enable him to produce the utterances in question. This implicit rule consciousness 
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is a know-how. The interpreter, in turn, who not only shares but wants to understand 
this implicit knowledge of the competent speaker, must transform this know-how 
into explicit knowledge, that is, into a second-level know-that. This is the task of 
reconstructive understanding, that is, of meaning explication in the sense of rational 
reconstruction of generative structures underlying the production of symbolic for-
mations. 
Another currently relevant point made by Habermas has to do with what he calls the 
‘evaluative accomplishments of rule consciousness.’ What he means by this phrase is that 
there is a difference between the explicating the surface level meaning of an utterance 
and explicating the underlying structures of utterances (or other symbolic formations) 
(ibid., p. 34): 
Reconstructive proposals are directed toward domains of pretheoretical knowledge, 
that is, not to just any implicit opinion, but to a proven intuitive preknowledge. The 
rule consciousness of competent speakers functions as a court of evaluation, for 
instance with regard to the grammaticality of sentences. Whereas the understanding 
of content is directed toward any utterance whatever, reconstructive understanding 
refers only to symbolic objects characterized as ‘well formed’ by competent sub-
jects themselves. Thus, for example, syntactic theory, propositional logic, the the-
ory of science, and ethics start with syntactically well-formed sentences, correctly 
fashioned propositions, well-corroborated theories, and morally unobjectionable 
resolutions of norm conflicts, in order to reconstruct the rules according to which 
these formations can be produced. 
Habermas then goes on to provide the example of Chomsky’s grammatical theory which 
aimed to (ibid., p. 35): 
reconstruct the intuitive rule consciousness common to all competent speakers in 
such a way that the proposals for reconstruction represent the system of rules that 
permits potential speakers, in at least one language L, to acquire the competence to 
produce and to understand any sentences that count as grammatical in L, as well as 
to distinguish these sentences well-formed in L from ungrammatical sentences.  
Why do rational reconstruction? 
This last point is illustrative of the kind of use that reconstructive knowledge may be put 
to. It can transfer competence or skill from one set of subjects to another and enable this 
new set of subjects to participate in the practice in question in a more qualified manner 
(i.e. understand, evaluate and produce sentences in a language or, more generally, com-
prehend, evaluate and perform actions in a kind of activity hitherto not understood, let 
alone mastered, by these subjects). This idea is also a motivating consideration in the 
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current dissertation. If evaluation of rhetoric is a skill that can be learned, i.e. an activity 
governed by certain principles, it may be possible to increase our understanding of the 
skill through a rational reconstruction of those who already possess the skill. If the pre-
theoretical knowledge of evaluative critics is based on principles and these principles can 
be reconstructed, it becomes possible for aspiring critics to appreciate evaluation in a new 
light and to use the governing principles in practice.  
Evaluation is typically characterized as a dimension of rhetorical criticism. An-
other way to conceptualize evaluation is to regard it as a specific domain or type of action 
carried out by subjects known as rhetorical critics. When seen from this angle, evaluation 
becomes a kind of practice, ostensibly structured or governed by certain assumptions, 
norms, and principles that can be understood, learned and criticized by anyone with the 
right kind of competence. 
One problem with the evaluative dimension of rhetorical criticism is, I have ar-
gued, that the assumptions, norms, and principles governing this practice are not under-
stood to a degree that matches the central place afforded to evaluation in rhetorical criti-
cism. Rational reconstruction should make us see more clearly what is going on, to see 
patterns of evaluative reasoning in a clearer light, thus making it easier to understand, 
follow and perhaps criticize the reasoning. 
Also, rational reconstruction can make it easier to compare and contrast cases of 
reasoning and argumentation across multiple authors. As such, it is a technique that ena-
bles one to discover features of similarity and difference between authors that reason 
about the similar issues but do so from different perspectives. Hopefully, the four case 
studies to be presented in Chapter 6-9 will make it clear how this is a beneficial aspect of 
rational reconstruction.  
Discussion 
Although my analytical approach in the case studies of the proceeding chapters is inspired 
by Habermas’ idea of rational reconstruction, there are also certain differences that need 
to be mentioned. 
Firstly, the scope of Habermas’ idea of rational reconstruction is deeper than 
mine. Habermas’ conception of rational reconstruction is aimed at uncovering or expli-
cating “species-wide competencies.” I see no need to follow Habermas in this regard. 
Much less general competencies may also be explicated through rational reconstruction. 
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Of course, this distinction between my understanding of rational reconstruction and Ha-
bermas’ is to some extent a matter of straight-forward definition. If Habermas, as a matter 
of stipulation, would like rational reconstruction to pertain to only species-wide compe-
tencies, then that is his right. But I see rational reconstruction as a valuable style of anal-
ysis regardless of whether the competence is species-wide or more local. A case in point 
is the rational reconstruction of Danish grammar mentioned earlier. Rational reconstruc-
tion does not have to aim at general linguistic structures shared across the human species 
in the style of Chomsky. Another case in point regards the scope of moral competence. 
Moral competence may or may not be universal across the human species, but rational 
reconstruction can still be used to explicate certain local customs or patterns of coopera-
tion that could count as morality for the group in question. 
A second difference pertains to the domain of competence to be reconstructed. 
Habermasian rational reconstruction as presented above aims in the first instance at spe-
cifically pragmatic-linguistic insights. And my project here does not. Unlike Habermas, 
I am not concerned with linguistic competence per se, but rather with explicating certain 
resources of reason-giving that I claim to be central for the evaluative judgments found 
in rhetorical criticism (to be sure, these judgments are of course expressed in linguistic 
form). So, in this sense there is another difference between my project and Habermas’. 
But, I will maintain, the underlying ambition of explicating a kind of knowing-how in-
herent in a practice is retained. 
Lastly, I would like to briefly clarify the difference between rational reconstruc-
tion and a related style of analysis, which is argumentation analysis. The idea of rational 
reconstruction as I use it here is closely related to (indeed partially overlapping with) 
argumentation analysis. One similarity between the two is found in the attempt to expli-
cate tacit assumptions and principles that seem to be operative in the reasoning under 
analysis. In argument analysis, this typically would involve formulating warrants that 
allow for the connection between data and claim. Engaging in this kind of analysis nec-
essarily involves interpretations and projections on the part of the analyst, and the result 
will always be a conjecture and subject to revision if convincing reasons can be mar-
shalled against the interpretation. These epistemological limitations are also found in ra-
tional reconstruction. 
Another similarity between argumentation analysis and rational reconstruction is 
found in the assumption that the subject whose reasoning is being analyzed is behaving 
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rationally. This assumption ensures that any analysis or reconstruction is performed on 
the basis of a principle of charity. This involves considering the utterances from a per-
spective that will yield the most convincing and consistent explanation of the subjects’ 
actions. 
One major difference between argumentation analysis and rational reconstruction, 
however, is found in the aim of the two pursuits. Whereas argumentation analysis ulti-
mately aims at bringing to light the structure of argumentation for the sake of understand-
ing the practice of argumentation, rational reconstruction aims at bringing to light a 
deeper, “field-dependent” knowledge (a kind of know-how) assumed to be operative in 
the subject. This may be the knowledge of grammar, law, morality, justice—or evaluation 
of rhetoric. In other words, whereas argumentation analysis aims at elucidating the prac-
tice of argumentation in order to better understand this practice, rational reconstruction 
aims at elucidating principles and assumptions operative in any human domain governed 
by rules and principles. In this sense, rational reconstruction may be considered to be a 
somewhat broader endeavor than argument analysis, even though argumentation analysis 
is clearly also a kind of rational reconstruction.  
Conclusion 
The fundamental problems to be dealt with in the analytical part of the dissertation con-
cern the structure of the evaluative dimension of rhetorical criticism understood as the 
assumptions, norms, and principles governing the activity of evaluation as this is carried 
out by rhetorical critics. In this chapter I have introduced a style of analysis suitable for 
shedding light on these aspects of evaluation. Rational reconstruction as understood here 
promises to produce knowledge of a domain of practice through explicating more or less 
implicit aspects of the domain of practice. In this sense, rational reconstruction paves the 
way for increasing understanding, learning and criticism of the practice, which, I have 
argued, is an appropriate agenda when taking into consideration the central role of eval-
uation in rhetorical criticism and the paradoxically modest amount of theorizing about 
this phenomenon.  
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C H A P T E R  6  
Function from designer intentions: 
Herbert A. Wichelns 
 
 
 
One of the main aims of this dissertation is to investigate the origin of evaluative criteria 
for rhetorical artifacts and the issue of how their appropriateness for particular artifacts 
may be justified. In Chapter 4 I posited that a promising avenue for answering this ques-
tion may be intimately related to the notion of function. More specifically, I showed that 
according to a widely shared intuition (the Functional Goodness Intuition), evaluative 
criteria may come from, and therefore presuppose, a conception of function. In this sense, 
in order for an object or artifact to be evaluated positively, it must fulfil or be able to fulfil 
its function, and, conversely, for an artifact to be evaluated negatively, it must not fulfil 
or be able to fulfil its function.50 If this basic intuition is correct, a rhetorical critic with 
evaluative pretensions must therefore somehow be able to identify, establish or ascribe a 
function to an artifact. But this insight only shifts the problem of the origin of evaluative 
criteria to another level. Instead of asking ‘where do criteria come from’, we instead have 
to ask, ‘where do functions come from?’ Just how can a rhetorical critic establish an 
artifact’s function? 
                                               
50 A distinction can of course be made between artifacts that ‘fulfil their function’ and artifacts that ‘are able 
to fulfil their function.’ An artifact may fulfil its function due to exceptional contextual circumstances 
without it necessarily having much to do with the artifact, such as when a knife cuts without being sharp 
due to the softness of the material cut by the knife. Conversely, an artifact may also fail to fulfil its function 
due to exceptional circumstances such as when a sharp knife does not cut due to the rigidity of the material 
to be cut. Cf. here the challenge of rhetors confronting an audience that is very easy to persuade or an 
audience that is very difficult to persuade.  
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In this chapter, I propose that one answer to this question can be found by studying 
Herbert A. Wichelns’ essay on “The Literary Criticism of Oratory” (1925/1995). In the 
essay, Wichelns’ famously argues that critics of oratory too frequently have applied cri-
teria that are somehow inappropriate for oratorical artifacts. As a corrective to this situa-
tion, Wichelns proposes a set of alternative—and in his opinion—more appropriate cri-
teria. This explicit focus on criteria and their appropriateness makes Wichelns’ landmark 
paper a suitable case for reconstructing knowledge of evaluation. 
The question to be pondered here concerns the structure of Wichelns’ evaluative 
reasoning. Where do Wichelns’ criteria come from, how is their appropriateness justified, 
and how are these questions in turn connected to the concept of function? Explicating 
Wichelns’ reasoning requires reconstruction in the sense explained in the Chapter 5, i.e. 
it requires identifying and explicating certain assumptions, concepts, principles etc., op-
erative in Wichelns’ evaluative practice. We must work from the hypothesis that 
Wichelns bases his criteria on identifiable and justifiable principles (i.e. he is a ‘compe-
tent subject’ in the practice of evaluation as explained by Habermas), rather than from 
the hypothesis that Wichelns employs more or less arbitrary preferences. The challenge 
is to identify those principles—to transform Wichelns’ know-how into know-that. 
To anticipate, I will argue here that gaining a proper understanding of Wichelns’ 
reasoning requires paying close attention to a substantial portion of his paper largely ig-
nored by many commentators—the middle section.51 In this section of the paper, 
Wichelns compares and contrasts different approaches to evaluation employed by literary 
critics while he explains why some of these approaches are more appropriate for rhetori-
cal artifacts (oratory) than others. By paying close attention to these passages, I propose, 
it transpires that Wichelns uses a specific approach to function ascription which I will 
term the “designer approach to function ascription.” Reading Wichelns as using a de-
signer approach to function ascription accomplishes three things: it explains the source 
of his ‘persuasive effects’ criterion; it explains his claim that permanence and beauty are 
inappropriate criteria for rhetorical artifacts; and it explains the claim that persuasive ef-
fect is an appropriate criterion for rhetorical artifacts. 
                                               
51 As Gaonkar (1990, p. 293) notes: “Although Wichelns' essay consists of eight sections, later commentaries 
generally dwell on the last two sections, especially section seven.” 
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The basics of Wichelns’ position 
Wichelns’ essay is written at a time when rhetorical criticism as a discipline was largely 
non-existent. In order to carve out a space for a specifically rhetorical form of criticism, 
Wichelns therefore had to establish rhetorical criticism as distinct in certain ways from 
literary criticism. 
The structure of Wichelns’ essay is specifically designed to do so. Wichelns opens 
his essay by noting a certain deficiency in the extant scholarship on oratory. According 
to Wichelns, the deficiency consists in the lack of serious scholarship dealing with an 
“interesting” and “important” (ibid., p. 3) issue, namely “the judging of orators”, i.e. eval-
uation. According to Wichelns, the compelling reason why this is a problem is that “the 
conditions of democracy necessitate … the study of the art” (ibid., p. 4). Oratory is “a 
permanent and important human activity” (ibid., p. 4) and as such the critical study of 
oratorical method must be taken seriously. Notice here how this justification immediately 
distinguishes rhetorical criticism from literary criticism by referring to democracy. 
Based on this fundamental premise, Wichelns describes in outline how he will 
contribute to solving the problem. He wants to “spy out the land, to see what some critics 
have said of some orators, to discover what their mode of criticism has been.” (ibid., p. 
3) He concedes that his project is “limited” (ibid., p. 3) in the sense that he will only be 
able to focus on a small portion of criticism, namely “the verdicts on [a few well-known 
orators] found in the surveys of literary history, in critical essays, in histories of oratory, 
and in biographies.” (ibid., pp. 3-4). But even though Wichelns is interested in the ver-
dicts of these critics, the substance he is really after lies behind those verdicts. He wants 
to interrogate “the method of the critic: his standards, his categories of judgment, what 
he regards as important.” (ibid., p. 4) In other words, Wichelns aims to reconstruct the 
principles employed by critics in building cases for their evaluative verdicts.52 
The designer approach to function ascription 
I will defend the view that Herbert Wichelns employs what I will call a designer approach 
to function ascription in order to arrive at and justify the appropriateness of his criterion 
of effect. What does this approach entail? At its most basic level, the designer approach 
                                               
52 In this sense, there is a methodological parallel between Wichelns’ project and my own. But Wichelns of 
course ultimately aimed at promoting a specific set of criteria, whereas I aim to investigate methods for 
arriving at and justifying criteria. 
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to function ascription entails the view that the function of an object is what its designer 
intended the object to be for. Translated to a context of rhetoric, this means that the func-
tion of, say, Lincoln’s speech is to persuade the audience of the basic need for liberty if 
persuading the audience of the basic need for liberty is what Lincoln intended the speech 
to be for. Notice how the designer approach to function ascription is fully compatible 
with the Functional Goodness Intuition according to which the quality of an object de-
pends on its capacity to fulfil its function. 
To flesh out these general and quite abstract propositions, consider the following 
explanation. As a matter of definition, artifacts are always brought into existence by 
someone—typically humans although other animals such as tool-using monkeys could 
also in a sense create artifacts. On the standard definition, artifacts will always have de-
signers. The idea of a designer should be understood broadly. A designer is not neces-
sarily someone working at a computer, making sketches of toys, clothes, graphics, etc. A 
designer is simply someone who—through a rather ineffable thought process—brings 
into existence (or perhaps plans to bring into existence) an object or entity with the inten-
tion that the object or entity has a certain purpose—that it is for something. In this sense, 
a designer can be everyone from a granddaughter making a clay ashtray for her grandfa-
ther, a shoemaker, toolmaker, chef, artist, author and rhetor. 
The designer approach to function ascription entails that because an object was 
designed by someone with the intention that the object has a certain purpose, this purpose 
constitutes the function of the object. Or, as a variation on this theme, the approach can 
entail that because an object was designed to be of a kind that has a certain purpose, the 
purpose of the kind constitutes the function of the object. 
In a widely cited article from the literature on functions, philosopher Larry Wright 
(1973) explains the idea in the following way:53 
[…] if something is designed to do X, then doing X is its function even if doing X 
is generally useless, silly, or even harmful. In fact, intention is so central here that 
it allows us to say the function of I is to do C, even when I cannot even do C. If the 
windshield washer switch comes from the factory defective, and is never repaired, 
we would still say that its function is to activate the washer system; which is to say: 
that is what it was designed to do. 
                                               
53 It should be noted that Wright himself does not support the designer approach in the simple version outlined 
here. 
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This is an intuitively appealing approach and it illustrates two central issues, namely how 
objects get their functions and how they are evaluated by their ability to perform this 
function. In Wright’s example, the windshield washer switch is thus negatively evaluated 
(“defective”), and the reason for this is simply that the switch will not perform its func-
tion, i.e. do what it was intended to do by its designer. 
In the contemporary literature on functions, Wright is perhaps the first to articulate 
the above conception of function ascription, but the view is commonly acknowledged by 
a range of thinkers from the literature on functions. Ariew and Perlman (2002, p. 1) thus 
opine: 
Humans often create objects with a purpose in mind, endowing the objects with 
particular functions from the intentions of their inventors. It is taken to be relatively 
unproblematic to have artifacts receive their functions from the intentions of their 
inventors. For example, can-openers are invented with the function of opening cans. 
We see again here how the function of the artifact flows from the intentions of the de-
signer (“inventor”). The designer is in a position from which he can endow certain mate-
rial objects with functions, thereby bridging the gap from the purely objective, material 
realm into the realm of socially constructed facts. 
Peter McLaughlin, another noted thinker on functions, also expresses the idea that 
functions are derived from the intentions of a designer (McLaughlin, 2001, p. 52): 
In the case of the functions of whole artifacts the determination of their functions 
or purpose is completely external. It lies in the actual intentions of the designer, 
[…], however socially determined these intentions may in fact be. Such functions 
or purposes can be changed by a change of mind, and we can use the terms purpose 
and function interchangeably. 
Karen Neander, another prominent function theorist, also makes a point to the same ef-
fect: “I suggest that the function of an artifact is the purpose or end for which it was made 
[…] by an agent […]” (Neander, 1991a, p. 173). 
In the context of art criticism, Jonathan Gilmore holds a similar view. According 
to Gilmore (2011, p. 302), we find “the source and determination of […] functions in art 
in its creator’s intentions.” And he goes on to say that: 
 […] the standard case is that an artist intends to create a work of art that has a 
function and some capacity to discharge it and acting on that intention explains (in 
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the right way, i.e., without a deviant causal chain) why the work she creates has 
that function and capacity. 
In the context also of art criticism, Noël Carroll writes (p. 67): 
[K]nowing what the artist is intending to do also gives us access to the purpose her 
work is supposed to sub-serve—which, pari passu, supplies the critic with an im-
portant goalpost against which to measure the achievement of the work under scru-
tiny. 
And returning briefly to Aristotle’s rhetorical question from his ergon argument de-
scribed in Chapter 4, commentator W.F.R. Hardie apparently also subscribes to a kind of 
designer approach to function ascription, for he rejects Aristotle’s suggestion that humans 
could have a function “unless one is prepared to say that a man is an instrument designed 
for some use.” (Hardie, 1980, p. 23). 
The preceding remarks illustrate the intuition behind the designer approach to 
function ascription. In general, according to this approach to function ascription, objects 
get their functions from the intentions of the designer, either directly or through member-
ship in a category or a kind, which in turn is derived from the intentions of the designer. 
Let us take a closer look at how Wichelns uses this approach to function ascription to 
derive and justify the appropriateness of his proposed evaluative criterion—and to argue 
against the appropriateness of literary criteria such as permanence and beauty. 
Reconstruction of Wichelns’ approach to function ascription 
In his paper, Wichelns notes that “the section of the history of criticism which deals with 
judging of orators is still unwritten. Yet the problem is an interesting one, and one which 
involves some important conceptions” (Wichelns, 1995, p. 3). On this background, he 
therefore sets out “to spy the land, to see what some critics have said of some orators, to 
discover what their mode of criticism has been.” (ibid., p. 3) He limits his investigation 
of criticism to those critics who have written on the oratory of such major public figures 
as Burke, Webster, Lincoln, Gladstone, Bright and Cobden. (ibid., p. 3) And he further 
delimits his study in order to make it a squarely meta-critical one: “What interests us it 
the method of the critic: his standards, his categories of judgment, what he regards as 
important. These will show, not so much what he thinks of a great and ancient literary 
type, as how he thinks in dealing with that type. The chief aim is to know how critics 
have spoken of orators.” (ibid., p. 4) 
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In order to get a handle on his survey, Wichelns offers an initial categorization of 
the criticism he wishes to survey. First, there is a type of criticism which is “predomi-
nantly personal or biographical” in the sense that it focuses on the character and the mind 
of the orator in order to shed light on the human being. Second, there is the type of criti-
cism which divides its attention between the biographical aspect of the speaker on the 
one hand and his oratorical products on the other. Last, Wichelns includes a category of 
criticism, which “is occupied with the work and tends to ignore the man.” Wichelns finds 
problems in all three categories and I will argue in the following that this fact can ulti-
mately be explained by Wichelns’ specific conception of function ascription (which it is 
the purpose of this chapter to reconstruct). After having conducted his survey, Wichelns 
ends up with two broad groups of critics. One group he labels ‘literary critics,’ and the 
other he labels ‘rhetorical critics.’ 
The fundamental problem that Wichelns finds in the group of literary critics is 
this: Despite all their differences in point of view, in styles of description, and in their 
differing propensity toward making evaluative judgments, the literary critics are—ac-
cording to Wichelns—characterized by a unity of purpose (ibid., p. 21). This unity of 
purpose consists “in the attempt to interpret the permanent value that they find in the 
work under consideration. That permanent value is not precisely indicated by the term 
beauty, but the two strands of aesthetic excellence and permanence are clearly found, not 
only in the avowed judicial criticism but in those writers who emphasize description ra-
ther than judgment.” For these writers, Wichelns claims (ibid., p. 22): 
there is implicit in the critic’s mind the absolute standard of a timeless world: the 
wisdom of Burke’s thought (found in the principles to which his mind always grav-
itates rather than in his decisions on points of policy) and the felicity of his language 
are not considered as of an age, but for all time. Whether the critic considers the 
technical excellence merely, or both technique and substance, his preoccupation is 
with that which age cannot wither nor custom stale. 
And this attitude is common to all the literary critics. “They are all, in various ways, 
interpreters of the permanent and universal values they find in the works of which they 
treat” (ibid., p. 22). In short, these critics are preoccupied “with the thought and the elo-
quence which is permanent.” (ibid., p. 22) 
In contrast to this attitude common to those writers who Wichelns designates as 
literary critics, Wichelns characterizes the project of rhetorical critics thus (ibid., p. 22): 
“If we now turn to rhetorical criticism as we found it exemplified in the preceding section, 
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we find that its point of view is patently single. It is not concerned with permanence, nor 
yet with beauty. It is concerned with effect.” 
The basic point made by Wichelns on the difference between literary criticism 
and rhetorical criticism thus concerns the appropriateness of evaluative criteria employed 
in the two types of criticism. Criticism of literary objects will appropriately apply the 
criteria of permanence and beauty, while criticism of rhetorical objects must instead ap-
ply the criterion of effect. In Wichelns words (ibid., p. 25): 
the point of view of literary criticism is proper only to its own objects, the perma-
nent works. Upon such as are found to lie without the pale, the verdict of literary 
criticism is of negative value merely, and its interpretation is false and misleading, 
because it proceeds upon a wrong assumption. 
But what makes literary objects distinct from rhetorical ones? Clearly, it will not do to 
answer that literary objects are different from rhetorical ones, because they ought to be 
evaluated using different standards. An answer to the question must begin from the op-
posite direction, namely by noting that these objects ought to be evaluated using different 
standards, because literary objects are different from rhetorical objects. And, as I will 
suggest, the beginning of an answer to this question lies in Wichelns’ approach to func-
tion ascription which we can begin to understand by noting Wichelns’ insistence through-
out his paper that literary critics fail to see the orator as orator and instead misconceive 
the orator as something other than an orator. 
Failing to see the orator as orator 
As noted earlier, Wichelns divides his survey of critical methods into three portions. The 
first, in which critics are grouped according to their propensity to “seek the man behind 
the work” is treated briefly only to be dismissed as irrelevant for oratory in Wichelns’ 
brief Section II. The problem with critics adopting this attitude, according to Wichelns, 
is their failure to conceive correctly of the speaker in question (ibid., p. 5): 
But [these critics] do not occupy themselves with Burke as a speaker, nor even with 
him as a writer; their first and their last concern is with the man rather than with his 
works […] These critics, in dealing with the public speaker, think of him as some-
thing other than a speaker. 
Albeit in a preliminary form, in this passage we find a key to understanding the funda-
mental premise of Wichelns’ argument against the appropriateness of criteria of 
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permanence and beauty for oratorical objects. For the basic failure of all the literary critics 
surveyed in the paper comes down to the implications of their misconception of the 
speaker as speaker (or, in other words, the orator as orator). 
This basic failure is highlighted by Wichelns in Section III, which deals with the 
kind of criticism which focuses on both the person and the work. Regarding this kind of 
criticism, Wichelns holds that “[a]t its best, the type of study that starts with the orator’s 
mind and character is justified by the fact that nothing can better illuminate his work as 
a persuader of men.” (ibid., p. 5). What we see here is Wichelns’ definition of an orator 
as ‘a persuader of men.’ Moreover, we sense the importance that Wichelns places upon 
this definition of an orator as a persuader of men. But, as Wichelns notes, there is also a 
danger in this kind of criticism focusing equally on the person and the work (ibid., p. 5): 
[W]hen not at its best, the description of a man’s general cast of mind stands utterly 
unrelated to his art: the critic fails to fuse his comment on the individual with his 
comment on the artist; and as a result we get some statements about the man, and 
some statements about the orator, but neither casts light on the other. 
This passage highlights once more that, for Wichelns, it is of the utmost importance that 
rhetorical critics see the speaking subject in the correct light; not as a person or an indi-
vidual, but as an orator—a “persuader of men”. This is emphasized when Wichelns com-
plains that in in Grierson’s criticism of Burke, the “analysis of the orator is incomplete, 
being overshadowed by the treatment of Burke as a writer” and that in other cases the 
critics fail to make the best critical choices, perhaps because they “habitually take large 
views of the orator himself, considered as a personality”. The same problem of failing to 
see the orator as an orator reveals itself in Wichelns’ comments on the critic Elton’s treat-
ment of Burke. “For Professor Elton, evidently, Burke was a man, and a mind, and an 
artist in prose; but he was not an orator.” (ibid., p. 7). And the same goes for the critic 
Stephenson’s analysis of Lincoln: “But though we find in Stephenson’s pages a sugges-
tive study of Lincoln as a literary man, we find no special regard for Lincoln as orator.” 
(ibid., p. 8) 
In Section IV, Wichelns turns his attention to those critics who are “more dis-
tinctly literary in aim.” (ibid., p. 10). This group he further subdivides into judicial critics, 
interpretive critics, and the critics who “regard the speech as a special literary form.” Of 
the judicial critics, Wichelns concludes that they all make the same mistake. That is, in 
addition to their failure to ground their evaluative standards of which permanence is one, 
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their “point of view is always that of the printed page.” (ibid., p. 12) Likewise with the 
interpretive critics, who also in general “take the point of view of the printed page, of the 
prose essay. Only to a slight degree is there a shift to another point of view, that of the 
orator in relation to the audience on whom he exerts his influence; the immediate public 
begins to loom a little larger; the essential nature of the oration as a type begins to be 
suggested.” (ibid., p. 12) 
From this exposition of passages from the first four sections of Wichelns’ essay, 
a distinct pattern or topic in Wichelns argument may thus be identified: Those critics who 
fail to see the speaker as a speaker—the orator as orator—and conceive of the speaker 
instead as a man, a mind, a writer, or a person, have simply premised their criticism on a 
mistake. In order to see in more detail wherein this mistake lies, let us consider what 
Wichelns has to say about those critics who avoid this mistake (at least partially) and the 
implications this has on the validity of their criticism. 
Succeeding in seeing the orator as orator 
In the structure of Wichelns’ argument, these more successful critics appear towards the 
end of Section V and through Section IV. One example is the critic Saintsbury, who 
manages to grasp something central about Burke’s oratory and focus his critical point of 
view accordingly (ibid., p. 13): 
Saintsbury’s attitude toward the communicate, impulsive nature of the orator’s task 
is indicated in a passage on the well-known description of Windsor Castle. This 
description the critic terms ‘at once … a perfect harmonic chord, a complete visual 
picture, and a forcible argument.’ It is significant that he adds, ‘The minor rhetoric, 
the suasive purpose [presumably the argumentative intent] must be kept in view; if 
it be left out the thing loses’; and holds Burke ‘far below Browne, who had no needs 
of purpose’ It is less important that a critic think well of the suasive purpose than 
that he reckon with it, and of Saintsbury at least it must be said that he recognizes 
it, although grudgingly; but it cannot be said that Saintsbury has a clear conception 
of rhetoric as the art of communication: sometimes it means the art of prose, some-
times that of suasion. 
Saintsbury, then, according to Wichelns, understands something central about oratory 
and the “orator’s task” that the previously analyzed critics did not; namely the idea of 
“suasive purpose” or, in Wichelns paraphrase, “argumentative intent.” And this under-
standing elevates Saintsbury above the previous critics who failed to see the orator as 
orator. 
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For the critic Hazlitt, says Wichelns, the topic of ‘suasive purpose’ is still out of 
reach. Although Hazlitt has the merit of focusing attentively on the style of Burke, Hazlitt 
still lacks “a clear sense of Burke’s communicative impulse, of his persuasive purpose, 
as operating in a concrete situation”, and this omission leads Hazlitt to mistakenly con-
ceive of Burke as “speaking to the judicious but disinterested hearer of any age other than 
Burke’s own” and thus misunderstand the “problem of the speaker.” (ibid., p. 13). 
In contrast, the critic Whipple understands, according to Wichelns, that “an orator 
has as his audience, not posterity, but certain classes of his own contemporaries.” Whip-
ple’s criticism of Webster is thus premised on the realization that “Webster was not a 
writer, but a speaker” and this, to Wichelns, makes him an example of those critics who 
recognizes “the orator’s function” and in whose criticism “’the minor rhetoric, the suasive 
purpose’ is beginning  to be felt, though not always recognized and never fully taken into 
account.” (ibid., p. 15) 
Through this acknowledgement of Whipple’s criticism, Wichelns segues to exam-
ine the final group of critics, who together represent the most appropriate form of rhetor-
ical criticism. What makes this group stand out, according to Wichelns, is that “[t]he 
writers now to be mentioned are aware, more keenly than any of those we have so far 
met, of the speech as a literary form” in which the critics view “oratory as oratory”. To 
illustrate, Wichelns quotes the critic Lord Curzon (ibid., p. 16): 
In dealing with the Parliamentary speakers of our time I shall, accordingly, confine 
myself to those whom I have myself heard, or for whom I can quote the testimony 
of others who heard them; and I shall not regard them as prose writers or literary 
men, still less as purveyors of instruction to their own or to future generations, but 
as men who produced, by the exercise of certain talents of speech, a definite im-
pression upon contemporary audiences, and whose reputation for eloquence must 
be judged by that test, and that test alone.54 
According to Wichelns, Lord Curzon’s point of view in which the speaker is recognized 
as a speaker and not as something else (a writer, author, etc.) is what makes this approach 
to criticism valid. And, in the same vein, Wichelns applauds the critic H.M. Butler’s crit-
icism focusing on “Chatham as an orator” by “thinking of the speech as originally deliv-
ered to its first audience rather than as read by the modern reader” (ibid., p. 16) and, next, 
                                               
54 Wichelns immediately corrects Lord Curzon and notes that ”the judgment of orators is not solely to be 
determined by the impression of contemporary audiences.” (p. 16). Those who take Wichelns to be a pro-
ponent of an “immediate effects” criterion should therefore reconsider. 
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the critic Lecky’s account of Burke in which Lecky regards “Burke as primarily a 
speaker” and also in the critic Bryce’s account of Gladstone, which deals “explicitly with 
the orator as orator.” Similarly, Chauncey A. Goodrich is commended for his “powerful 
grasp” and “comprehensive view” on criticism, which entails a “consistent view of his 
subject as a speaker.” 
In sum, what the critics of this last section accomplish that the lesser critics did 
not, according to Wichelns, is this: They all adopt “a different attitude towards the orator; 
his function is recognized for what it is: the art of influencing men in some concrete 
situation. Neither the personal nor the literary evaluation is the primary object. The critic 
speaks of the orator as a public man whose function it is to exert influence by speech.” 
(ibid., p. 21) 
The function of the orator 
I have claimed that Wichelns derives the function of oratory from the intentions of the 
designers, i.e. the orators. Let us see more specifically how Wichelns does this. 
I suggest that the place to start is by looking at Wichelns’ definitions and remarks 
about the nature of the orator. Wichelns is concerned to show that criticism of oratory 
suffers if we do not take into account the orator as orator. But how should we see an 
orator, then? 
Several passages indicate Wichelns’ answer to this question. For example, 
Wichelns posits that the orator should be seen as a “persuader of men.” In fact, this is 
defined as the work of an orator. (ibid., p. 5) In another passage, Wichelns advises the 
critic to take into consideration the strategic purpose of the oratorical works, in their func-
tion as speeches delivered by a “public man” (ibid., p. 7) In a third passage Wichelns 
commends the critic Elton for recognizing not only that Burke was a speaker (as opposed 
to a man) but further that Burke therefore “is to be judged in part at least as one who 
attempted to influence men by the spoken word.” (ibid., p. 9) This idea is followed up 
when Wichelns commends the critic Grierson for realizing “better than the others that 
Burke’s task was not merely to express his thoughts and feelings in distinguished prose, 
but to communicate his thoughts and his feelings effectively.” (ibid., p. 9) And this “task” 
is soon supplemented with a description of “the problem that confronts every orator: so 
to present ideas as to bring them into the consciousness of hearers.” (ibid., p. 10) 
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Wichelns then goes on to talk of oratory as a type of object that has a purpose. He 
notes the failure of many critics to realize this. For these critics, he says, “the speech is 
regarded as a musical meditation might be regarded: as a kind of harmonious musing that 
drifts pleasantly along, with little of inner form and nothing of objective purpose.55 Fur-
ther, Wichelns notes that the critic Hazlitt is “lacking a clear sense of Burke’s communi-
cative impulse, of his persuasive purpose, as operating in a concrete situation.” And 
Wichelns goes on to note some of the more accomplished critics are to be commended 
because in their criticism “the presence of a persuasive purpose is clearly recognized.” 
(ibid, p. 15) 
Wichelns also discusses how Lecky has managed to elevate his criticism by re-
garding Burke as a public man (ibid., p. 17,) and he commends Morley’s work on Glad-
stone, which again regards Gladstone as a public man. Wichelns also praises Goodrich 
who “consistently thinks of the speeches he discusses as intended for oral delivery” and 
on p. 20, Goodrich is commended for taking the “point of view of public address.” On p. 
20, Wichelns summarizes his conclusion in the following way: “But we have arrived at a 
different attitude towards the orator; his function is recognized for what it is: the art of 
influencing men in some concrete situation. Neither the personal, nor the literary evalu-
ation is the primary object. The critics speaks of the orator as a public man whose function 
it is to exert influence by speech.” 
Wichelns quotes with approval the following (p. 23): “The writer of rhetorical 
discourse has his eye upon the audience and occasion; his task is persuasion; his form 
and style are organic with the occasion.” 
Wichelns (p. 24) notes a crucial distinction between poetry—rightly judged by 
literary standards—and rhetoric. The difference is that poetry “always is free to fulfil its 
                                               
55 Although Wichelns does not reference Kant, the distinction between objects with an objective purpose and 
those without such a purpose seems to me to be very much inspired by Kant’s ideas of free beauty (pul-
chritudo vaga) and adherent beauty (pulchritudo adhaerens) introduced in §16 of his Critique of the Power 
of Judgment (Kant, 2000). As explained by Paul Guyer (2005, ch. 5), Kant’s first kind of beauty presup-
poses no concept of what the object ought to be (and therefore no given function), whereas the second kind 
of beauty does presuppose a particular end (i.e. a for-ness, a function). Wichelns, it seems to me, would 
see oratory as subject to adherent judgments (i.e. functional judgments), whereas music is subject to judg-
ments of free beauty. Beauty, even adherent beauty, is something different from, e.g., persuasive effect, 
but the passage seems to reveal that functional goodness intuition seems to be very much present in 
Wichelns’ reasoning. 
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own law”, whereas rhetoric—due to the suasive purpose—is “perpetually in bondage to 
the occasion and the audience.” 
Similarly, as a critic of rhetoric, “one must conceive of the public man as influ-
encing the men of his own times by the power of his discourse.” 
This marks another distinction between rhetorical criticism and literary criticism. 
For due to its focus on permanent values, literary criticism does not take into considera-
tion crucial aspects of rhetorical criticism, namely the notion that in rhetoric there is a 
special purpose and thus misses to interpret the discourse “in the light of the writer’s 
intention” 
To illustrate this point, Wichelns quotes Morley: “The statesman who makes or 
dominates a crisis, who has to rouse and mold the mind of senate or nation, has something 
else to think about than the production of literary masterpieces.” In other words, the men-
tal events, i.e. the intentions, of the statesman—the public man—are different that those 
of the writer of literature. This is further underlined, when Wichelns notes that rhetorical 
criticism should “reconstruct the author’s own intention”. 
What all of these passages suggest is the following: Orators are “public men”, 
who have as part of their very definition certain tasks that they must grapple with. It is 
built into the fabric of the concept of public man that he must intend to influence and 
persuade. This is his ergon, and these intentions imbue the oratory of “public men” with 
a certain function. This is an interesting variation on the idea of the designer approach to 
function ascription in which the function of the object is derived from the actual inten-
tions of the designer. As would later be noted by writers in discussions of the so-called 
intentional fallacy (Wimsatt & Beardsley, 1946), actual intentions are to some extent be-
yond the scope of the critic. But Wichelns’ interestingly bypasses this problem by incor-
porating in the definition of an orator an intention to persuade. On the basis of this as-
sumption, Wichelns thus bypasses problems of the uncertainty of actual intentions and 
levies instead idealized intentions that in turn make the possibility of function ascription 
a reality. 
Conclusion 
Although the focus of this dissertation is evaluation, the aim of this chapter has not been 
to describe the criteria posited in Herbert Wichelns’ essay, nor has it been to attempt an 
evaluation of the appropriateness of those criteria. Instead, the aim has been 
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reconstructive; to get behind the criteria proposed by Wichelns in order to see where those 
criteria come from and to ascertain how Wichelns’ justifies their appropriateness. This 
kind of approach is in part made feasible by the fact that Wichelns was responding to a 
set of opponents. He did not have the luxury of being able to simply propose criteria in a 
domain hitherto devoid of such criteria. Wichelns had to show that his criteria were in 
some sense superior to—i.e. more appropriate than—the criteria he intended to replace. 
This in turn means that Wichelns had to build a case for his criteria, and this situation 
formed the basis for selecting Wichelns’ paper as a viable case study. 
How, then, did Wichelns derive his criteria and defend their appropriateness? The 
answer to this question, I have argued, is intimately related to the notion of function. 
More specifically, Wichelns’ case for the appropriateness of the criterion of persuasive 
effect in the evaluation of oratory rests on the idea that literary and oratorical objects 
constitute different kinds of objects in the sense that they have different functions; and 
this claim is in turn based on the idea that the designers or creators of these objects have 
different intentions in bringing the objects into existence. 
Through his essay, Wichelns weaves an ideal type in the form of a designer of 
messages (the public man). This designer is defined in part by his “task” and his inten-
tions as “a persuader of men.” The public man is dissociated from the ideal designer of 
literature and poetry who has different intentions. This move of constructing a designer 
with certain intentions lets Wichelns imbue oratory (i.e. designs of the public man) with 
a general function, which is to persuade. Once this function of oratory is in place, the 
evaluative criteria will follow: If a message persuades (i.e. fulfils the purpose as intended 
by its designer), then it should be positively evaluated, if not, then it should be negatively 
evaluated. 
In ascribing functions to oratorical objects in this way, Wichelns’ essay may thus 
be said to instantiate a general approach to function ascription which may be called the 
designer approach to function ascription. The designer approach to function ascription 
thus constitutes one strategy for systematically deriving evaluative criteria and justifying 
their appropriateness.  
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C H A P T E R  7  
Function from user needs: Christian Kock 
 
 
 
For critics who subscribe to the Functional Goodness Intuition, the relevant evaluative 
criteria are derived from the function of the object in question. For Wichelns, this function 
was in turn derived by appealing to the (idealized) intentions of the designer of the arti-
fact, “the public man”. But is this kind of function ascription the only possible one? 
In this chapter, I examine Christian Kock’s evaluative reasoning in order to pro-
vide an answer to this question. The evaluative thinking of Christian Kock warrants its 
own case study for several reasons. First of all, Christian Kock’s work is interesting from 
the point of view of this dissertation, because Kock is a contemporary rhetorician who 
explicitly holds that evaluative criticism is central to rhetoric. This commitment to nor-
mativity suggests that his work will contain indications as to how to actually go about 
evaluating rhetoric. Secondly, as I will argue, although Kock clearly makes use of func-
tion ascription, he does so in a fashion that leaves some of his key evaluative assumptions 
and premises somewhat ambiguous. And third, despite this ambiguity, Kock’s work 
clearly illustrates that Wichelns’ designer approach to function ascription is not the only 
possible approach. 
More specifically, the main claim I will be defending in this chapter is that pas-
sages of Christian Kock’s work illustrates the so-called user approach to function ascrip-
tion. This means that evaluative criteria are derived from considerations of the user of the 
rhetorical artifact rather than its designer. This approach to function ascription corre-
sponds roughly to function theorist Peter Achinstein’s (1983) notion of “user-function.” 
 
Beyond the reconstruction of Kock’s approach to function ascription, the chapter also 
considers a criticism of Kock’s normative reasoning by David Zarefsky (2013). I argue 
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that Zarefsky’s criticism of Kock is ultimately premised on their different intuitions about 
function ascription, and further that there are good reasons not to adopt Zarefsky’s ap-
proach to function ascription. 
Christian Kock’s commitment to normativity 
The first point to be established is that Kock’s conception of rhetoric as a discipline is 
thoroughly normative. In a number of publications this commitment to normativity has 
been explicitly communicated through programmatic statements as well as through more 
implicit acts of evaluative criticism. 
Perhaps Christian Kock’s most clear commitment to normativity can be found in 
his paper “The Identity of Rhetoric as a Discipline and a University Program” (2011).56 
In this paper, Kock sets out his vision of rhetoric, which entails that “[r]hetoric is an 
empirical and normative discipline” about utterances regarded in their total context. 
According to Kock, adopting this view of rhetoric involves studying both the pro-
duction and reception of utterances in their complete situational contexts. Rhetoric, Kock 
says in another publication (2004), “will teach us not only to do certain things with words, 
but also to do these things well […]”. 
Drawing on Bitzer’s (1968) ideas about the rhetorical situation, Kock maintains 
that rhetoric as a discipline contains a crucial focus on evaluation which sets it apart from 
other communication disciplines in that it “starts with the situation in which something 
is to be uttered—and from that point of departure it raises normative discussions about 
every choice. Most significant is the fact that rhetoric will pronounce on the quality of 
the content of the utterance” (Kock, 2011, p. 49, my emphasis). 
Judgments of quality imply the presence of evaluative criteria. And these, accord-
ing to Kock, are also central to the rhetoric as a scholarly discipline, since the study of 
rhetoric “asks what the criteria are for the value, merit or quality of utterances. Rhetoric 
takes it upon itself to pronounce, as a scholarly discipline, on the value of its objects of 
study; it will not merely describe them according to their essential characteristics, it will 
also appraise them […]” (ibid., p. 48) 
The quotations should suffice to illustrate that Christian Kock holds a fundamen-
tally normative view of rhetoric as a discipline. The point of the discipline is not merely 
                                               
56 This article is Christian Kock’s own English translation of an earlier publication (Kock, 1997). 
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to gain a deeper understanding of the characteristics of concrete utterances in their situa-
tional context, but also crucially to understand the quality of these utterances, which in 
turn requires an understanding of evaluative criteria. The question becomes, then, where 
do these criteria come from and how are their justified? 
Kock’s normativity is functional 
A key aspect of understanding the source and justification of evaluative criteria lies, I 
propose, in Kock’s understanding of rhetoric as functional. The claim that Kock sub-
scribes to the Functional Goodness Intuition can be supported by considering the follow-
ing passages in several of Kock’s publications. 
For instance, Kock states that “[rhetoric’s] emphasis on production as well as re-
ception implies that it must consider how utterances function; the normativity of rhetoric 
implies that it considers how well they function.” (2011, p. 47) Later in the same paper 
when contemplating the fundamental rhetorical question “what ought to be said here and 
why?”, Kock proposes that any answer to this question “and all other choices made by 
the rhetor are to be made with reference to aim or function.” (ibid., p. 49) In a similar 
vein, Kock (2004) explains that “in general rhetoric teaches us that the function a message 
is meant to serve very largely determines all the properties that the message should have, 
which again implies that messages meant to serve different functions will have very dif-
ferent properties.” And this perspective of rhetoric as function-oriented is further sub-
stantiated when Kock states (2011, p. 42) that “Burke, Booth and Perelman are undoubt-
edly among the principal architects of what rhetoric as a contemporary scholarly disci-
pline ought to be: what they teach us is to look at a specific, authentic utterance in its 
entirety, primarily its ideational content, its invention, and its correlated function.” 
These remarks about rhetoric and function are situated at a general level as a pro-
posal of what rhetoric as a discipline ought to focus on. But they also consistently per-
meate the more specific conception of rhetoric as public discourse that Kock has outlined 
in a number of publications. For instance, when discussing public discourse and the me-
dia, Kock maintains that “Rhetoric takes a view of media and of public communication 
generally that we may call functionalist.” And this functionalist perspective should in 
turn inform the stance of rhetorical critics: “Today, the media are the forum where public 
discourse is conducted. It follows that we should criticize the media when they fail to 
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perform this function, and we should try to suggest how they could do it better.” (Kock, 
2004). 
The idea that rhetorical normativity is grounded in function becomes even more 
clear when Kock contrast his perspective with other approaches to communication such 
as critical discourse analysis. A major difference between critical discourse analysis and 
Kock’s conception of rhetoric is the lack of a functional perspective in the former: “[…] 
Critical Discourse Analysis is a purely descriptive pursuit. There is no theory of how 
public communication ought to be in order for it to fulfil a constructive role in society, 
no notion of a constructive function for public discourse at all.” (Kock, 2004, my empha-
sis.57) 
The idea that public political discourse has a function—or several functions—leads 
naturally to a normative, ameliorative role of rhetorical critics (Kock, 2004): 
[…] Rhetoric believes that there is good discourse and bad discourse, i.e. some 
properties of public discourse will hinder and some will serve the functions for 
which public discourse is needed. Hence, Rhetoric is informed by the wish to iden-
tify these properties and to suggest or demand specific changes in current social 
discourse practices. 
In line with Aristotle’s and Plato’s Functional Goodness Intuition (cf. Chapter 4), Kock 
thus emphasizes that virtues and vices—the properties that help or hinder the fulfilment 
of function—are central topics for the rhetorical critic. But notice how the singular notion 
of function has now become a plural notion of functions. The idea that public discourse 
may serve several functions is thus highlighted (Kock, 2004) : 
As stated before, it is a key point in a rhetorician's approach to the media that a 
given medium has several widely differing functions. Consequently, it makes little 
sense to speak of the function of that medium as such, or to assume that the medium 
as such imposes specific conditions on whatever content it is used to mediate. The 
function of a medium is to mediate the functions of the content that it carries. And 
each medium may carry many types of content, each with its own distinctive func-
tion. 
And the same idea can be found in yet another publication where the term ‘function’ has 
been substituted by the term ‘purpose’ (Kock, 2008): 
                                               
57 Christian Kock’s current position is that it is imprecise to characterise CDA as a purely descriptive pursuit. 
According to Kock it is a pursuit that always results in a kind of negative evaluation, since it contains no 
conception of a positive function of public discourse (personal communication). 
94 
Behind this programmatic statement lies an important premise; namely that public 
debate as a matter of fact has a purpose (or purposes)—i.e. it serves the common 
interest and the interests of society (e.g., by being important for the best possible 
functioning of democracy). This premise stands in opposition to the idea that public 
debate is merely to be seen as maneuvers by individual political actors to promote 
their own power and maximization of interests.58 
To sum up this section, Kock subscribes to a conception of rhetoric as a discipline and 
public discourse as a domain of empirical study in which functions play a central role. In 
other words, Christian Kock’s writing places him squarely amongst those thinkers who 
subscribe to the Functional Goodness Intuition. 
Kock rejects the designer approach to function ascription 
It follows from the Functional Goodness Intuition that in order for Christian Kock’s nor-
mative conception of rhetoric to get off the ground, we may assume that he employs some 
kind of approach—or several approaches—to function ascription. But in the above sec-
tions, we have still not seen any clear examples of just how Christian Kock would go 
about ascribing functions to rhetorical artifacts. 
The first thing to note in search for an answer to Kock’s approach to function as-
cription is that it departs from Wichelns’ approach. In a paper on what Kock calls the 
‘cynicism syndrome’,59 he clearly distances himself from the view that the intentions of 
the designers of public messages are the most relevant aspect of an evaluation of public 
discourse (Kock, 2009, my translation): 
And so we arrive at the final characteristic trait of the cynicism syndrome. Despite 
its cool view of politics as a cynical-selfish game, politics is not simply described 
in a cold and ‘value-neutral’ fashion. Instead, there is a definite “normative” super-
structure attached. Since it is the politicians’ primary motive to attain, protect or 
expand their own position of power, it is also natural to find on the part of the 
political commentators a normative position based on the politicians’ skill to pro-
mote these selfish purposes. […] A natural correlate of the cynical evaluation is 
                                               
58 Translated from Danish: ”Bag denne programerklæring ligger en vigtig præmis: nemlig at offentlig debat 
faktisk har formål (et eller flere) – dvs. at den tjener fællesskabets og samfundets interesser (f.eks. ved at 
den er vigtig for demokratiets bedst mulige funktion). Denne præmis står i modsætning til den opfattelse 
at offentlig debat kun skal anskues som de enkelte politiske aktørers manøvrer til at fremme deres egen 
magt og interessemaksimering.” 
59 The cynicism syndrome is a constellation of assumptions shared by political commentators, which, on the 
whole, amount to a cynical view of political discourse, according to Kock. 
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therefore, paradoxically, a lack of interest in evaluating communicative quality in 
any other way […] 
The above excerpt is in effect a rejection of the designer approach to function ascription 
adopted by those political commentators who base their criteria on the alleged “primary 
motive”, i.e. intention, of the politicians (which, according to cynical commentators is 
always to advance their own position of power) and their skill in promoting this kind of 
selfish purpose. According to Kock, basing an evaluation of public discourse on the in-
tentions of the designers of public messages in this fashion is not appropriate. 
This rejection of designer intentions as the basis for ascribing functions to rhetorical 
objects is supported in other places. For instance, in defining the proper normative orien-
tation of rhetorical argumentation, Kock has distanced himself from other definitions of 
rhetorical argument that involve considerations of the intentions of the designer (Kock, 
2013): 
It is worthwhile focusing on this question because various misleading definitions 
of rhetorical argumentation have been in circulation for almost as long as rhetoric 
has existed. Some misleading definitions see the defining property of rhetorical ar-
gumentation in the arguer’s aim. And that aim, which is often assumed to override 
all the arguer’s other considerations, is strategic: the persuade his hearer(s) by any 
available means and, if possible, to “win” the argument. 
Christian Kock expands on this idea in his paper “Choice is Not True or False” (Kock, 
2009a): 
Leading contemporary argumentation theories such as those of Ralph Johnson, van 
Eemeren and Houtlosser, and Tindale, in their attempt to address rhetoric, tend to 
define rhetorical argumentation with reference to (a) the rhetorical arguer’s goal (to 
persuade effectively), and (b) the means he employs to do so. However, a central 
strand in the rhetorical tradition itself, led by Aristotle, and arguably the dominant 
view, sees rhetorical argumentation as defined with reference to the domain of is-
sues discussed. On that view, the domain of rhetorical argumentation is centered 
on choice of action in the civic sphere, and the distinctive nature of issues in this 
domain is considered crucial. Hence, argumentation theories such as those dis-
cussed, insofar as they do not see rhetoric as defined by its distinctive domain, ap-
ply an understanding of rhetoric that is historically inadequate. It is further sug-
gested that theories adopting this understanding of rhetoric risk ignoring important 
distinctive features of argumentation about action. 
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What this passage highlights is that the function of rhetoric, according to Kock, is not the 
advancement of an arguer’s goal of persuading effectively, but rather something akin to 
facilitating the choice of collective action in the public domain. 
Based on these passages, it seems that Kock rejects the designer approach to func-
tion ascription. But what does he put in its place? My suggestion is that Kock employs 
an alternative which can be called the user approach to function ascription. What this 
amounts approach to will be the topic of the next section. 
The user approach to function ascription 
In a discussion of various types of function, the philosopher of science Peter Achinstein 
makes just the distinction I hold is at issue in the case of Christian Kock and his rejection 
of the appropriateness of the designer approach to function ascription. That is, Achinstein 
notes that although it may be common and reasonable to assume that the function of an 
object is related to the intentions of the designer, it can also be relevant to focus on the 
user of the object. According to Achinstein (1983, p. 275) 
Although what function an object has been designed (or produced, etc.) to serve 
often coincides with the function it is used to serve, sometimes it does not. Some-
thing may have been designed or even placed where it is to serve as a means of 
doing y, although it is in fact never used, or although it is used only as a means of 
doing z. The function that trough may have been designed and placed where it is to 
serve is to water the pigs, even though it is never used or the only function it is used 
to serve is to water the flowers. Moreover, x may be used to serve a given function 
without this being so by design. The function a mosquito’s wings are used to serve 
is to enable the mosquito to fly. We need not say the mosquito uses them by design 
or that they were designed or created by design. 
Another point, relevant for our purposes is that functions derived from the use of an object 
can also contain a normative aspect according to Achinstein (1983, p. 275): 
Use-function, like design-function, sentences can be prescriptive. Someone who 
claims that the function of a college education is to arouse intellectual curiosity and 
not just to get a job might mean that this is the function it ought to be used to serve, 
not that it is in fact used to serve this. 
Achinstein’s clear recognition of a use function is supplemented by other function think-
ers. For instance, Peter McLaughlin proposes a conception of function which—though 
broader—includes the idea of use-function (2001, p. 47, my emphasis): 
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The function or purpose of an artifact is the end to which it is a means – whether 
successful or unsuccessful – for whoever made it, acquired it, used it, is expected 
to purchase it, or is supposed to be given it as a present. The same artifact in the 
same material circumstances can have different functions and different kinds of 
functions according to the various mental events that accompany behavior dealing 
with it. 
In a similar vein, philosopher Karen Neander includes the notion of a user in her concep-
tion of function (1991, p. 462, my emphasis): 
I suggest that the function of an artifact is the purpose or end for which it was 
designed, made, or (minimally) put in place or retained by an agent … Since there 
will often be several agents involved, and each might have a different purpose, we 
might want to distinguish between ‘design functions’, ‘user functions’, ‘occasion 
functions’, and so on. The everyday notion of an artifact’s function is context sen-
sitive, and in some contexts one intentional agent can take precedence over another 
[and] the particular context might highlight the intentions of the user, rather than 
the designer […]60 
These passages spell out a clear alternative to the idea that the function of an object is 
determined by the intentions of the designer of that object. But how does Christian Kock 
argue for the function of rhetorical objects? Let us consider some relevant candidate for-
mulations from Kock’s work. 
Reconstruction of Kock’s approach to function ascription 
In one paper, Christian Kock suggests that the function of an utterance with “what it does 
for, or to, its receiver.” (Kock, 2011, p. 42) This is clearly a different approach to function 
ascription than the designer approach. But there is a kind of equivocation going on here, 
for it is clearly possible for there to be a difference between what an utterance does “for” 
its receiver and what it does “to” its receiver. For instance, an utterance may convince its 
receiver that the Earth is flat. This kind of effect could be described as something the 
utterance does “to” its receiver, but it does not seem reasonable to describe it as some-
thing the utterance does “for” the receiver. For in doing something “for” the receiver, the 
utterance is implied to confer some good on the receiver, which is not implied in saying 
                                               
60 Although Neander clearly recognizes the relevance of use in her conception of function, she is in fact a 
proponent of a conception of function which includes the notion of selection as a central factor. At this 
point, though, the point is simply that use is taken to be a possible part of the notion of function and, 
consequently, of function ascription. 
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that an utterance does something “to” the receiver. Ascribing a function to an utterance 
on the basis of “what it does for or to its receiver”, although clearly oriented towards the 
“user” of the utterance, is still not entirely precise. 
Further, the formulation seems to ascribe function too liberally. For clearly an ut-
terance can be said to “do something for or to its receiver” on an almost indefinite range 
of levels, including seemingly (rhetorically) irrelevant sensory and psychological levels. 
For instance, if we were to accept the above formulation as Christian Kock’s preferred 
approach to function ascription, we would have to include such things as “vibrating the 
eardrum” and any number of other effects as a function of the utterance, and this seems 
odd. But at the same time, the formulation seems to restrict function ascription in an 
unfortunate sense. For, according to Kock’s formulation, the object in question—i.e. the 
utterance—is in fact required to have an actual effect in order for it to have a function. 
This would mean that many utterances which we would intuitively want to describe as 
“having a function” (for instance, an argument that fails to persuade or is not heard) would 
in fact have no function. The above formulation, then, is too ambiguous, too broad, and 
too narrow to be a successful approach to function ascription. 
But there are other candidate formulations. Consider for instance this passage 
(Kock, 2011, pp. 47-48): 
[W]hat do these utterances do when they are received? Do they do what they were 
intended to do? Is what they do what the sender intended them to do? Or what the 
receiver intended them to do? Do they perform – and this question is particularly 
relevant in relation to utterances in the public sphere – a function situated at a level 
above purely personal motives, for example by filling a given function in society 
or democracy? 
The quotation actually contains three possible approaches to function ascription. The first 
is squarely centered on the intentions of the designer, the “sender”, which is a position 
we rejected earlier. The second focuses on the intentions of the receiver. And the third 
focuses on “a level above purely personal motives” and considers instead the utterance 
from the perspective of society or democracy. 
 
The idea that the function of rhetoric in the sense of political discourse is somehow con-
nected to a society or democratic perspective is also found in the following quotation 
(Kock, 2008, p. 59, my translation): 
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Theories of democracy which imply that deliberative debate has a function and a 
value for society as such, must as a consequence also concern themselves with the 
issue of what in principle makes a deliberative debate good. All things which have 
an important function may be thought to perform this function better or worse. But 
when does it do the former and when the latter? 
And we find the societal or democratic perspective again in the following quotation, 
where Kock speaks about the rhetorical perspective (as he sees it) on the role of commu-
nication in society (Kock, 2017, p. 348): 
[…] a rhetorician looks at public communication and the media with a functionalist 
eye [and] recognizes that we need public communication for society to exist at all, 
and […] asks not only: “How well does public communication perform the social 
functions it is meant to perform?” but also: “How could it perform them better?”  
We thus now start to get a sense that the function of rhetoric—at least in its significance 
as political discourse—has to do with a social aspect. But what, more specifically, does 
such a function consists of? One answer to this question is related to the task of citizens 
in democracies (Kock, 2008, p. 59, my translation): 
My general answer to the question of the function of public debate is that it must 
serve to give decision-makers and voters/citizens a better foundation for making a 
choice about important issues […] 
And this function is the basis of the evaluative criteria (so-called ‘rules for public debate’) 
preferred by Kock (2008, pp. 63-64, my translation): 
At the beginning of the article I argued that such rules are necessary, at least if one 
believes in deliberative democracy and if one believes that public debate has a func-
tion for society […] Much of what politicians and other public debaters do causes 
confusion and obfuscation of those topics we are to decide upon and undermine the 
conditions for a common dialogue […] The rules have been formulated on the basic 
premise that whatever is said by the debaters has to be useful for the voters. It must 
serve to throw light on the topic and not darkness, and thus help the voters make 
more qualified decisions. 
In the above quotations, there is, I suggest, a particular movement—a narrowing—of the 
conception of function that Kock employs. For the purposes of criticism of public debate, 
or political discourse, he rejects the designer approach to function ascription. Instead, he 
shifts the perspective to that of the audience or the receiver of the utterance to be evalu-
ated. This is akin to the perspectival shift taken by those function theorists (such as 
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Achinstein) who explain that the user rather than the designer sometimes takes priority 
as the relevant agentive genesis of certain functions. But crucially, Kock talks of user 
needs and not actual, empirical use. How does Christian Kock determine what the user 
or receiver needs? I suggest that he does this in an idealizing move, which parallels that 
of Wichelns. Kock constrains the relevant user needs by placing or embedding the user 
of rhetorical artifacts in a system (a society or a democracy) in which users of rhetorical 
objects are charged with a task, an ergon, which is defined by the role in the system as 
voters or citizens. The needs of the citizens are thus constrained. This move has normative 
implications as I will argue in the next section. 
Discussion of Zarefsky’s criticism 
As we have seen, Christian Kock clearly subscribes to a functional view of rhetorical 
objects, and the way in which he ascribes functions to rhetorical objects can be describes 
as version of the user approach to function ascription. I call it ‘a version’ of the user 
approach to function ascription, because Kock introduces the notion of user need in order 
to idealize the users of the rhetorical objects and thus constrain the relevant use of the 
objects by relating them to a system (democracy) in which the users (citizens) play a 
certain role. This is analogous to the move by Wichelns who also idealizes the speaker 
or orator by conceiving of him as a “public man” who intentions are fixed by the task he 
is to perform in a democracy. 
In a commentary, David Zarefsky criticizes Kock’s norms for public discussion 
derived from his idealized user approach to function ascription as he notes that there “is 
a problem in using Kock’s criteria to evaluate actually existing political debate […]” 
(Zarefsky, 2013): 
Kock rightly begins by saying, “we should assess the virtues of political argumen-
tation from the point of view of citizens,” but he posits that what citizens need is a 
“basis for making choices.” That is some of what some citizens need. But we know, 
for example, that most viewers of political debates already have decided for whom 
they will vote, at least provisionally. What they need from the argumentation is 
reinforcement of their beliefs, or motivation to act on them by turning out to vote, 
or rehearsals of refutation that they might use in response to friends or co-workers 
who disagree with them. And for those who are using political argumentation as a 
basis for making choices, some will make a choice on the balance of considerations 
of all the major issues of the campaign, some on the basis of a single issue or a 
small group of key issues, and some on the basis of the ethos or likeability of the 
candidates. Some will decide on the basis of what is congruent with their self- 
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interest and some may decide on the basis of a transcendent appeal that may even 
run counter to their own self-interest (Frank, 2004). It is, in short, a mistake to 
assume that the audience for political argumentation is composed entirely of tabu-
lae rasa who are prepared to make their choices on the basis of criteria such as Kock 
proposes. Some are, but to posit that as the model case for political argumentation 
is as limiting as it is to posit the analytic deductive syllogism as the model for ar-
gumentation in general 
The most pertinent point of Zarefsky’s criticism is this: Zarefsky disagrees with Kock on 
what citizens need from political rhetoric. This means, in effect, that Zarefsky disagrees 
with Kock’s approach to function ascription. But what does Zarefsky offer as an alterna-
tive? Zarefsky lists a number of conceivable uses to which public discourse may actually 
be put as a matter of empirical fact, and there can be no quarrel with the idea that some 
citizens actually use political arguments for the purposes that Zarefsky lists. But the prob-
lem with this criticism is that political discourse may as matter of fact be used for any 
number of more or less random purposes. It may be used as entertainment or any range 
of other conceivable purposes, but this does not mean that political discourse therefore 
suddenly has a range of functions that we should evaluate it against. Precisely this criti-
cism is contained in one of Kock’s discussions of the so-called uses-and-gratifications 
theory (Kock, 2008): 
A trend in media studies that rhetoric has much in common with is uses-and-grati-
fications theory. Rhetoric shares with it the notion that utterances are used for dif-
ferent, specific purposes. However, uses-and-gratifications theory assumes, opti-
mistically and individualistically, that each user selects and uses media content for 
his or her individual purposes. Rhetoric takes the social angle: how can we have 
communication that will perform these social functions for us? As a result, rhetor-
icians look closely at specific properties of media content, often with a view to how 
it could be different, whereas uses-and-gratifications theory, in a much broader ap-
proach, describes what each medium, considered as such, is used for.  
In order to avoid the problem of frivolous function ascription where the function of an 
object is made dependent on the actual use of the object, there must be a mechanism of 
idealization or constraint of the relevant uses. Precisely such a mechanism is absent in 
Zarefsky’s notion of “user need” whereas it is present in Kock’s notion of “user need” as 
argued above. In other words, even though Zarefsky talks about “need”, it seems to me 
that he comes close to equating need with actual use and bases his function ascription of 
political discourse on the actual uses to which people put political discourse—thereby in 
effect eroding a normative foundation. 
102 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued through a rational reconstruction of Christian Kock’s eval-
uative thinking that the designer approach to function ascription should be supplemented 
with a user approach to function ascription in which the needs of an idealized user of 
rhetorical artifacts is the main factor in ascribing a function to these objects. This is con-
sistent with the view of function theorist Marcel Scheele who writes (Scheele, 2006, p. 
34): 
As it stands, the designer is privileged with respect to the function ascription of the 
artefact […] The designer need not be privileged in this way: if my arguments are 
correct, there are cases in which the designers’ intentions regarding the function 
ascription are not the only relevant considerations. The current users overrule these 
intentions and use the object in an alternative way, which is just as ‘proper’ as the 
use intended by the designer. 
The chapter also revealed that when focusing on candidate formulations for function as-
cription in Christian Kock’s work, we find a number of them not always pointing in the 
same direction. For instance, sometimes Kock acknowledges that rhetoric should focus 
on the intentions of the designer, while in other places he dismisses this focus as irrele-
vant. 
Ultimately, though, this discrepancy can be resolved if we consider that Kock’s 
conception of rhetoric is not exclusively critical. He also thinks about rhetoric, consist-
ently with its ancient roots, as an art related to production of utterances. It seems reason-
able to assume that in thinking about how to produce or design rhetoric, Kock acknowl-
edges the relevance of the designer’s intentions, but in the more critical aspect, he prefers 
to focus instead on the needs of the user of a rhetorical artifact conceived as a citizen in 
a democracy and that rhetorical objects in this particular context get their functions thus. 
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C H A P T E R  8  
Function from etiology: J. Jeffery Auer 
 
 
 
In this chapter I reconstruct the evaluative reasoning in J. Jeffery Auer’s famous essay on 
“The Counterfeit Debates” (1962). The point of the reconstruction is to show how a rhe-
torical critic can derive evaluative criteria for a rhetorical artifact by ascribing a function 
to the artifact without appealing to the intentions of a designer (the approach taken by 
Herbert Wichelns) or the needs of a type of user (the approach taken by Christian Kock), 
but instead by appealing to the historical evolution of the artifact. This is an example of 
the so-called etiological approach to function ascription. 
The basics of Auer’s position 
Before going into the specifics of Auer’s approach to function ascription, let us briefly 
introduce his general project. In 1962, communication scholar Sidney Kraus (1962) ed-
ited and published a comprehensive anthology containing more than 30 essays devoted 
to studying the first televised presidential debates between candidates John F. Kennedy 
and Richard Nixon from 1960. Among these essays was J. Jeffrey Auer’s contribution 
“The Counterfeit Debates” (1962). In his paper, Auer aims at “judging” (ibid., p. 142) 
the Kennedy-Nixon debates, and for our present purposes Auer’s explicit emphasis on 
evaluation makes his paper a good case for increasing our understanding of the evaluative 
dimension in rhetorical criticism. 
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Even to this day, Auer’s essay on the Kennedy-Nixon debates is a widely cited 
example of criticism of presidential debate.61 It is a rather short essay, consisting of eight 
short pages, and it does not engage in close textual analysis of any kind. But the essay 
may still provide us with interesting insights—maybe not primarily about the Kennedy-
Nixon debates, but about evaluation more generally. For, as noted above, Auer frankly 
sets out to judge the debate and so he openly proceeds, as Parry-Giles and Parry-Giles 
(2015, p. 116) note with slight consternation, “[p]rogrammatically, indeed normatively.” 
So what does Auer make of the presidential debates? His evaluative conclusion is 
clearly negative. Although he admits that some ameliorating aspects can be found in the 
debates, his overall judgment is perhaps best captured by his point that “it is unhappily 
necessary to conclude that ‘the Great Debates’ were not debates in the American tradi-
tion, and the rhetorical critic sighs for what they might have been.” (Auer, 1962, p. 148). 
Auer bases his negative verdict on a list of five evaluative criteria that debates 
must meet if they are to be evaluated positively. The first criterion is ‘confrontation’ 
(ibid., p. 147). In order for this criterion to be met, the candidates must engage each other 
rather than primarily a journalist, moderator, panel or the TV cameras. The second crite-
rion is ‘equal and adequate time’. Auer concedes that Kennedy and Nixon had equal time, 
but he maintains that they did not have adequate time, because the important questions 
could not be meaningfully answered in the allotted time of three minutes. And proceeding 
as if they could, says Auer, contributed to creating “the illusion that public questions of 
great moment could be dealt with in 180 seconds. This is a dangerous fiction in a time 
when the future of the free world may depend upon the decision of the American presi-
dent.” (ibid., p. 147) The third criterion is ‘matched contestants’, and according to Auer, 
this criterion was in principle fulfilled as “the candidates were closely enough matched 
for a real debate, had they been willing to hold one.” The fourth criterion is that the topic 
of debate must be ‘a stated proposition’. This criterion was not fulfilled, says Auer, since 
instead of debate “on a single and significant issue, the listeners were exposed to a cate-
chism as far-ranging as Allen Ludden’s questions on the GE College Bowl.”62 The fifth 
and final criterion is to gain a decision. And judged by this criterion, states Auer, “the 
                                               
61 For two recent examples of publications discussing Auer’s text, see Jamieson (2015) and, for commentary, 
Parry-Giles & Parry-Giles (2015). 
62 “College Bowl” was a student quiz show hosted by Allen Ludden airing on American radio stations from 
1953, and moving to television from 1959. 
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‘debates’ were least adequate.” The debates did not “contribute to the enlightenment of 
listeners, or provide them a rationale for thoughtful decisions on the issues,” partly be-
cause the broadcast format “emphasized personality rather than issues.” 
So, to sum up, on four out of five criteria, the debates were judged to be inade-
quate. But the relevant question in the context of the current project, however, is not so 
much whether the debates fulfilled the posited criteria. More importantly, we want to 
understand where Auer’s criteria come from and how they are justified. My suggestion, 
as stated above, is that we may understand Auer to be employing an etiological approach 
to function ascription. 
The etiological approach to function ascription 
The etiological theory of function and its approach to function ascription is perhaps the 
most widely endorsed current theory in the literature on functions. A wide range of think-
ers subscribe to versions of the etiological theory of function, but it is most frequently 
associated with philosophers Larry Wright (1973), Ruth Millikan (1984, 1989, 1999), 
Karen Neander (1991a, 1991b), and to some extent Beth Preston (1998, 2009, 2013).63 
The word etiology is derived from the Greek aitiologia (αἰτιολογία) meaning “giv-
ing a reason for”64 and denotes a focus on causation or origination. Translated to the 
context of function, the etiological theory looks to the historical origin of the item in 
question and uses this origin to infer the item’s function. Consider for example our intu-
ition that items such as hearts have a function. How can this be explained if these items 
have no designer and they are not “used” in any conscious way? (Of course, a religious 
appeal could be made such that we could say that the function of a heart is what its de-
signer, i.e. God, intended it to be, but for now we may disregard this option.) The etio-
logical theory of function attempts to explain our intuitions about items such hearts by 
appealing to the origins of those items—more specifically, their evolutionary history. 
Philosopher Ruth Millikan, one of the leading proponents of the etiological theory 
of function, proposes the following formulation to explain what it means to have a func-
tion (1993, p. 41): 
                                               
63 Preston aims to build a pluralistic theory of function, but it clearly incorporates elements of the etiological 
theory. 
64 Aetiology. Oxford English Dictionary (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press. 2002. 
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Items have functions when their being there depends on reproduction from ances-
tors having similar traits, these traits having been causally efficacious in helping to 
produce these items, and these traits have been selected at some point in this history 
for their capacity to make this kind of contribution. 
Clearly, on the above formulation, hearts have a function. After all, hearts play a major 
role in the production of new hearts, and it is surely reasonable to say that the capacity of 
hearts to do so has been selected for at some point in their evolutionary history. But the 
above formulation still gives us no indications as to what the function of a heart might 
be. This problem is solved with the following formulation from Karen Neander. Accord-
ing to her, “the central element of the etiological approach should be seen as the simple 
idea that a function of a trait is the effect for which that trait was selected” (Neander, 
1991b, p. 459) And she goes on to make the formulation more exact (Neander, 1991, p. 
174): 
It is the/a proper function of an item (X) of an organism (O) to do that which items 
of X’s type did to contribute to the inclusive fitness of O’s ancestors, and which 
caused the genotype, of which X is the phenotypic expression, to be selected by 
natural selection.  
This formulation gives us clearer picture of how to discern the function of a heart (pre-
sumably to circulate blood). For the given heart (X) in my body (O) circulates blood just 
like my ancestors’ hearts did, and this effect (circulating blood) caused hearts to be se-
lected by natural selection due to its contribution to the fitness of my ancestors. Notice 
how the above formulate rules out a whole range of effects that hearts might have. For 
instance, hearts make a thumping sound, but we do not want to say that this is their func-
tion. And since the thumping sound is not an effect for which hearts are selected (as far 
as we know), the above formula is capable of distinguishing between proper functions 
(the capacity or effect that an item ought to have) and accidental functions (fortuitous 
capacities or effects of an item). 
The distinction between proper functions and accidental functions is exemplified 
by Beth Preston (1998, p. 222): 
Hearts, for example, have proliferated not because they make noise, but because 
they circulate blood. Thus, even a heart that comes into the world so badly de-
formed that it is never capable of circulating a single drop still has circulating blood 
as its proper function. It is still relevantly similar to its ancestors which did circulate 
blood, and whose circulation of blood in the past accounts for the production of the 
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deformed heart (though not for its deformation) in the present. Similarly, vegetable 
peelers have proliferated—this time in virtue of deliberate selection on the part of 
manufacturers and consumers—because they remove peels from fruits and vegeta-
bles. So even if a manufacturing defect makes it impossible for one of them to peel 
anything at all, peeling is still its proper function. 
Summing up the discussion so far, we may quote philosopher Peter McLaughlin on the 
general structure of etiological function theories (2001, p. 83): 
Thus, in order to have a function, an item must instantiate a type whose tokens are 
– or at least once were – in general disposed to have certain effects. It must also 
have the right kind of history, in which the effects of tokens of the function bearer’s 
type have led to that type’s being instantiated in later generations or at later times. 
In some recent literature, a trait with the proper (evolutionary) history is then said 
to have a “proper function.”  
As I mentioned earlier, the etiological theory of function are among the most widely en-
dorsed current theories in the literature on functions. It is a theory subject to many com-
peting conceptions among its proponents, but they share a central commitment to ascrib-
ing functions to objects in virtue of those effects of the item that have led to that type’s 
“being instantiated in later generations or at later times”, as McLaughlin puts it above. 
And as I will argue below, it is the basic idea that lies at core of Auer’s evaluative rea-
soning. 
Reconstruction of Auer’s approach to function ascription 
As seen earlier, Auer explicitly posits a set of five evaluative criteria. We may assume 
that Auer takes these criteria to be appropriate for evaluating the rhetorical artifact in 
question (the debate between Kennedy and Nixon), but he is not very explicit about where 
these criteria come from or how their appropriateness is established. The task of this sec-
tion is to reconstruct Auer’s evaluative reasoning to get a clearer picture of these issues. 
The first possibility to consider is that Auer simply relies on custom or convention 
in order to establish his criteria. After all, in positing his five criteria, Auer explains that 
these are the criteria “commonly agreed upon by writers on debate” (Auer, 1962, p. 146) 
and, further, that these are the “accepted criteria of debate as we have known it in the 
American tradition.” (ibid., p. 147). What these formulations suggest upon first estima-
tion is that Auer follows the unsatisfactory model proposed by Thonssen and Baird (1947, 
p. 136), who proclaim that the critic in deciding upon evaluative criteria may “erect 
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standards of worth based upon the united wisdom of his colleagues.” But while this may 
in fact be how Auer has proceeded, we may be able to more charitably reconstruct the 
argument of his short essay. 
In doing so, the first thing to note about Auer’s essay is that he squarely places the 
practice of debate in the larger context of democracy: “In short”, he says, “debate has 
historically been regarded as an essential tool of a democratic society. (Auer, 1962, p. 
142). And Auer goes on to substantiate this claim at length by showing three different 
dimensions in which debate has contributed to democracy: as an educational method, as 
a legislative procedure, and as a judicial procedure. 
In his review of debate as an educational method (ibid., pp. 142-143), Auer show-
cases a number of different historical highlights all pointing to the idea that the practice 
of debate has been used extensively in this domain. Beginning in ancient Greece, Auer 
points out that “one Protagoras of Abdera” had his pupils argue both sides of questions 
similar to those facing the elders. And apart from pointing to Protagoras, Auer also notes 
that debate featured in the educational system of the schools of the Middle Ages at Oxford 
and Cambridge, at American colleges in the nineteenth century and in the “extensive 
programs of debate” of the modern-day educational system. Auer concludes his review 
of the educational use of debate with a quotation from the then current president John F. 
Kennedy, who observes that debate is “a most valuable training whether for politics, the 
law, business, or for service on community committees such as the PTA and the League 
of Women Voters […] The give and take of debating, the testing of ideas, is essential to 
democracy.” 
The perspective taken by Auer in reviewing the history of debate as an educational 
method spans generations. And the same broad approach is adopted in his consideration 
of debate as a legislative process (ibid., p. 143). Here, Auer points to the American Con-
gress and the British Parliament. In both places, debate occurs when final decisions about 
the policy of the nation are made based on elected representatives having a “real voice in 
the affairs of the government.” The generational perspective is highlighted when Auer 
notes that the debates of the American Congress have been part of the institution since 
“the first colonial legislatures, and the history of the American Congress could well be 
written in a sequence of chapters focusing upon significant debates over the bank ques-
tion, the slavery issue, imperialism, the tariff, the League of Nations, the neutrality 
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controversy before World War II, and involving such stalwarts as Benton, Beveridge, 
Calhoun, Clay, Corwin, LaFollette, Lodge, Taft, Vandenburg, and Webster.” 
The generational perspective also features prominently in Auer’s description of the 
importance of debate as a judicial procedure (ibid., p. 144). Over time, Auer states, debate 
has been used in courts “where each party is represented by a lawyer, debating the same 
issues before the same judge and for the decision of one jury.” The perspective is enforced 
when Auer explains that “[e]ach generation in the history of jurisprudence has its roster 
of distinguished legal debaters, from Cicero to Grotius, and down to Morris Ernst and 
Thurgood Marshall.” (ibid., p. 144, my emphasis). 
And Auer’s focus on tradition continues in his discussion of debating societies 
(ibid., pp. 144-145): “[P]erhaps the most significant elements of the debate tradition in 
America have been the forensic clashes in debating societies and in public debates on 
political, social, and religious questions.” For Auer, the participation in this tradition of a 
range of historically important figures of distinction such as Thomas Jefferson, Abraham 
Lincoln, Henry Clay, Tom Corwin, and Alexander Campbell is a sign of the importance 
of this practice in democracy. “In short,” Auer notes, “whether the critical questions of 
the day concerned slavery, the gold standard, socialism, public power, or evolution, pub-
lic debate was in order […]”. 
Auer’s emphasis on tradition whether in education, legislative, juridical or amongst 
debating societies is reaffirmed even in Auer’s discussion of debate in a media society 
(pp. 145-146). “It was inevitable,” writes Auer here, “that the electronic age should 
strengthen and perpetuate the debate tradition via the broadcast media.” Notice here how 
the emphasis is not on change or adaption to a new media ecology, but rather on conti-
nuity. The introduction of broadcast media into democratic society does not modify this 
tradition in any relevant way, but instead strengthens and perpetuates it. Auer cites three 
examples of popular radio shows solidly built on the foundations of the debate tradition. 
The first is “American Forum of the Air”, which Auer uses to exemplify the aforemen-
tioned strengthening and perpetuation of the tradition. The second is “America’s Town 
Meeting of the Air”, which according to Auer was “fashioned […] from the same tradi-
tion.” And the third is “Face the Nation”, which Auer notes “continued the tradition.” 
And besides the regularly scheduled radio shows, Auer also mentions singular debates 
on national issues, which have all “generally adhered to the debate tradition.” 
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The central and most obvious feature of Auer’s rather lengthy review of various 
instance of debate in democracy is its relentless focus on history and tradition as seen 
over generations. And this exact focus is also emphasized by Auer when he posits his set 
of favored evaluative criteria (ibid., p. 146, my emphasis): 
 [L]et us isolate the specific elements of debate as it has developed in the American 
tradition. There are five, commonly agreed upon by writers on debate. A debate is 
(1) a confrontation, (2) in equal and adequate time, (3) of matched contestants, (4) 
on a stated proposition, (5) to gain an audience decision. Each of these elements is 
essential if we are to have true debate. Insistence upon their recognition is more 
than mere pedantry, for each one has contributed to the vitality of the debate tra-
dition. 
This passage, I suggest, contains the crucial clue to understanding Auer’s approach to 
function ascription. As we have seen above, Auer’s main concern throughout his essay is 
to show how the debate tradition as contributed in various ways to the development of 
democratic society. And one rationale behind his rather detailed exposition of the tradi-
tion becomes apparent when considered from the perspective of the etiological theory of 
function. According to this theory, the function of a trait is intimately connected to the 
effect it has on its surrounding organism. If a trait has contributed causally to the fitness 
of its surrounding organism as considered against the selection pressures exhibited by the 
environment of this organism, then we may conclude that the effect accounting for this 
contribution is the function of the trait. I propose that Auer’s reasoning is equivalent. His 
five criteria are traits of debate making its continued survival possible, like the four valves 
separating the chambers of a heart. In a line of reasoning analogous to this—even em-
ploying biological language—Auer proclaims that each of his five criteria, i.e. each of 
the five traits, has “contributed to the vitality of the debate tradition.” 
Conclusion 
In one sense, Auer’s description of the function of debate is very similar to Christian 
Kock’s, but I have argued that their approach to function ascription differs. Whereas 
Kock derives the function of public debate from the perspective of user needs, Auer care-
fully weaves together a story of the way in which debate has played a central role, gen-
eration after generation, for democracy. The five criteria posited by Auer are traits of 
debate that have secured the survival through generations of debate as a social institution. 
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The main claim of this chapter, then, is that the Auer’s evaluative reasoning may 
be reconstructed as an instance of the etiological approach to function ascription. The 
etiological approach to function ascription is most typically associated with the biological 
domain, and Auer’s language exhibits signs of being inspired by this domain. By contin-
ually stressing how debate has reproduced itself generation after generation for 2400 
years, and by noting how the criteria are essential because they are traits that secure the 
vitality of democracy in generation after generation, Auer’s approach to function ascrip-
tion may be said to be etiological. For Auer, debate is to democracy what hearts or lungs 
are to a living body. Without debate and the concomitant effects that have made it possi-
ble for democracy to reproduce through the times, the survival of democracy would be at 
risk. 
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C H A P T E R  9  
Function from optimality considerations: 
Steven Patterson 
 
 
 
The rational reconstructions of various approaches to function ascription have until this 
point concerned rhetorical critics. But the notion of function also plays an important role 
in the evaluative dimension of the neighboring field of argumentation theory, and recon-
structing a case from this field may relevantly extend our understanding of the diversity 
of function ascriptions. 
Argumentation theorists in general are not shy about making function claims. As 
pointed out earlier, informal logician Ralph Johnson (2000, p. 149) explains that he sees 
the “preeminent” function of argumentation as “persuading someone (I call this person 
the Other) of the truth of something (I call this the Thesis) by reasoning, by producing a 
set of reasons whose function is to lead that person rationally to accept the claim in ques-
tion.” In the influential pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation, a different func-
tion is intimated: “Argumentation is basically aimed at resolving a difference of opinion 
[…]” (van Eemeren, 2010, p. 2). And much of the work of the prolific Canadian argu-
mentation theorist Douglas Walton builds upon a pluralistic approach in which the func-
tion of argumentation varies, at least to a degree, with the different kinds of dialogue in 
which argumentation is embedded (see e.g. Walton, 1998). More examples could be ad-
duced, but the above will suffice to remind ourselves that functions feature prominently 
in argumentation theory. 
The prominence of (unsupported) function claims in argumentation theory has 
been critically addressed by Jean Goodwin in her article “Argument has no function” 
(2007). Here, Goodwin problematizes a range of ideas connected to the use of function 
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for normative theorizing, including the strategy of making use of an assumed, but unsup-
ported, function of argumentation as a starting point for deriving evaluative criteria. In 
my opinion, Goodwin’s criticisms have still not been discussed adequately in the field of 
argumentation theory, but philosopher Steven W. Patterson (2011) has made a genuine 
attempt to address at least some of the critical points from Goodwin’s article. In contrast 
to Goodwin, Patterson explicitly endorses the view that argumentation does have a func-
tion, and in order to substantiate his claim, he proposes a way for us to understand what 
that function is and how argumentation gets this function. 
The basics of Patterson’s position 
Before considering Patterson’s proposal, it will be instructive to briefly note what Patter-
son claims is the function of argumentation. His term for this function is “rational doxas-
tic coordination” (Patterson, 2011, p. 15). Rational doxastic coordination is, Patterson 
explains, a species of a broader genus of communication which he calls “doxastic coor-
dination”. Doxastic coordination, in brief, is “the bringing into equilibrium or harmony 
of the opinions or beliefs of multiple persons, without respect to the means employed.” 
(ibid.) Doxastic coordination thus understood is important for humans, according to Pat-
terson, because when “people are closer in their opinions, or at least feel that they are, it 
is easier for them to sustain cooperative attitudes toward one another in a wide variety of 
settings” (ibid.) ranging from hunting and gathering, building shelters, conducting war-
fare and, we may presume, any other activity for which cooperation and coordination is 
needed. Now, there are many ways to produce doxastic coordination, e.g. by telling sto-
ries to each other, by making contracts, by the use of threats and promises and so on. But 
the particular coordination produced by argumentation (when it fulfils its function) is 
rational doxastic coordination, and for Patterson this is the function of argumentation. 
The question we are trying to answer here, of course, is how he substantiates this claim. 
And the answer I will propose is this: Patterson primarily employs what I call the opti-
mality approach to function ascription—although, as we will see, Patterson in fact also 
appeals to etiology, so ultimately his approach must be characterized as somewhat of a 
hybrid. 
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The optimality approach to function ascription 
The optimality approach to function ascription builds fundamentally on considerations of 
how well a given object would be capable of performing some task. Perhaps the most 
widely known contemporary proponent of this approach to function ascription is philos-
opher Daniel Dennett, whose writings on subjects such as mind, consciousness and evo-
lution have been extensively discussed amongst philosophers. Dennett’s position on the 
concept of function, however, is difficult to pin down with accurate precision, but a sus-
tained book-length attempt has been made by Dutch philosopher Melissa van Amerongen 
(2008), and I will draw on her work here. 
According to Amerongen, a fundamental aspect of Dennett’s concept of function 
is that it is non-intentional in the sense that it regards appeals to the intentions of artifac-
tual users or designers in order to derive functions as “hopeless and spurious” (2008, p. 
13) Instead, Dennett’s approach is based on considerations of optimality, which Amer-
ongen illustrates in the following way (ibid.): 
The distinction between intentionalism and optimality can be illustrated rather 
simply by means of an example. Consider a knife. What does make this steel object 
with a sharp edge a knife, instead of just a steel object with a sharp edge? Is it a 
knife because it was created with that purpose in mind (intentionalism)? Or, rather, 
is it a knife because it just cuts very well (optimality)? Dennett chooses the second 
answer: the function of a thing, be it biological or technical, is always what it is 
best able to do. 
Amerongen warns that her interpretation of Dennett’s approach to function ascription is 
just that—an interpretation—for as she explains, Dennett’s position on the issue is “a 
moving target” (ibid., p. 92). But her interpretation builds on specific passages of Den-
nett’s work, which together seem to point to the conclusion that the function of a thing is 
what it is best able to do. 
To see this, consider first how Dennett dismisses the idea that the intentions of a 
designer (“inventor”) may be used to derive the function of an object (Dennett, 1990, p. 
186): 
[T]he inventor is not the final arbiter of what an artifact is, or is for; the users decide 
that. The inventor is just another user, only circumstantially and defeasibly privi-
leged in his knowledge of the functions and uses of his device. If others can find 
better uses for it, his intentions, clearheaded or muddled, are of mere historical in-
terest. 
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At first glance, this passage seems to place Dennett squarely among those who would 
subscribe to the user approach to function ascription. But according to Amerongen, this 
would be a hasty conclusion. For Dennett goes on to state that neither the intentions of 
designers nor those of users suffice to ascribe functions to artifacts: “[W]hat something 
is really for now [i.e. its function] is no more authoritatively fixed by the current user’s 
‘intentions’ than by any other intentions” (Dennett, 1990, p. 194). 
Dennett’s rejection of intentions as the basis of function ascription is premised on 
his view that our sense that intentions play a role in the interpretation of artifacts is merely 
the output of our function ascription, not an input to it. In other words, it is only after we 
see knife with a function that we infer that someone must have designed it. To bolster 
this point, Dennett quotes Wimsatt and Beardsley (1946), the authors of the seminal paper 
on “The Intentional Fallacy” (Dennett, 1990, p. 177): 
Judging a poem is like judging a pudding or a machine. One demands that it works. 
It is only because an artifact works that we infer the intention of an artificer. 
Dennett’s rejection of intentions as the basis for function ascription and his alternative 
solution become clearer in his discussions of various archeological findings. In the case 
of archeological findings, present day humans do not have access to the intentions of 
designers or users. Given the fact that this does not stop us from making function ascrip-
tions, Dennett maintains that in general referring to intentions of designers and users in 
order to ascribe functions is illegitimate. 
One example of such a finding is the ancient Greek “Antikythera mechanism” 
discovered in 1902 in a shipwreck off the coast of the Greek island Antikythera. As Den-
nett explains (1990, pp. 183-184), this object consists of many interlocking complex 
bronze gears, and the object’s function is not immediately obvious seen from our current 
perspective. What could it be for? The current consensus among archeologists is that the 
mechanism must have been an orrery or planetarium, i.e. it must have had the function of 
calculating the motion of the planets. Crucially, the reason for ascribing this function to 
the object is that it has the capacity to do so accurately—this is what the object would be 
optimal for. As Dennett states, “[t]he important feature in these arguments is the reliance 
on optimality considerations; it counts against the hypothesis that something is a cherry-
pitter, for instance, if it would have been a demonstrably inferior cherry-pitter.” 
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According to Amerongen, the case of the Antikythera mechanism is indicative of 
Dennett’s approach to function ascription. Although she laments that “[u]nfortunately, 
Dennett is not very clear about it,” she also finds that in order to ascribe a function to an 
artifact, Dennett would advise us to look “for some ‘best’ or ‘optimal’ role the artifact 
could have.” (2008, p. 108). And this leads her to the conclusion that Dennett subscribes 
to a “thesis of optimality” according to which “the function of an item is—or should be 
understood as—what it is best able to do (or be), given its physical constitution and its 
context, and not what the designer(s) or user(s) intend it to do (or be).” (Amerongen, 
2008, p. 90). 
Plato’s functionalism 
In contrast with the etiological approach to function ascription, the optimality approach 
does not seem nearly as popular in the current literature on functions. However, the intu-
ition behind the optimality approach in fact has ancient roots (although neither Dennett 
nor Amerongen make this connection), and of the four approaches to function ascription 
discussed in this dissertation, it is safe to say that the optimality approach has the most 
illustrious progenitor—namely Plato. 
As we saw in Chapter 4, Plato is among the long line of thinkers who subscribe 
to the Functional Goodness Intuition. But Plato not only relies on the notion of function 
to derive evaluative criteria intuitively; he also devises an approach to function ascription 
that relies on optimality considerations. 
As noted by the authoritative interpreter of Plato’s works, Gerasimos Santas 
(1985; 2010, pp. 63-67), Plato’s Republic contains two theories of good. One of these 
Santas calls the ‘metaphysical theory of the Form of the Good’ (this is the theory Plato 
illustrated with his Cave simile), and the other theory of good is the ‘Functional Theory 
of Good’. We find the crux of Plato’s exposition of this latter theory towards the end of 
the first book of the Republic (352e–354c), where Plato has Socrates explain to Thra-
symachus how things get their function (ergon): 
“Tell me then—would you say that a horse has a specific work or function?” “I 
would.” “Would you be willing to define the work of a horse or of anything else to 
be that which one can do only with it or best with it?” “I don’t understand,” he 
replied.” “Well, take it this way: is there anything else with which you can see 
except the eyes?” “Certainly not.” “Again, could you hear with anything but ears?” 
“By no means.” “Would you not rightly say that these are the functions of these 
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(organs)?” “By all means.” “Once more, you could use a dirk to trim vine branches 
and a knife and many other instruments.” “Certainly.” “But nothing so well, I take 
it, as a pruning-knife fashioned for this purpose.” “This is true.” “Must we not then 
assume this to be the work or function of that?” “We must.” 
And this piece of dialogue let’s Socrates conclude: “You will now, then, I fancy, better 
apprehend the meaning of my question when I asked whether that is not the work (func-
tion, ergon) of a thing which it only or it better than anything else can perform.”65 
For Plato, as for Dennett, ascribing a function to an artifact involves consideration 
what one can do ‘best’ with that artifact, either in the sense that no other artifact or item 
could perform the task so well, or in the sense that the artifact or item could not perform 
any other task better. On this view, function ascription involves optimality considera-
tions. I now turn to explicating, i.e. reconstructing, how Patterson uses this optimality 
approach to ascribe a function to argumentation. 
Reconstruction of Patterson’s approach to function ascription 
Perhaps in contrast with the majority of argumentation theorists who rely on the notion 
of function for their normative theorizing, Patterson acknowledges that functions do not 
simply present themselves unproblematically to our understanding. But this does not de-
ter him from seeing potential value in the notion of function (Patterson, 2011, p. 7): 
It is difficult to discern a primary or central function for argumentation, but from 
this fact we should not draw the conclusion that the attempt to do so is in vain, or 
misguided. 
This stance immediately makes Patterson’s article interesting from the point of view of 
this dissertation: Since Patterson wants to defend the claim that argumentation has a func-
tion, and since he does not rely on his readers being able to simply intuit this function, he 
must make an attempt to show—through reasoning—in what sense argumentation can be 
said to have a function, and what this function might be. 
Patterson still relies on intuitions to make his case, though. Specifically, Patterson 
appeals to our intuitions about “straight-forwardly” functional objects to make the case 
that argumentation does have a function. The background of the following quotation is 
Patterson’s rebuttal of the idea intimated by Goodwin that if argumentation is routinely 
                                               
65 I rely here on the translation from Shorey: (Plato, 1937). 
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deployed for many different purposes (i.e. with many different intentions), it must as a 
consequence be impossible to ascribe to it a single proper function (Patterson, 2011, p. 
6): 
Consider, by analogy, happening upon someone in the midst of working on his car, 
using a crescent wrench to beat into place a recalcitrant piece of sheet metal that 
has become bent out of place in the course of his work on the engine. This man 
uses the wrench as a hammer, but we would not say upon seeing this that wrenches 
have no function. The fact that one can use a heavy crescent wrench in the same 
fashion as a hammer in a pinch does not diminish the case for thinking that the 
function of a crescent wrench is the tightening  of loose fasteners of a particular 
type. If we did draw the conclusion that the wrench had no function as such because 
it could be used as a hammer in a pinch, we would be mistakenly identifying the 
practical effect of the particular instrument in that instance with the proper function 
of that type of instrument. That the instrument has such a proper function is clear. 
There is something that it does, that it is designed to do, and that other instruments 
do not do as well as it does. That the instrument can be used in another way does 
not in any way diminish the case for thinking of it as being primarily designed to 
do a particular job. 
From our perspective, it is interesting to note that Patterson seems on first glance to be 
using two different approaches to function ascription in the above quotation. One ap-
proach relies on the notion of a designer, and this is a type of function ascription that we 
have encountered in the case of Wichelns. The second approach, however, is clearly the 
optimality approach, as illustrated through Dennett and Plato, according to which the 
function of an object is determined by considering what it is optimal for. 
From the above quotation we may also infer that Patterson rejects the legitimacy 
of the user approach to function ascription treated earlier according to which the inten-
tions—or needs—of a user will ground the ascription of function. Again, in order to de-
fend this rejection, he appeals to presumably shared intuitions from the case of the me-
chanic (Patterson, 2011, p. 7): 
To return to the example of the mechanic, our mechanic's motivations for using the 
wrench could be highly variable. He may have chosen the wrench because it was 
heavier, or longer or sturdier, than anything else he had ready to hand for the job of 
beating back into place the inconveniently bent piece of body work. He might have 
chosen it because he thought it to be lucky, or because he thought his hammer to 
be unlucky, or simply because he was too lazy to go back into his garage to get the 
proper tool for the job. Here again, however, notice that the possible motives our 
man may have for using the wrench in the way that he does say nothing about what 
the purpose or function of wrenches is. Similarly, the effects of his using the wrench 
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as a hammer should not deter us from speaking of the function of wrenches—even 
if he is successful in his “aberrant” usage of the tool, or if his usage is systematic 
in some way (e.g., if he always does this, or if it's quite a common thing to do). 
In other words, what the wrench is being used for—even what the mechanic might in a 
sense need the wrench for—is for Patterson not a consideration that should play a role in 
determining the function of wrenches. So for Patterson, it will not do to appeal to the 
needs or intentions of a user to ground a function ascription. 
In another place (p. 10), Patterson phrases his approach to function ascription in 
the following way: “Argumentation has a telos that it serves better than alternative modes 
of linguistic social interaction. This telos is its function.” What we see from this quotation 
is a clear example of optimality considerations. According to this line of reasoning, what-
ever argumentation does better, i.e. more optimally, than other modes of linguistic social 
interaction (communication) is its function. 
But while Patterson most obviously seems to appeal to optimality considerations 
in order to ground function, his article also contains passages that seem to indicate an 
etiological approach to function ascription. For, as Patterson points out, argumentation is 
a human practice that has existed for a long time, and it would therefore at least on first 
glance seem to be able to consistently produce some kind of effect that enables the con-
tinued survival of the practice of argumentation through generations (Patterson, 2011, p. 
14): 
Argumentation then, it seems clear, has persisted side-by-side with apparent func-
tional alternatives for some time without waning as a practice. Not only has argu-
mentation held its own, it has developed into more and more sophisticated varia-
tions over time, many of which are represented in the different disciplinary and 
theoretical orientations that comprise the contemporary study of argumentation it-
self. Knowing as we do that when human beings retain a practice over a long period 
of time that there is usually an explanation that appeals to its ability to produce a 
certain socially desirable good or state of affairs, it seems that all this indicates that 
there is a good prima facie case that argumentation provides something to human 
beings that other forms of communication do not, or at least that other forms of 
communication do not provide as well. 
This passage reveals, in my estimation, the hybrid nature of Patterson’s approach to func-
tion ascription. The etiological element is clearly present in Patterson’s reasoning about 
the function of argumentation—he is trying to limit the scope of possible function ascrip-
tions by appealing to some effect that has caused the phenomenon to reproduce over time. 
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But he simultaneously and repeatedly emphasizes that from among these candidate ef-
fects we should be looking for a specific effect that argumentation is somehow optimal 
for producing. This effect, for Patterson, is rational doxastic coordination (ibid., p. 15): 
”The general good to which all these views conduce I shall call rational doxastic 
coordination. I maintain that it is the function of argumentation to produce this 
good.” 
Conclusion 
In sum, Patterson’s article reveals a hybrid approach to function ascription employing 
both etiology and optimality considerations. On balance, however, the optimality consid-
erations seem to feature most prominently, and so my contention here is that Patterson 
employs an optimality approach to function ascription—an approach that can be shown 
to have roots as far back as Plato. 
Further, we should note that Patterson does not proceed to derive specific evalu-
ative criteria based on his conception of the function of argumentation, but we may as-
sume that they would follow the same logic as Plato himself outlines (see Chapter 4). 
This means that the evaluative criteria would be closely connected to the virtues and vices 
of argumentation that would promote or hinder rational doxastic coordination. These vir-
tues and vices are not part of Patterson’s argument (as Patterson notes, “considerations 
of time and the reader's patience forbid the extensive digression it would take to even 
begin such a discussion in this paper”), but this need not delay us here. Our main interest 
was in seeing exemplified a fourth approach to function ascription, and in Patterson’s 
work we find just this. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
The evaluative dimension of rhetorical criticism is a broad and unwieldy topic. Given the 
modest amount of attention that has been paid to the foundational issues of this aspect of 
rhetorical criticism, any treatment of it is bound to raise as many questions as it hopefully 
answers. As noted by James Jasinski, rhetorical critics are still struggling to understand 
rhetorical quality. Hopefully, this dissertation has contributed to a better understanding 
of this thorny field of inquiry. 
There are four points on the agenda in this chapter. I will briefly recount the find-
ings of the various chapters, discuss some outstanding questions related to these findings, 
point to some avenues that future research about the evaluative dimension of rhetorical 
criticism could fruitfully explore, and finally offer some concluding remarks. 
Did practicing rhetorical critics actually evaluate? 
The historical part of the dissertation focused on tracing the contours of the decline of the 
evaluative dimension of rhetorical criticism. I argued, based on textual evidence, that the 
decline of the evaluative dimension postulated by scholars such as Jasinski, Olson, and 
Zarefsky could indeed be substantiated. Importantly, however, I also argued that there 
are passages in the literature suggesting that practicing rhetorical critics have not always 
focused on evaluating the rhetoric they have studied. This opens up an important avenue 
of historical-empirical investigation: If we bracket publications consisting mainly of 
meta-critical discussions of the aims of rhetorical criticism (which I focused on) and study 
instead actual examples of rhetorical criticism, to what extent will we find that practicing 
critics since Wichelns have actually evaluated rhetoric? Has evaluation been their pri-
mary concern, or has it been slighted or “timorously tacked on to the summary,” as 
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Baskerville lamented? Investigating this question would provide a different perspective 
on the development of the evaluative dimension than the one pursued in this dissertation. 
Given the importance repeatedly attributed to the evaluative dimension (especially from 
Wichelns’ seminal article in 1925 to the Wingspread Conference in 1971), investigating 
this question could lead to interesting insights about whether and to what extent the idea 
that rhetorical criticism ought to evaluate has actually been translated into practice. 
A more detailed explanation of the decline 
Such insights would, in my opinion, be valuable in their own right due to their potential 
to throw light on the trajectory of the reorientation of rhetorical criticism constituted by 
the decline of the evaluative dimension. But they might also be valuable for a different 
reason related to the explanation of the decline. Based on the developments in disciplines 
related to rhetorical criticism (mainly political theory and informal logic/argumentation 
theory), I have proposed an explanation for the decline based on the 1960s’ countercul-
ture, the decade’s revolt against established figures of authority and the simultaneous 
increase in demand for scholarly rigor. According to this explanation, the evaluative con-
ception of rhetorical criticism declined in part since it represented a paradigm of criticism 
identified with a previous generation, but also in part because it did not have the kind of 
rigorous basis needed to maintain the status as a respectable academic endeavor. It must 
of course be conceded that this explanation remains tentative, although the explanation 
seems to me to have more explanatory power than the narrative of professionalization 
offered by Nothstine, Blair, and Copeland (1994). If, however, a detailed historical-em-
pirical analysis of the evaluative dimension was to be carried out along the lines just 
proposed, such an analysis could contribute to testing and refining possible explanations 
for the decline. As I argued in Chapter 3, knowledge of this kind is useful for anyone who 
agrees that the evaluative dimension of rhetorical criticism deserves more attention, since 
such knowledge could point to theoretical and practical obstacles that would need to be 
overcome in order for evaluative criticism to flourish. In this dissertation I have focused 
on two such problems: the problem of the origin of evaluative criteria and the problem of 
the appropriateness of those criteria. These are problems that various rhetorical critics 
have identified as central and yet thorny, but many other such problems may of course 
be discovered, analyzed, and potentially solved on the basis of further historical-empiri-
cal inquiry. 
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Functional Goodness 
Apart from identifying the problems of criterial origin and appropriateness, the theoreti-
cal and methodological part introduced the Functional Goodness Intuition. According to 
this intuition, shared by a range of thinkers across disciplines from antiquity to the pre-
sent, the quality of objects depends in large part on their capacity to fulfil their function. 
But while I argued that the Functional Goodness Intuition does offer a preliminary solu-
tion to the problems of origin and appropriateness, it also contains its own difficulties. 
For even though intuitions about the function of an object are sometimes uncontroversial 
and therefore intersubjectively shared (and thus prima facie without need of further jus-
tification), this is certainly not always the case. This leads to the problem of function 
ascription, which I proposed could be addressed through case studies based on rational 
reconstructions of actual evaluative reasoning. 
Rational reconstructions 
The aim of the case studies presented in the dissertation was to reconstruct the implicit 
know-how of evaluative critics (operative intuitions, assumption, principles) in order to 
translate this knowledge into a form of ‘know-that.’ On the basis of the Functional Good-
ness Intuition, I argued that four different approaches to function ascription, each captur-
ing intuitions from the literature on functions, were operative in the evaluative reasoning 
of the four critics Herbert A. Wichelns, Christian Kock, J. Jeffery Auer, and Steven Pat-
terson. 
The reconstructions contribute to a better understanding the evaluative dimension 
by illustrating the explanatory force of the Functional Goodness Intuition as a common 
foundation for establishing evaluative criteria in rhetorical criticism, and also by showing 
how this common foundation may be actualized or realized in at least four different ways. 
By explicating possible foundations of evaluative criteria in this way by revealing simi-
larities and differences across evaluative critics, these findings contribute in toto to vin-
dicating the possibility of evaluative rhetorical criticism based on more than subjective 
inclinations or criteria inherited from ostensible experts of evaluation such as Aristotle or 
others. The case studies, however, also contribute in other, more subtle, ways. 
For example, the analyses reveal, in their totality, an interesting structure of eval-
uative reasoning consisting in the possibility of separating or disconnecting the Func-
tional Goodness Intuition and the act of function ascription. The four different case 
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studies presented in Chapters 6-9 rely on a formal concept of goodness connected to the 
concept of function regardless of the precise content or substance of this concept. This is 
rather abstract, but consider these political analogies: Two parties in a political debate 
might agree that ‘freedom’ is centrally important in a liberal society and that it should be 
prioritized over every other issue. But this agreement is often merely formal; it can cover 
some very real substantive disagreements about what exactly constitutes ‘freedom.’66 Or, 
take the idea that ‘justice consists in giving each his/her due.’ Two people might agree 
on this principle without thereby necessarily agreeing how this principle is to be inter-
preted and implemented in specific cases.67 In other words, it is perfectly normal for two 
parties to agree on the formal level while disagreeing on the substantive level.68 I suggest 
that the case studies in toto reveal that this formal/substantive ambiguity is also present 
in the structure of evaluative reasoning analyzed in Chapter 6-9: Critics may agree that 
goodness is intimately related to the concept of function while subscribing to different 
conceptions of function. 
Should we be surprised to see this pluralism of conceptions of function among 
critics? I would answer this question in the negative. The four conceptions of function 
that I claim to be operative in Chapters 6-9 are not my inventions. They are commonly 
found intuitions, and their diversity reflect the current situation in the literature on func-
tions. Even though some conceptions of function are more widely accepted than others, 
there remains a fundamental disagreement among prominent function theorists regarding 
the proper understanding of function. It is true that impressive attempts have been made 
both inside and outside the core literature on functions to show that certain conceptions 
of function are superior to others, or that certain overarching conceptions of function can 
incorporate and explain the diverse intuitions about functions that, on the surface, make 
                                               
66 Isaiah Berlin’s (1969) famous notions of positive vs. negative liberty come to mind as an example of this; 
George Lakoff’s (2006) (somewhat) polemical division of freedom into a progressive and a conservative 
conception is another case. 
67 Incidentally, the realization of the formal nature of the concept of justice was what set off Chaïm Perelman 
on his course of reconstructing discursive techniques aimed at increasing adherence of those to whom the 
techniques are presented (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969). In his The Idea of Justice and the Problem 
of Argument (Perelman, 1963, p. 16), he says: “We can, then, define formal or abstract justice as a principle 
of action in accordance with which beings of one and the same essential category must be treated in the 
same way. Be it noted at once that the definition we have just offered is of a purely formal idea, leaving 
untouched and entire all the differences that arise in respect of concrete justice.” 
68 Thayer (1964, p. 309) distinguishes in a similar fashion between ‘vacuous’ and ‘filled-in’ use of functional 
language in Plato’s Republic. 
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a unified conception impossible (see, e.g., Harder, 1996, pp. 88-104; Harder & Kock, 
2016). These discussions have arguably been ongoing for at least the past 80 years since 
Carl Gustav Hempel published his article on “The Logic of Functional Analysis” (1959), 
and disagreements about function ascription have existed for much longer, since even 
Plato and Aristotle seemed to disagree on how to ascribe functions to objects.69 
And the reason why this pluralism is not surprising is that function theorists, gen-
erally speaking, are interested in explicating the pre-theoretical intuitions about function 
that can be found among ordinary language users. And so, if a multitude of conceptions 
of function can be found among these users (just like a multitude of conceptions of free-
dom can be found among citizens), despite the best and most creative efforts of function 
theorists hoping to one day arrive at a unified theory of function with a formal and precise 
definition, such a feat would conflict with empirical reality which at the moment just is 
pluralistic regarding function conceptions, just like empirical reality is pluralistic regard-
ing conceptions of freedom, justice, fraternity, equality, and so on. 
Nevertheless, we may assume that each of the theorists analyzed in this disserta-
tion would maintain that their specific conception of function and the accompanying ap-
proach to function ascription is somehow more appropriate than other rival conceptions 
and approaches. Wichelns, for instance, is not satisfied with a kind of modus vivendi with 
literary critics regarding function ascription. He maintains that his criteria are more ap-
propriate than theirs when it comes to oratorical artifacts (he even maintains that literary 
riteria are inappropriate for oratorical artifacts), and this position would seem to ulti-
mately rest on the premise that his approach to function ascription is more appropriate 
than theirs. Similarly, Christian Kock does not merely claim that his proposed function 
of deliberation and debate is one possible function among a list of acceptable functions; 
rather, he would seem to claim that his proposed function is more appropriate than other 
rival functions. And again, Patterson presents his function of argumentation as a more 
appropriate proposal than other rival proposals. These positions amount to what we might 
call “strong appropriateness claims”, i.e., claims that entail that one possible function is 
more appropriate than another possible function. A valuable future research project could 
consider the extent to which reasons or principles are used in such cases to justify strong 
appropriateness claims. 
                                               
69 As we saw in Chapter 9, Plato subscribes to an optimality approach, whereas Aristotle, at least in his 
discussion of the ergon of man, invokes considerations of uniqueness rather than optimality. 
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A concern about rational reconstruction 
Finally, in discussing the analytical part of the dissertation, I want to address a concern 
about rational reconstruction and my attempt to translate know-how into a more precise 
know-that. The concern is driven by the idea that rhetorical criticism should always be 
guided by a kind of unfettered critical sensibility in the critic, who when confronting the 
object of criticism, should not let pre-existing methods or theories control the process of 
critical discovery (see e.g., Black, 1980). The ultimate example of such a ‘controlled crit-
ical discovery’ would be the familiar idea of ‘cookie-cutter criticism.’ 
To some readers it may seem that this dissertation is on some level an attempt to 
reduce (part of) the evaluative dimension to a formula when any formula will of necessity 
do injustice to the multifarious modes, strategies, and perspectives that evaluation can 
and should be open to. It may seem that the various competences of a good critic—being 
able to invent appropriate terms, construct novel arguments, forge convincing interpreta-
tions, and generally judge matters not susceptible to algorithmic rules—cannot be devel-
oped or promoted (and may even be harmfully circumscribed) by attempts to explicate 
these competences. 
This kind of concern directed specifically at projects of rational reconstruction has, 
in fact, been described by the eminent philosopher of science Abraham Kaplan in his 
classic work The Conduct of Inquiry (1964/1998). Kaplan does not use the terms know-
how and know-that, but he does make a similar distinction between ‘logic-in-use’ and 
‘reconstructed logic’ (ibid., pp. 8-11): 
Scientists and philosophers use a logic—they have a cognitive style which is more 
or less logical—and some of them also formulate it explicitly. I call the former the 
logic-in-use, and the latter the reconstructed logic. […] [L]ogic-in-use may precede 
and be superior to its own reconstruction. This reminder is true not only of the 
logic-in-use in everyday life but of the logic-in-use in science as well. Newton and 
his followers made excellent use of the calculus in physics, despite the astute criti-
cisms of its foundations made by Bishop Berkeley, criticisms which were not sat-
isfactorily met till the reconstruction by Weierstrass some two hundred years later. 
Conversely, a reconstruction may become, or at any rate influence, the logic-in-
use. […] The great danger of confusing logic-in-use with a particular reconstructed 
logic, an especially a highly idealized one, is that thereby the autonomy of science 
is subtly subverted. The normative force of the logic has the effect, not necessarily 
of improving the logic-in-use, but only of bringing it into closer conformity with 
the imposed reconstruction. […] When the reconstruction is mathematically ele-
gant, precise, and powerful […] its attractions are nearly irresistible. But the crucial 
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question concerns, not the intrinsic virtues of the reconstructed logic taken in itself, 
but rather its usefulness in illuminating the logic-in-use. 
The quotation from Kaplan illustrates the concern about the general project of reconstruc-
tion that some readers might have. But while the concern is understandable (perhaps es-
pecially because much neo-Aristotelian rhetorical criticism, for a while at least, was un-
doubtedly too formulaic), I do not think its significance should be overstated. In fact, the 
project of reconstruction undertaken in the analytical part of this dissertation may be seen 
as an attempt to bring even more pluralism into critical practice. A motivating premise 
behind this dissertation has been the observation that rhetorical critics too often refrain 
from evaluation and too often limit themselves to the remaining dimensions of rhetorical 
criticism. And while I do not wish to claim that these other dimensions are not important, 
relevant, etc., I do wish to propose that evaluative criticism contains unique potentials 
that go beyond those of descriptive-explanatory criticism. 
At the same time, though, I agree with Kaplan that logic-in-use may frequently be 
superior to reconstructed logic. And it is therefore important to always regard reconstruc-
tions as tentative or, in Habermas’ words, hypothetical. In the last analysis, critics possess 
an autonomy and an understanding of the world-at-large that they must never allow to be 
subverted or restricted by even the most convincing model or rational reconstruction. The 
critic may use ready-made rational reconstructions to guide their own criticism, just like 
a speaker intending to apologize may glean inspiration from, say, Ware and Linkugel 
(1973)’s reconstruction of apologia. But in the end, a given reconstruction will almost 
always be less-than-exhaustive of the relevant principles underlying a particular prac-
tice—be that evaluation,  apologia or logical thinking, and so the competent subject will 
need to make choices without any guidance. 
Further case studies that may extend our understanding of function 
Even though concrete reconstructions have their limitations, it is important to recognize 
that reconstructions can be improved upon and extended. This is part of their hypothetical 
status alluded to by Habermas. And one way to increase our understanding of the evalu-
ative dimension is simply to continue along the lines laid out in this dissertation, i.e., to 
study actual cases of evaluative reasoning from rhetorical critics. One way to catalogue 
a collection of such cases would be to undertake the historical-empirical investigation 
proposed above. If, upon conducting such an investigation, it turned out that practicing 
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rhetorical critics have paid serious attention to the evaluative dimension, then such an 
investigation should provide a much more exhaustive and systematic list of suggestions 
for further case studies that I can offer here. Nevertheless, here are five case studies that 
would contribute to our understanding of the evaluative dimension of rhetorical criticism. 
One such case study would be a reconstruction of Edwin Black’s analysis and 
evaluation of the Coatesville Address (Black, 1965/1978). What makes Black’s evalua-
tion of the Coatesville Address interesting from the point of view of this dissertation is 
that Black’s evaluation is clearly positive—even laudatory—despite the speech being de-
livered in front of an audience comprised of less than a handful of people. If the Func-
tional Goodness Intuition is operative in Black’s evaluative reasoning, what then could 
be the function that this speech fulfilled? What could Black’s approach to function as-
cription be? At first glance, it would seem that Black does not employ a designer approach 
to function ascription (this was effectively the kind of evaluative reasoning that Black 
scorned the Neo-Aristotelian critics for employing). Nor does he seem to be employing 
a user approach to function ascription, since the audience is almost non-existing. There 
are, as we have seen, other approaches to function ascription that Black might have em-
ployed in his evaluation. Regardless, reconstructing Black’s evaluation of the Coatesville 
Address would, in my estimation, amount to an improvement or augmentation of the 
approaches to function ascription presented in this dissertation. It would expand our un-
derstanding of function ascription or it might provide an example of a kind of evaluative 
reasoning not susceptible to analysis through the Functional Goodness Intuition. 
A second interesting case study would be a rational reconstruction of the two 
competing evaluations of Nixon’s 1969 “Vietnamization Speech” by Karlyn Kohrs 
Campbell and Forbes Hill respectively (K. K. Campbell, Hill, Thompson, & Black, 
1972). Since Campbell and Hill reach radically difference evaluative conclusions (Camp-
bell’s verdict is clearly negative whereas Hill’s is clearly positive), the two critics would 
seem to be employing different approaches to function ascription (if, that is, we hypoth-
esize that they are both basing their evaluations on the Functional Goodness Intuition). 
What could those approaches be? Answering this question would expand our understand-
ing of the problem of function ascription. 
  A third highly relevant case study for reconstructing evaluative reasoning would 
focus on ideological criticism (e.g., McGee, 1980; Wander, 1983). To what extent can 
ideological criticism be said to rely on the Functional Goodness Intuition, and to what 
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extent can evaluative criteria employed by ideological critics be appropriately understood 
as originating from a perceived function of rhetoric? There are several reasons why such 
a case study would be interesting. First, in current rhetorical criticism, ideological criti-
cism is arguably among the mainstream approaches. As such, a study of ideological crit-
icism would certainly be a welcome addition to the four case studies conducted in Chap-
ters 6-9. Second, ideological criticism presents a challenge to the Functional Goodness 
Intuition and the problem of function ascription in the following sense: All four case 
studies share the common characteristic that they ascribe a positive function to the artifact 
in question; in other words they point to an effect or capacity that the artifact ought to 
have. But ideological criticism seems to work in the opposite direction. It seems to point 
to an effect or capacity (typically something along the lines of maintaining the status quo) 
that an artifact ought not to have. Whether and how this kind of “negative” function as-
cription can be analyzed from the perspective of functions remains to be seen. 
A fourth case study would consist in an analysis of Lloyd F. Bitzer’s classic essay 
on “The Rhetorical Situation” (1968) from the perspective of function ascription. In the 
essay, Bitzer repeatedly talks about functions, but it is not entirely clear to me that his 
conception of function is compatible with the four conceptions presented in Chapter 6-9. 
For instance, Bitzer tells us that he regards discourse as rhetorical “insofar as it functions 
(or seeks to function) as a fitting response to a situation which needs and invites it.” In 
using the term “seek,” Bitzer is using the kind of intentional language that on first ap-
proximation would place him in the same category as Wichelns, but in using the term 
“need,” Bitzer is signaling an understanding of function closer to that of Christian Kock. 
But, ultimately, neither of these two approaches to function ascription appear acceptable 
to Bitzer, as he intimates when he writes of those who eulogized John F. Kennedy: 
One cannot say that the situation is the function of the speaker's intention, for in 
this case the speakers' intentions were determined by the Situation. One cannot say 
that the rhetorical transaction is simply a response of the speaker to the demands or 
expectations of an audience, for the expectations of the audience were themselves 
keyed to a tragic historic fact. 
So Bitzer’s approach to function does not seem compatible with an approach to function 
ascription that begins from considerations of the designer’s intention, nor one that begins 
from considerations of user needs. Instead, the function of a rhetorical artifact, for Bitzer, 
is clearly related to his concept of situation. But how far will the concept of situation take 
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us in ascribing functions to a rhetorical artifact? Investigating this question would perhaps 
lead to yet another approach to function ascription. 
The fifth and final type of case study to be mentioned here would undertake an 
analysis of the relationship between genre and function. Generic criticism as this is un-
derstood in the field of rhetorical criticism historically connects with evaluation. But the 
connection between genre and function ascription does not seem to have received a thor-
ough analysis as of yet. 
Concluding remarks 
Further discussion points and additional indications of future research could be adduced. 
The evaluative dimension is a vast topic, even when delimited to the problems of origin 
and appropriateness of evaluative criteria. But the above will be sufficient, I think, to 
make clear some of the most central findings of this dissertation. But one more thing 
should be noted: An important motivating factor behind this dissertation is my hope that 
the evaluative dimension will one day transform its decline into an ascent. This does not 
mean, however, that I am advocating a return to a situation (regrettably not entirely ficti-
tious) where evaluative critics consisted primarily of white, middle-aged men who saw it 
as their duty to report to the world their personal opinions about some unsuspecting rhe-
torical artifact. And this is all the more true to the extent that such a situation would lead 
to primarily negative evaluations following the comical, but realistic, critical model of  
“leaving no turn unstoned.” (to reuse an apt phrase allegedly from George Bernhard 
Shaw). In short, I am not hoping for a return to a situation where rhetorical criticism is 
understood as basically little more than the public expression of private taste. 
What I am hoping will happen is an increase of the exercise of reasoned judgment 
informed by rigorous evaluative argument. What I am advocating is for rhetorical critics 
to increasingly practice, study, and theorize the very kinds of discourse that they often 
find most interesting as objects for rhetorical criticism; namely the evaluative, value-
laden, action-oriented discourse. I concede that I have not provided an enactment of such 
evaluative rhetorical criticism here. But I hope to have shown the possibility of undertak-
ing this kind of criticism by showing ways in which evaluative criteria—the most funda-
mental components of evaluative criticism—may be established and their appropriate-
ness justified. 
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I opened this dissertation with a quotation by Wayne C. Booth: “No critical judg-
ments can be more complicated than trying to distinguish good rhetoric from bad.” (2004, 
p. 39). At this point, it seems fitting to return to a related point made by Booth. In his 
essay “Why Ethical Criticism Fell on Hard Times” (1988) Booth describes an imaginary 
and somewhat embarrassing conversation with “one of the great critics of the past”, Sam-
uel Johnson. As Booth and Johnson sit down to discuss the state of current critical culture, 
Johnson is immediately impressed by the seemingly endless outpouring of literary criti-
cism. “Surely”, Samuel Johnson exclaims excitedly, “this must be a marvelous civiliza-
tion, if it can produce each year thousands of books and journals devoted to scholarship 
and criticism centered on the finest flowers of human history.” And since Booth under-
stands that Johnson’s main critical interest was always “the systematic effort to appraise 
the worth of literary works, the achievement of their periods, the quality of their works,” 
he is not surprised when Johnson asks hopefully to see examples of this kind of criticism. 
Booth, feeling a bit on the defensive, quickly hands Johnson some of the publications that 
claim to do serious reviewing: The Times [London] Literary Supplement, The New York 
Times Book Review, The Atlantic, The American Scholar, The New Yorker, and so on. 
After speed-reading about a dozen reviews, Johnson looks increasingly troubled and turns 
to Booth (ibid., p. 278): 
“Sir, you have not understood. Here, indeed, I find a plenitude of improvised judg-
ments. Praise and blame flow freely in these journals, as freely as they did in the 
coffee houses of my time. On these two pages of this journal that you call TLS, for 
example, I find many confident snap judgments. But the criteria, sir, the criteria 
strike me as not among those that either a thinking man or a learned man would 
dare to express or choose to defend. And in any case, they are not defended, merely 
asserted.” 
Booth, now even more on the defensive, produces a selection of acclaimed critical jour-
nals. After browsing them, only to find still more improvised judgments, Johnson tries 
again: 
“Perhaps you can tell me where I might find a discussion of the principles underly-
ing such judgments? […] I here again find a great pile of judgments, mostly ill-
disguised as history, description, or interpretation. But where are the arguments?” 
Samuel Johnson’s challenge pertains to the evaluative criticism of literature. But it ap-
plies, I think, equally to rhetorical criticism. The challenge is a request for an academic 
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discussion of principles underlying judgments of quality. Providing such a discussion has 
been the agenda of the present dissertation: Where do evaluative criteria of rhetorical 
critics come from, and how can their appropriateness be justified? 
To mangle a phrase by Stanley Fish (1980, p. 356), there was a time when evalu-
ation was the only game in town for rhetorical critics; when anything worthy of the label 
‘rhetorical criticism’ had to include an evaluative dimension. To be sure, practicing critics 
may not always have followed this doctrine, and those who did perhaps sometimes pro-
duced improvised judgments based on little more than subjective preferences hardly ca-
pable of meeting reasonable demands of academic rigor. But the evaluative ambition of 
rhetorical criticism was always present. 
The situation now seems quite different. The evaluative dimension of rhetorical 
criticism seems to be on the decline, even while other disciplines recognize the value and 
importance of cultivating an understanding and appreciation of normative scholarship. 
Normative scholarship is difficult. Evaluation involves considerations of values 
and quality, and these remain notoriously slippery concepts. Nonetheless, on another 
level, quality is often uncontroversial and obvious. We all simply recognize it when we 
are exposed to it, almost viscerally, like cold and heat. Quality is familiar to all of us; we 
feel it when we encounter it. The problem is that we do not feel the same way about the 
same object. And this is when feeling becomes insufficient and understanding becomes 
necessary. But really understanding quality with our minds is a problem caught between 
subjectivity and intersubjectivity. Perhaps reconstructing our capacity for evaluation is 
ultimately an impossible task, since some irreducibly subjective element will always re-
main. Such a reconstruction is an attempt to translate a seemingly largely visceral phe-
nomenon into something intellectual, and perhaps there is no method of translation that 
will be without remainder. But that, I think, is no reason not to make the attempt. Our 
ability to understand and explain quality is one of important tasks on the grand human 
agenda. 
And there is evidence that it is at least possible to travel some of the way towards 
this goal. For when we disagree with others about the value of some object, and securing 
the adherence of these others seems to us sufficiently important, we may try to persuade 
them about the quality of the object in question. We have argumentative resources to 
attempt this feat regardless of whether it involves the quality of a movie, poem, speech, 
opera, the character of a person, a political proposal, or a course of action. And we do so 
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almost on a daily basis. We evaluate. We attempt to make ourselves or others see and 
understand the quality or its absence in things that seem to us worthy of evaluative judg-
ment. 
But how do we argue for quality? How do we attempt to persuade someone whose 
intuitions about quality seem to differ from ours? What are the argumentative resources 
that we employ in order to make others see or even feel things our way? What, in these 
cases, are the available means of persuasion? This dissertation provides a beginning of 
an answer to these questions. To be sure, much more could be said. Therefore, this dis-
sertation is also a call for a renewed attention to the evaluative dimension of rhetorical 
criticism. This dimension is intimately connected with the historical roots and the societal 
importance of rhetoric. As such it deserves a better fate than that of a story of decline.  
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